


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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

USSR-FRG To Build Cranes, Convert SS-20 Chassis

24000095 Prague ZAPISNIK in Czech 18 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by Pavel Frcek: "Cranes Instead of Missiles"]

[Text] Mobile missile launcher chassis of the Soviet medium-range missiles RSD-10 with (Western designation SS-20) earmarked for liquidation on the basis of the Soviet-American treaty, will be rebuilt by a joint Soviet-West German firm as heavy mobile cranes.

The information was provided by the Soviet publication TRUD. It reported that what only a few years ago would be considered impossible, will become a reality in a few months.

Last September, the Odessa Heavy Engineering Production Association and a West German engineering firm Liebherr from Ehingen in Baden-Wuerttemberg founded a joint enterprise which plans to undertake a number of engineering projects. As early as this year it will produce several dozen modern mobile cranes with a capacity of 45 and 60 tons. The first serially produced models of the joint production will be seen at the international engineering exhibit which will open on 25 May 1988 in Moscow.

At the February session of the joint enterprise management, the Soviet partner proposed the reuse of special chassis (self-propelled wheel base and body) of the mobile launchers for SS-20 intermediate range missiles. The West German partner immediately accepted the Soviet proposal. The intention is to develop unique heavy mobile cranes equipped with telescopic lifting arms with a capacity of up to 140 tons. The crane is to operate under conditions of extreme temperatures from plus 40 to minus 40 degrees of Celsius. Both partners agreed that the Soviet specialists will supply the design in such way that the first two test prototypes could be completed this year. According to the Duesseldorf daily UNSERE ZEIT [a communist daily] the spokesman for Liebherr indicated that the contract is worth DM 1.8 million [West]. The Ehingen specialists will first rebuild two missile tractors into truck cranes and if they pass all necessary operational tests, a serial production will be started. That will take place in the new plant being built jointly by the West German crane builder Liebherr and the Soviet heavy crane manufacturer on the Black Sea Coast near Odessa.

The USSR defense minister, general of the army D. T. Yazov, said in February of this year that the auxiliary technology left over after the liquidation of the medium and shorter range missiles will be used in the engineering industry of [the Soviet] economy. The Odessa and Ehingen machine engineers intent to implement those words into specific action. The design work on the "swords into plowshares" project was started even

before the ratification of the Soviet-American treaty on liquidation of the medium and shorter range missiles signed in Washington in December 1987. Any holdup in the process of ratification would, of course, mean a holdup in the implementation of the praiseworthy Soviet-West German intention of changing the missile transporters into unique auto cranes.

Details of Slovak Believers' Manifestation Revealed

23000065 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 30 Mar 88 p 6

[Article by Ota Filip: "Bratislava's 'Good Friday'"]

[Text] In recent months, more than 400,000 CSSR citizens have signed a petition calling upon the government to at last permit the Church to appoint reliable bishops to the 10 bishoprics that have been vacant for years—three of them for 38 years. The Prague Government feels itself threatened by this petition which also includes the citizens' demand for freedom of religion and the observance of human and civil rights. After its 40-year war on the Catholic Church, the government had no longer expected so much civic courage.

On 10 March, mathematician Frantisek Miklosko wrote a letter to the National Committee in Bratislava, advising it that, on 25 March, Bratislava Christians intended to assemble on Hviezdoslav Square from 1800-1830 hours, to pray for the appointment of 10 bishops, the restitution of religious freedom and full civil and human rights in the CSSR. The authorities promptly banned this demonstration. Invitations for participation in the peaceful demonstration were nevertheless put on the noticeboards of churches in Pressburg and surroundings. An anonymous writer added a rider to this notice in one of the churches, declaring in large letters: "He who waits until someone gives him freedom, is not worthy of it!"

The Slovak Government in Bratislava responded with even greater irritation to the banned demonstration. It caused newspapers, the radio and television broadcasts to talk a great deal about so-called religious freedom, stating that the government was also interested in appointing bishops to the five sees in Slovakia and the five in Bohemia and Moravia. While this appeasement campaign was in full swing, the secret police began to hit out hard: All colleges in Bratislava were given a holiday on Friday, 25 March. Students at the College for Economics were explicitly warned that anybody caught on Hviezdoslav Square at 1800 hours on Friday would be expelled from the college. Students at the faculty of mathematics and physics were made to sign the following: I am aware that the demonstration on 25 March will be of an antisocialist nature; that is why I will not attend it.

The day before the planned demonstration, the Austrian Bishops' Conference asked the Czechoslovak Government to respect the wishes of 400,000 religious believers

in Czechoslovakia, while many priests in Austria called on their congregations to pray for the Slovaks at 18.00 hours on 25 March. This caused the authorities in Bratislava to change their propaganda tune: The planned demonstration was now said to be the result of a provocation by Western emigres and controlled by the American transmitters "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe."

In the evening of 24 March, Mrs Coufalova from the Moravian village Kostelec went on the air on "Radio Free Europe." She is the mother of certified engineer and underground priest Premysl Coufal who was murdered in Bratislava in 1981 under still mysterious circumstances. She called on believers in Czechoslovakia to pray for the Slovaks at 1800 hours on Friday.

Preparations for dealing with the demonstration in Bratislava began on Thursday. Citizens employed on shift work and suspected of being Church activists had their Friday working hours changed so that they had to be at work at 1800 hours. The fire brigade was mobilized and, together with street cleaning vehicles, sent to an air strip to practice water cannon attacks.

A regiment of the auxiliary police from Pezinok near Bratislava was moved into the city. The traffic police suddenly proclaimed a "Traffic Safety Day," to be held on Friday in Bratislava and surroundings. Beginning on Thursday, all cars and buses driving to the Slovak capital were subjected to checks. City hospitals were asked to keep stored blood in readiness for Friday.

On Friday some 2,000 believers from Bratislava and vicinity assembled on Hviezdoslav Square, in front of the opera house. Many came from far away. According to estimates, 10-15,000 people did not manage to get through. Numerous vehicles equipped with water cannons circled the market square from 1600 hours on. At about 1745 hours they began to splash water on the people. The believers assembled in the center of the square, holding lit candles and singing first the national anthem, then the papal hymn. Later they prayed. Police vehicles, with sirens blaring, attacked the people. Agents provocateurs made as if to attack the police vehicles, but when the police proceeded to launch a "counterattack," they hit out just as lustily as the uniformed police. Most of the faithful stood firm. At 1830 hours, they disbanded peacefully, sang hymns and shook each others' hands. "We've made it, we held out for half an hour!"

Some 100 people were arrested on Hviezdoslav Square and in adjoining streets and interrogated until late at night. Residents of Bratislava and vicinity, who had attended the demonstration, later reported to their friends in the West: "The most wonderful thing was that people had lost their fear of the totalitarian system. It was quite evident how much a totalitarian state must fear that its citizens will no longer be afraid of it."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

West German Journal on 17 January GDR Demonstration

23000069 Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in German Mar 88 pp 227-232

[Article by Ilse Spittmann: "The 17th of January and Its Consequences"]

[Text] "The concern here is not with the wallpaper nor the color of the wall. The concern is with the ghosts in the basement, the skeletons in the closet, the foul odors that need airing out. That will be the real topic of the debate in the coming years." (Stefan Heym, ZDF, 3 January 1988)

"The law decides who is an offender, and if eating bread were to be legally banned in the GDR tomorrow, we would be an entire country full of criminals." (Monika Maron, ZEITMAGAZIN, No 8/1988)

"He will be set free: Everybody will be set free. There is no room anymore, there are too many of them." (Premiere of Brecht's "The Mother" at the Berlin Ensemble Theater on 10 February 1988. Prison guards talking about the arrest of Pawel, arousing the laughter of the audience at the premiere.)

17 January 1988 will go down in history not only as the result of the largest mass arrest operation in the more recent history of the GDR, but also due to the manifestation of a new self-confidence among the people, a manifestation that brought the changes in the country's psychology into sharp focus. It was a day when the hope for change was initially buried once more, but also a day when a little more than 100 people caused the state powers to demonstrate its inability to have a dialog with its own youth.

Arrests, Sentences, Deportations

Independent human rights groups intended to join in the traditional East Berlin memorial march on the anniversary of the murders of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and they wished to bring along their own slogans. For their homemade banners they chose quotations from Rosa Luxemburg: "Freedom always means the freedom of those who think differently," and "He who does not move, does not feel his fetters." Others intended to draw attention to their unsuccessful attempts to emigrate. Their project was known, the would-be participants had told friends and acquaintances in East and West Berlin as well as Western media correspondents—in fact they sought publicity. To prevent this from happening, the state security organs had, for some days prior, tried a strategy mixing threats, promises and deportations. Some 150 people were urged to give written assurances that they would not attend the demonstration. The majority of the would-be demonstrators did not manage to get through to Frankfurt Gate

(the assembly point); they were arrested at home or on the way to the assembly point. This is what happened to songwriter Stephan Krawczyk who carried a banner protesting professional bans in the GDR.

Fourteen families who had waited several years for permission to emigrate, were made to leave the country within 24 hours, other applicants were kept away from the memorial march by the promise that it would shortly be their turn. Those who did get to Frankfurt Gate, were arrested when they unfolded their banners and taken to Rummelsburg prison (a total of more than 100).

Most were released quickly. Those who had applied for emigration were deported to the FRG directly from prison. Family members followed them soon after. On 25 January, five would-be emigrants received prison sentences of up to 14 months. To deter others, an example was made of the civil rights spokesmen who wished to remain in the GDR. Freya Klier, Stephan Krawczyk's wife and professional partner, had published an appeal for the release of her husband and asked West German artists to manifest their solidarity. Thereupon she also was arrested, on 25 January. Other well known human rights activists were taken to jail the same day: Vera Wollenberger, one of the initiators of the "church from below" and of the admonitory vigils in Zion Church, who last year took the chief editor of the FDJ newspaper JUNGE WELT to court for slander and libel, because he had equated the admonitory vigils in the church with the neo-Nazi skinheads. Also taken into custody were members of the peace and human rights initiative such as Ralf Hirsch, the couple Wolfgang and Regina Templin, the painter Barbel Bohley and her associate Werner Fischer. Andreas Kalk, Bert Schlegel and Till Boettcher, all working for the environmental library, had already been taken to prison with Krawczyk on 17 January. These eight refused to emigrate. On 1 February, Kalk, Schlegel and Boettcher received 6 month prison sentences for "attempted rioting." According to an ADN report dated 25 January, the others were also accused of "treasonable connections," carrying the threat of a long jail sentence, although such an offense is not listed in the penal code. Vera Wollenberg, initially also indicted for "rowdyism," was given 6 months on 28 January, "for the proven attempt to participate in a riot."

As they had done in last November, the Berlin-Brandenburg Evangelical Church leadership, in particular Bishop Gottfried Forck, consistory president Manfred Stolpe and synod president Manfred Becker, endeavored to get the prisoners released. They hired Wolfgang Vogel, the successful East Berlin attorney, to represent the interests of those willing to emigrate; GDR attorneys Wolfgang Schnur and de Maiziere handled the affairs of those who preferred to remain in the GDR.

On 11 February all were released, although not in the GDR as requested by the eight human rights activists. Bert Schlegel who had already applied for emigration

before, Stephan Krawczyk and Freya Klier who had signed an application in jail, were deprived of their GDR citizenship on 2 February and deported to the FRG. The couple Templin, Barbel Bohley and Werner Fischer followed them on 6 February, with a GDR travel passport and the promise that they would be able to return to the GDR after 6 months. Vera Wollenberger arrived in the FRG on 9 February. She, too, retained her GDR citizenship and, with her husband and two children, accepted an invitation by the Archbishop of Canterbury to take a "sabbatical" in England. Till Boettcher and Andreas Kalk were released in the GDR. On 10 and 11 February, four young people were deprived of their citizenship and deported to the FRG. They had begun a hunger strike for the prisoners on 20 January: Steffen Telschow, Sven Ertl, Peter Wiswede and Holger Knot were initially supposed to be tried on 11 February. The indictment spoke of a breach of public order and unlawful contacts with the Western media. Confronted with a choice between up to 5 years in jail or deportation, they chose the latter. They also were put on a train directly from prison, without a change of clothes or money.

Voluntary or Not?

In Bethel on 3 February, a public controversy erupted after the first appearance of the Krawczyks. It concerned the question of whether there had been compulsion with regard to the application for emigration. On Tuesday, 2 February, attorney Vogel had announced that all those arrested would be freed at the weekend, and that they could choose whether they wished to be released in the West or in the GDR. At that time the Krawczyks were already in the West and at first refused any statement. They issued a denial only when East Berlin ecclesiastical sources said that they had both signed in the presence of Bishop Forck and done so voluntarily and for personal reasons. They asserted that they had been confronted only with the alternatives of long years in prison or emigration. No free decision was possible inside prison walls. Attorney Schnur and President Becker reproached both of them that their statement had made it harder to obtain the release of the others. Attorney Vogel resigned his brief, an action interpreted as a protest against Krawczyk. However, his resignation assumed a very different aspect when almost all those who had wanted to be released in the GDR were later made to leave for the West, too. In Dresden, on 13 February, Bishop Forck publicly stated that he had been misled by the authorities. He had been explicitly assured that all those who wished to be released in the GDR would be able to remain there. In an interview on 26 February, Forck intimated that Honecker had been unable to prevail in the Politburo with the solemn promise made to Attorney Vogel. Stolpe mentioned two different lines among the leadership, which, so to speak, bisected the country and aroused the impression of alternately blowing hot and cold.

Who can possibly tell the magnitude of pressure in a prison cell, where interrogators and guards are the only source of news about the well-being of friends and

partners, where short meetings with attorneys and bishops are counteracted by the steady and refined psychological terror inflicted by the guards? "Think only of yourself, now, Mr Krawczyk. Freya also wants to go the West, and nobody will help you here. Mr. Forck may preach as much as he wants. In any case, the Church has long since distanced itself." (Juergen Fuchs, TAZ, 3 February)

Solidarity

Even last November's admonitory vigils in Zion Church showed that the young human rights activists were no longer quite so easily intimidated. Still, nobody had expected the tidal wave of expressions of solidarity. In the wake of 17 January, this united thousands not only in East Berlin but in other GDR cities also. They called for the release of the prisoners, tolerance, independent commitment and "breathing space." In East Berlin intercession services were held in the churches—a different church each day—where people prayed and discussed, and East Berlin served as a model for other cities. Up to 3,000 people were regular attendants at such services. A church contact bureau received many gifts of money and pledges of solidarity.

A protest statement of the environmental library said: "We simply will not stand for an absurdly constructed indictment, such as happened earlier in connection with the environmental library. If the GDR wishes to be accepted as a credible partner in the international dialogue, it will be able to achieve this only if the domestic legal system is adjusted to European standards."

On behalf of ten young writers, songwriters and artists, author Lutz Rathenow read a protest against the criminalization of literary, artistic and political actions. "We hope that it will not be left to the public prosecutor's office alone to decide what is useful and what harmful to the social development of the GDR."

Lyric poet Uwe Kolbe said: "The authorities are about to convert the GDR to a cemetery of independent thought."

Fifteen former GDR writers, including Sarah Kirsch, Wolf Biermann, Reiner Kunze, Erich Loest, Hans Joachim Schaedlich and Juergen Fuchs, spoke of the "GDR rulers' cold war against dissident natives." "We are not begging. Nor are we able to threaten, because we have no power. But we have a very long memory. And we have frank words and will use them in the struggle for the freedom of our friends in the GDR."

Reiner Kunze said that the prisoners had overlooked the fact "that a political system built on fear considers its very foundations imperiled when fear subsides." "Before I was deprived of my citizenship in spring 1977, I was told that a very senior body had pronounced: 'Let nobody imagine that he might make a new start like Kunze or Heym.' They have started again."

However, both human rights activists and church organizations are none too happy with a certain radicalization of the would-be emigres who are increasingly and publicly belligerent about their wishes while using protected church locations.

East Berlin General Superintendent Guenther Krusche had offered from his offices to look after and provide for the spiritual needs of citizens whose efforts to leave had hitherto been in vain. The office set aside for this purpose had to be shut down after only one day, because it could not cope with the onslaught of people who had mistaken the offer of spiritual help for concrete aid for emigration. Consistory President Stolpe appealed to the responsible agencies: "The Evangelical Church urgently requests the state to deal with the concerns of the applicants and to establish comprehensible and humanitarian rules."

Entirely against its will, the Evangelical Church in the GDR has been thrust into a situation that over and over again calls upon it to perform delicate balancing acts between its pastoral and social duties on the one hand and its preoccupation with political ends on the other. After all, its decision to be a church in society also means that it must adopt a stance in cases of social conflict. This, in turn, exposes it to political pressures both from the authorities and the citizens who seek its protection. The church has accepted this burden. Aside from some incidental wavering, a definite attitude has begun to emerge precisely in recent weeks: Compassion and assistance to those who are oppressed and also the effort to influence the state power to create such conditions as may be acceptable to all citizens. Another new phenomenon is the emergence of the Catholic Church from its chosen isolation and its commitment in society: "We will always have to seek ways and means for Catholic Christians in the social reality of the GDR not only to live their faith undisturbed, privately so to speak, but also how they may be involved in social responsibilities, in full accord with their consciences, oriented to the faith of the churches. It is one of our fond hopes for the social development of the GDR that such forms of expression and utterance may evolve as may be approached independent of party political ties." (Cardinal Joachim Meisner, bishop of Berlin, in a letter to priests and deacons, dated 1 February)

Exonerating Propaganda

Initially the GDR press published no reports at all about the events. The first article referring to them appeared in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and other newspapers on 26 January. This was a reprint from UNSERE ZEIT (UZ), the central organ of the West German DKP, of 23 January. This designated Roland Jahn, forcibly expelled from the GDR in 1983 and member of the Jena peace group, as the "switchboard for the technical and financial equipment of groups 'hostile to the regime' in the GDR." A letter addressed by Jahn to pertinent firms and asking for typewriters, copiers, video cassettes, and so on

for friends in the GDR, served as "evidence" of the Western "remote control" of the human rights movement in the GDR. "These go hand in hand: If it supplies the 'incident' at a 200,000 strong demonstration for peace and socialism, West Berlin knows about that before the event. Logically he who pays the piper, he who supplies the 'communication equipment,' decides what is going to be played and against whom. And of course there is a well functioning tie-up with the Western media. That is demonstrated by the new campaign against the GDR."

In the days that followed, the GDR press also used the DKP and the SEW to comment on Western reporting of the repressive measures adopted in East Berlin. The tenor was always the same: Human rights operations are controlled and directed from the West so as to discredit GDR peace policy. SEW chairman Horst Schmitt considered relations endangered by the "organized hate campaign" against the GDR: "Unless relations are to be further strained, it would be appropriate to expeditiously stop the flow of hatred and return to correct behavior. This is certainly in the best interest of West Berlin." (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 30/31 January)

At the end of January, GDR newspapers carried banner headlines describing the Federal Republic as the hotbed of travel bans, professional bans and social misery: "That Is What Happens at Their Borders: 13,607 Arrests, 65,189 Bans on Departure, 7,647 Expulsions, 128,715 Rejections," "World Public Opinion Demands the Abolition of Professional Bans in the Federal Republic," "Who, in the FRG, Protects Human Rights...Certainly Not the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution!" "Result of Unemployment in the FRG: Children Come to School Without Breakfast, Have Chills Because They Have no Stockings." At the beginning of February, headlines called for lifting the ban on the KPD—this demand being voiced by, among others, a member of the supervisory board of the DKP, the successor organization.

A campaign against West German media began on 32 February. Citing a Bavarian official of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, who had defected to the GDR, it was claimed that many reporters were "on the payroll of the FRG secret services" and deeply involved in "the creation of a GDR internal opposition." The correspondents accredited in the GDR were being misused with regard to news reports filed, and they were establishing connections "between such organisers of antisocialist actions as the secret service controlled Jahn, Faust, Fuchs, et al, and representatives of the so-called GDR opposition. The following day Erich Honecker took pains to assure FDP politician Count Lambsdorff that nothing would change in the working conditions of Western journalists in East Berlin. Nevertheless, these reports contained a definite threat that contacts between Western correspondents, the human rights movement in the GDR and former GDR citizens now living in West Berlin (such as the ones cited) could

be criminalized at any time. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND made that perfectly clear on 17 February in an editorial titled "Who Controls the So-called GDR Opposition?" "The discoveries and foolproof evidence described here are entirely convincing. They should therefore be taken seriously by all those concerned. At the same time they should be pondered by all those who still believe—for whatever motives—to have to commit themselves for these kinds of forces inside and outside our country."

The first Soviet reaction was to be found in a commentary by the TASS correspondent in East Berlin, dated 4 February (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 5 February), and it was followed by others. They all adopted the same line as the GDR papers and repeated their mistakes (for example the West Berlin "Glasnost Transmitter." In fact this is a monthly hour-long transmission by the left alternative Radio 100 private transmitter). These reports were particularly concerned to fend off the human rights activists' appeal to the Soviet reform movement and to certify the "legality" of the measures adopted against the "disruption of public order" by "elements hostile to the state." This is not surprising when we consider the Soviet response to national autonomy movements in the Baltic and Armenia.

The Party

The course of events since 17 January and a backward look to the preceding months appear to indicate a clash of opinions on the method for dealing with the popular unrest. One section probably advocated harsh measures by the security organs in order once and for all to finish with the insurgence. Others, mindful specially of the damage to foreign relations, may have advised restraint. This division is likely to date back to November last, and at that time the moderates prevailed fairly quickly. On 17 January, the hardliners had psychology on their side. The January march to Friedrichsfelde and the graves of the murdered revolutionary leaders has been sacred to every old communist for many decades—and the average age of Politburo members is around 65. Professor Kamnitzer, the 70-year-old president of GDR PEN, was full of indignation about this "sacrilege" (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 28 January) and certainly spoke for all of them. Nobody even bothered to consider whether there could be such a thing as "sacrilege" for a party with the "sole scientific ideology," nor whether the "disruption of public order" might not be due rather to the rampaging state security people than to demonstrators with Luxemburg quotations on their banners.

Initially, therefore, the party line favored the harshest possible punishment. This is evident in a printed "party notice" and letters to the editor, published by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 2 February. The editorial summary of these letters stated: "Communists, members of other parties and unaffiliated persons emphatically support the line of prosecuting everyone who opposes the vital interests of the citizens and the constitutional principles of our state." On precisely that date, Stephan

Krawczyk was deprived of his citizenship and deported to the FRG—the first of the “ringleaders” to be meted out this treatment. The others followed him soon after, though some retained their GDR passports. However, instead of the human rights movement being annihilated, it went on to go public in a demonstrative fashion on 13 February in Dresden, immediately after the conclusion of the Berlin affair.

At the present time, every faction in the leadership may well reproach the other for mismanagement, either by undue harshness or by indecisiveness. However, in some situations the rulers are bound to make mistakes, because they have maneuvered themselves into a dead end. Just as revolutions are always the penalty for the failure to adopt reforms, the SED is bound to worsen its problems by ideological immobilism. Already it is compelled to protect its rank and file from publications from the communist motherland—the latest example is the ban on the distribution of the Moscow periodical NOVY MIR that included excerpts from a play by Mikhail Shatrov, citing Lenin's approval of Luxemburg's phrase about the freedom of those who think differently.

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Government Criticized at Dresden Ecumenical Meeting

West German Reports on Dresden Events
23000068 Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in
German Mar 1988 pp 232-235

[Article by Harald Kleinschmid]

[Text] Government approval was a long time in coming. It was not until 4:30 pm on 11 February that the Journalistic Relations Department of the GDR foreign ministry granted permission to Western correspondents to cover the first “ecumenical meeting for peace, justice and the preservation of all creation by Christians and churches in the GDR” as well as the annual events commemorating the destruction of Dresden on 13 February 1945. There was an obvious reason for the delay in reaching a decision: on the morning of 11 February 1988, SED General Secretary Honecker had received West Berlin's Lord Mayor Diepgen at Niederschoenhauzen Castle in East Berlin and held out the long sought possibility of overnight stays for West Berliners in the eastern part of the city. It was not until Diepgen made a public announcement to that effect at Schoeneberg city hall that afternoon and otherwise appraised his visit with Honecker in a positive manner that the green light for Dresden was actually given.

Another reason for the GDR government's hesitation was the uncertainty about whether and how the events at the Liebknecht-Luxemburg demonstration on 17 January in East Berlin might repeat themselves at the next large-scale public meeting in the provinces. However that may be, the “large rally” in front of the Dresden

Schloss and the Bruehl Terrace on the morning of 13 February passed almost without incident. It is of no real consequence whether the GDR media report estimating the crowd which had gathered to listen to SED Bezirk chief Hans Modrow speak at 100,000 was in fact correct. At any rate, some members of the crowd could be seen holding up banners for a short time. One of the banners read: “Never again such an inferno—but also freedom for all those holding different views.” The other read: “Genuine peace through indivisible human rights.” The banners were confiscated, but those carrying them were neither arrested or otherwise molested.

A far more exciting event took place a few kilometers away at Christ Church in the Strehlen district of the city where 150 delegates representing 19 different Christian churches in the GDR, including 29 representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, were about to open their first ecumenical gathering. After lengthy internal dispute, agreement was reached on beginning the closed meeting with nine “witnesses of concern” on “justice, peace and the preservation of all creation.” Without a doubt, the most explosive testimonial was that of Dr Hans-Juergen Fischbeck, a physicist and official of the Protestant Church of Berlin-Brandenburg on the subject of confinement. Speaking of the omnipresent [Berlin] wall syndrome, Fischbeck said: “Not only does the wall represent a harsh restriction on our freedom to travel which we must accept whether we like it or not (for after all there are more important things than travel) but it has also more profoundly affected and deformed our self-perception, our sense of life and our social attitudes than I had previously dared to admit to myself. Our inferiority complex, our unjustified overall discrepancy, our poor relations mentality vis-a-vis visitors from the other part of Germany, our desire for Western goods, our awkwardness and inability to communicate with foreigners, our wrongheaded fixation on the idealized consumer society west of the wall are all symptoms of a syndrome. I have realized...among other things, the symptoms of the confinement syndrome include anxiety, lack of independence and maturity, a no-future mentality, the unwillingness to accept responsibility and substitute gratification of wants through adherence to a consumer cult. Is this not perchance one of the causes of alcoholism, too? Some of the consequences include the impoverishment of culture and art, comparatively unproductive science and technology lacking in creativity. The flood of applications for exit permits and the unhappy years spent by those who wait for them to be approved are symbols of our internal and external isolation.”

Commenting on the events of 17 January, Fischbeck noted that those arrested on that occasion had tried “to break out of the internal isolation.” Consternation over these events was voiced publicly several more times that morning, e.g. by members of the “Women for Peace” group whose delegation was originally supposed to include Regina Templin who had since left the GDR for West Germany. They spoke out against the “repudiation of those with different views” which includes both them

as well as others "who work for peace and justice and wish to contribute to these issues with their own ideas." Referring to the choice offered to civil rights activist Vera Wollenberger, psychologist Ludwig Drees from Stendal spoke of the "elegance of evil" which confronted the 17 January protesters with the alternative of "8 years in jail or admission to an English university."

The "witnesses of concern" offered in the safe haven of the church, none longer than 10 minutes, were comparable to the kind of statements usually made by a parliamentary opposition in this country. The statements were not directed against the GDR form of government or the social system of socialism but they did refute the idealized official image and openly enumerated the problems facing the country.

By evening, a diffuse mood had spread throughout the downtown area of Dresden. This became apparent when more than 1,000 people gathered 1 hour before the start of the traditional 13 February commemorative service in Dresden's Kreuzkirche [Church of the Cross] and began waiting for the doors of the church to open. By 8:30 pm, this largest church in the GDR was filled to more than capacity. Signs had been posted in the gallery one of which read: "Peace, Justice and Implementation of Human Rights in the GDR." The other was a quote from Gandhi which read: "Hunger for Freedom Is Greater than Hunger for Bread." There was applause when the signs were unfurled and more applause when those officiating at the service asked for the strength to respect the freedom of dissident views and when concern was voiced over the arrest and expulsion of persons involved in the 17 January events. In his sermon, Bishop Hempel of Saxony spoke of the "sense of uneasy longing in the hearts of men," a longing for justice and peace "which has not been foisted or urged upon people in the GDR by anyone." Following the service, church bells throughout the city rang out in the traditional commemoration of the bombing and no one paid heed to the order of the city council not to take burning candles to the ruins of the Frauenkirche [Church of Our Lady]—a practice which started in the early eighties—because of the construction work going on there. The order had previously been greeted with laughter and catcalls.

Guided by traffic policemen across intersections, several thousand people slowly marched through the inner city. Groups of people were quietly singing "dona nobis pacem" [grant us peace] in the starry night. They placed candles onto the pavement and made burning crosses out of them, reminiscent of similar scenes in Poland.

Between 10:30 and 11 pm, about 1 hour after the end of the church service, an extraordinary thing happened. By the light of burning candles, 20 to 30 mostly young men unfurled some more banners on the baroque balustrade of the Johanneum, the present museum of transportation. One of the inscriptions read: "Do Not Destroy Human Rights As Once Was Done in Dresden" and

another read: "Peace in Freedom." For some time nothing happened. The men on the balustrade silently held up their banners and some 500 to 1,000 Dresden citizens silently stood looking up at them, waiting. When no one intervened, a halting dialogue slowly began to develop between those down below and those on the balustrade. Almost all those carrying the banners wanted to leave the GDR. One could tell they were not entirely sober as they shouted slogans calling for human rights and for freedom of movement and speech. When they called on those standing below to join forces with them, perhaps 100 to 200 people intermittently ventured upon the balustrade. Those above shouted loudly: "The Wall Must Go" and "Erich, Give Us the Key" but the response below was meager.

The people down below debated among themselves in small groups about a little more freedom, often with tears in their eyes; but those on the balustrade were angrily faulted by some for taking unfair advantage of the 13 February commemorative events to promote their personal goal of leaving the GDR. One small group below sang "dona nobis pacem" while those up above called out that they were "animated" by the Berlin events and that the spark should "leap over to Dresden and all other cities in the GDR." One of those down below protested against equating the fate of Regina Templin with that of Nelson Mandela, as had already been done during the Kreuzkirche service. This highly unusual and unique debate (by GDR standards) lasted 1 and 1/2 hours. "We were never taught to do this kind of thing," one of those present said and another felt that it was at least "a beginning. Maybe we will get a discussion going after all."

By midnight, the entire affair seemed about to end peacefully; the demonstrators voluntarily left the balustrade. But then the authorities which had stayed out of sight all along suddenly did decide to intervene. A whistle was blown, a police car appeared on the scene and as the demonstrators came down off the balustrade and were walking across the square, some of them, i.e. those believed to be the ringleaders, were grabbed by plainclothesmen and dragged into the Palace of Culture through the back door. At that point, the crowd got angry, shouting "let those men go" and threatening to kick in the door through which the arrested demonstrators had been taken. All of a sudden, the authorities were there in force. About 10 patrol cars had taken up position in the darkness with their headlights dimmed. Using a bullhorn, the police called on the crowd several times to "end your meeting and leave the Neumarkt" but hardly anything happened. Some people left but most of them stayed and waited. Curiosity, tension and rage—a mixture of all these emotions was present. At about 12:30 am, three lorries containing 100 Vopos drove up and they then broke up the meeting. They did not use their nightsticks but some plainclothesmen did grab a few people, taking them to one side and either letting them go or arresting them. In all, five persons were arrested. On Sunday, sources close to the ecumenical meeting

reported that all five had been released after the church had intervened on their behalf. The church was also said to have urged the authorities prior to the incident to "engage in measured response" in such cases.

There are several reasons why this was actually done in the end. One of them is the date. On 13 February a harsh reaction by the security forces would have been unthinkable. Another reason was that West German television camera crews were present only at the start of the demonstration. In addition, it was also speculated that Hans Modrow, Dresden's Bezirk secretary who is considered a moderate, might have had a hand in dealing with the incident in this manner. The unspectacular way in which the police acted and above all the quick release of those who were arrested kept media treatment of the events during the night from 13 to 14 February within bounds. Nor did the demonstrators' secret wish of being expelled and sent to the West immediately following their arrest come true. They stayed right in the middle of the GDR where they did not want to be.

This rather elegant solution to this particular problem did nothing to alter the fundamental fact that there are several hundred thousand GDR citizens who want to leave the country. In an interview for Deutschlandfunk on 15 February 1988, Gottfried Forck, the Protestant bishop of Berlin-Brandenburg, put it this way: "The issue of those wanting to leave the country needs to be talked about as a matter of principle. In my opinion, there is a good deal of uncertainty because the response to requests for exit permits is such that the applicants have no idea where they stand and that some people must wait 3 or 4 years but that there also are cases in which the requests are approved quickly and that leads to uncertainty." Forck not only called for a meeting with government representatives "to clarify the situation" regarding exit permits, the educational system and military service. These problems, he said, should be resolved "by means of practical measures so that we can say 'now we are satisfied, things are as they should be.'" Thus far, the government has not given much indication that it might be willing to move in this direction even slightly. In a new departure, however, BERLINER ZEITUNG printed an ADN story quoting Berlin general superintendent Krusche even prior to the Dresden events. "Dealing with and deciding on applications for exit permits must remain the exclusive privilege of the authorities," Krusche said. Until then, the official GDR media had never even mentioned that possibility. The 16 February comment by the FDJ newspaper JUNGE WELT on the Dresden events of 13 February also differed from the stories appearing both prior to and following the event and in particular from a story in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND headlined "The So-Called GDR Opposition." "More than 100,000 persons gathered in front of the Castle, the Opera and the Kreuzkirche last Saturday. Those who had no intention of acting on behalf of peace and the primary human right to life did not fit in. Interested only in their private affairs, they took it upon themselves to turn historical truth upside

down. The commemoration of the bombing and the memorial service for the dead had no meaning for this small group of loafers and prior offenders, living at the expense of others and criminally betraying the values of the GDR, of mouthpieces of yesterday's ideology and idolators of capitalism and of supporting actors of FRG television. They tried to abuse the memory of the death and the legacy of tens of thousands for the purpose of breaking the law." For all the harsh words, there was no mention of Western intelligence services having pulled the strings. Could it be that the GDR realizes that the Dresden events represent an indigenous problem?

Hopeful Signs

23000068 Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in
German Mar 1988 pp 236-238

[Article by: Gisela Heilwig]

[Text] It was no accident that the first ecumenical meeting of the GDR churches was scheduled to take place around 13 February in Dresden. Exactly 2 years earlier, on the 41st anniversary of the destruction of the city during World War II, the local ecumenical council had first broached the idea. The idea itself was based on the 1983 appeal by the World Council of Churches for joint action on behalf of "justice, peace and the preservation of all creation." Dresden, a city reborn from the ashes, lent particular urgency to the appeal.

The Dresden gathering was one of several regional events in preparation for international meetings. A meeting in Basel designated "North Conference" has jointly been called for May 1989 by the Conference of European Churches and the Council of Catholic Episcopal Conferences in Europe [CCEE]. A world convocation being organized by the Geneva World Council of Churches and to be attended by Vatican representatives is to take place in 1990.

This first meeting of the GDR churches—to be followed by another in October 1988 and a third in the spring of 1989—was organized by the Working Group of Christian Churches in the GDR [AGCK] which had called on the other churches to cooperate under the motto of "hope learns to walk." After some initial hesitation, the Catholic Church, which only enjoys observer status within the AGCK, finally decided on full participation in December 1987 and wound up by sending the largest group of delegates, i.e. 26 men and women out of a total of 150 conferees. The member churches of the League of Protestant Churches in the GDR named a total of 80 delegates. The remaining participants represented the Union of Protestant Free Church Congregations, the Union of Protestant Reformed Congregations, the Old Catholics, the Mennonites, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Quakers and the Apostolate of Jesus Christ. The meeting was also attended by a number of advisers and guests, among them Catholic Bishop Johannes Bernhard Moeller from Holland as an observer of the CCEE.

The presidium chaired by Christof Ziemer, the Lutheran superintendent of Dresden, also included Ruediger Minor, the bishop of the Methodist Church in the GDR; Heino Falcke, the Protestant provost in Erfurt; Canon Dieter Grande, head of the Catholic "Justitia et Pax" [Justice and Peace] organization in the GDR; Eva Strotter, a Catholic social worker from Guestrau; Gottfried Forck, the Protestant bishop for Berlin-Brandenburg and Elisabeth Adler, head of the Berlin-Brandenburg Protestant Academy. Interestingly enough, the desired parity among men and women representatives was only achieved by the Catholic delegation. In all, only 26 percent of the participants were women.

The purpose of the meeting is "to find a common witness of faith and common ways of obeying the faith." To achieve this goal, it is necessary to view "the specific situation of our society in a global context." The preamble of the guidelines approved by the AGCK member churches states that the survival of humankind is threatened in the present world situation and that the people of God is thus confronted with new tasks related to its "responsibility for the world." In the age of weapons of mass destruction, war can no longer serve as a means of conflict resolution. Injustice in the distribution of worldly goods must be overcome and new ways must be found to deal with the natural environment.

At their next meeting the delegates will be called upon to evaluate some 10,000 written proposals on the themes of justice, peace and the preservation of all creation which have been addressed to the ecumenical group by church congregations, individual Christians as well as non-church organizations, indicating not only extraordinary great interest in this meeting but also that there is hope for change. Initial examination of the letters has shown that many of the writers took advantage of the opportunity "to identify the specific worries and problems not only of Christians in the GDR and to state their demands for remedying them."

It became apparent how explosive these demands are when several speakers announced their "witnesses of concern" in Dresden's Christ Church on 13 February. On that occasion, the confinement policy pursued by the party and government leadership was attacked even more sharply than at the last meeting of the synod of the League of Protestant Churches. Hans-Juergen Fischbeck, an East Berlin physicist, identified the symptoms of the "wall syndrome" and spoke of the plight of the applicants for exit visas who vainly wait for years to get them approved. That same evening, those concerned spoke out themselves. Following the traditional church service commemorating the bombing of Dresden on 13 February 1945, a group of demonstrators demanded the right to leave the GDR and debated the issue with churchgoers until Vopos and plainclothesmen intervened.

Additional issues of concern included the large number of abortions, threats to the ecology, the militarization of the educational system, demands for civilian service as an alternative to military service and the hostility toward foreigners.

The Dresden "Women for Peace" group opened its "witness" with a song that is taught to 3- to 6-year-olds in kindergarten, i.e. "soldiers came marching by, a whole company of them and when we grow up we want to be soldiers just like them." In this connection, the women voiced their dismay over the fact that "Christians and other concerned parents" are not invited to participate in discussions about what is taught in public educational facilities. A nurse called on the gathering to nip racist attitudes in the bud. In Rathenow, she said, where some Mozambicans live, several young people broke into the midnight service on Christmas Eve, shouting "let us have the niggers."

As at the Protestant church congress in East Berlin last June, some of the groups of church activists present in Dresden drew attention to their work. In the community hall of the Reconciliation Church [Versöhnungskirche] they set up a contact center about which the conference leadership had initially had some reservations. Nevertheless, in the end, two of the delegates—Kurt Dornich, the president of the land church office and Superintendent Christof Ziemer—did participate in the dialogue. Ecumenical constraints, however, do place some curbs on the impatience of the activists and on their desire for greater cooperation and more openness in debates on church policy. This, too, was quite apparent in Dresden.

Heino Falcke, one of the prime initiators of the Dresden meeting, termed the ecumenical gathering "a highly sensitive event" for the participating churches. Pointing out that publicity would only serve to make the achievement of consensus more difficult, Falcke asked for understanding of the need to hold the deliberations behind closed doors. A total of 13 working groups will now study the particulars of the major themes and will examine their proposals to see whether they are "consensus-capable." Following the close of the three sessions, a joint manifesto is to be drawn up. In addition, all the churches are to work out joint projects, e.g. on peace education.

It is probably too soon to speak of a "new quality" of the ecumenical dialogue in the GDR. But some impulses have indeed gone out from the Dresden meeting which continue to have an impact. Last but not least, the participants came to realize what it is that still separates the churches. The ecumenical service on 14 February at which prayers were said for mutual recognition of the various religious services was followed by a Protestant Eucharist and a Catholic Mass. Spokesmen of both the Protestant and the Catholic Churches deplored the fact that the two denominations have yet to agree on how to celebrate mass together. But foreign visitors "were strongly impressed" by the fact that the ecumenical process at this time "is being moved forward primarily by the Germans and that the initiatives in this direction are even stronger in the GDR than in the FRG."

In that part of Germany where the Reformation began, the churches are confronted with tasks today which go far beyond preaching the Gospel and providing for

pastoral care within the congregations. As the only organization independent of the government and the party, the churches are confronted with expectations—even on the part of non-Christians—which call upon them constantly to examine their self-image and their capacity for action. On the basis of sheer size alone this applies to a far greater extent to the various Protestant churches than to the Catholic Church which for a long time held a critical attitude toward the Protestants' stated goal of being "the church under socialism." The Catholics did not wish to be "onlookers," they wanted to "participate" because "this country is a home" to them. Cardinal Meisner declared in July 1987, echoing sentiments contained in a pastoral letter by the Berlin bishops' conference in the fall of 1986. The pastoral letter makes pointed reference to the "community of all Christians." Since there is more that unites Catholics and Protestants than divides them in spite of their theological and traditional differences, the ecumenical movement needs to be characterized by a spirit of mutual love "in the face of atheistic ideology and rampant materialism."

Bishop Joachim Wanke, the apostolic administrator for Erfurt-Meiningen, goes one step further in pleading for "solidarity among the as yet divided churches and congregations; between Christians and non-Christians." Wanke also calls for a "church that serves" as a refuge from all the vicissitudes of life.

Cardinal Meisner feels that a bond exists between himself and Gottfried Forck, his Protestant counterpart, in that they share "the concern and responsibility for God's people." Following the events of 17 January 1988, Meisner expressed the hope that "the efforts at mediation being made by the responsible officials of the Protestant Church will meet with the desired success." In addition, he called on all priests and deacons not to leave anyone alone with his cares and problems. "And when you yourselves are unable to do more, then find out whether the bishop himself could not be asked for help. In the past, this path has served us well, even if we did not talk about it in public."

In late February, Bishop Forck called on all Christians to continue "calmly and prudently" to speak out for change in the social life of the GDR—in the sense of freedom of speech and greater justice. At the same time, the bishop announced that the government had prohibited the church media from reporting on the Dresden ecumenical meeting. The reason given for this ban by the government was the demonstration by the would-be emigres following the memorial service. Forck termed this intervention in the activities of the church media "a step backward" and voiced the hope that government policy would change.

Statements Critical of Government
*2800906A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 29 Feb 88 p 6*

[Text:]

Statement by Physicist Hans-Joergen Fischbeck

I wish to speak of my dismay about the injustice of confinement. I am speaking on behalf of the "No to the Practice and Principle of Isolation" initiative started by my congregation (St. Bartholomew, Berlin) which triggered a synodal procedure still under consideration by the Berlin-Brandenburg synod and the national synod and which I would now like to introduce into the conciliar process.

1. On 13 August 1986, the 25th anniversary [of the Berlin Wall], a friend of mine and member of my congregation engaged in a solitary protest at the Wall. When I learned of this 2 weeks later, I was deeply shocked. I knew him as a reasonable human being. How could he act in such an irrational manner? What kind of despair drove him to do it? My concern became even greater a few weeks after that when I read in a paper he had written for his first theological examination what made him do what he did. He did not do it for personal reasons but because of his sorrow over our social plight and the silence of the Church. This opened my eyes to the defects and deficiencies of my own life, of all our lives, to the damage to my self-esteem which I had long since repressed and interiorized.

What became clear to me was this: Not only does the wall represent a harsh restriction on our freedom to travel which we must accept whether we like it or not (after all, there are more serious things than travel) but it has also more profoundly affected and deformed our sense of self-perception, our sense of life and our social attitudes than I had previously dared to admit to myself. Our inferiority complex, our unjustified overall despondency, our poor relations mentality vis-a-vis visitors from the other part of Germany, our desire for Western goods, our awkwardness and inability to communicate with foreigners, our wrongheaded fixation on the idealized consumer society west of the wall are all symptoms of a syndrome.

As a scientist, I must add something that was clear to me prior to this, i.e. the exclusion of most scientists from the international communication process (which does not just take place via the professional journals after all) has robbed a great many of them of their sense of professional achievement and seriously harmed our scientific establishment.

2. The steps taken in 1961 were understandable given the situation at that time. They closed off the socialist state against mass flight and protected the power political

gains achieved in World War II. The self-defense measure we accepted then has since become a permanent fixture. How is it possible for the state to dictate the fate of its citizens for such a long time?

In my view, the real reason for shutting us off from the outside clearly is to divide us internally from those who rule the country. The practice of internal isolation is so well known to all of us that it takes a special effort to remind ourselves of its countless facets. It insulates our public life from unauthorized information, opinions, artistic expression, creative effort and initiative and forces it into a handful of nooks and crannies where it withers away, but also into church enclaves where it can unfold to some extent.

But all those who are still studying or have already entered a profession have both a social and a private life to live. That is why this demarcation line passes through the midst of all of us. It was implanted in us while we were still in school. This has taught us to be what we are supposed to be in our professional lives. But at home we try to be what we really want to be. This enforced double life has made both us and our society ill. That is why the symptoms of the confinement syndrome include anxiety, lack of independence and maturity, a no-future mentality, the unwillingness to accept responsibility and substitute gratification of wants through acceptance of a consumer cult. Is this not perchance one of the causes of alcoholism, too? Some of the consequences include the impoverishment of culture and art, comparatively unproductive science and technology lacking in creativity. The flood of applications for exit permits and the unhappy years spent by those who wait for them to be approved are symbols of our internal and external isolation.

3. There is a principle behind this practice of confinement. We have called it the confinement principle. It is a principle of domination that does not relate to the normal separation of powers between the administrative, economic and judicial sectors which are pragmatically oriented toward dealing with public affairs in the interest of society as a whole. The confinement principle seeks to go further as it tries to impose social conformity with the actions and the thinking with the state leadership. The confinement principle with which we are confronted originated in the class struggle and still perceives itself as a strategy of the class struggle by the state today. Its goal is to bring about the victory of Marxism-Leninism and—let me emphasize this point—to build a just, socialist social order. In fact, it has helped create just structures of social security. But we have to recognize that the principle and practice of isolation are threatening to suffocate real existent socialism in our country. Gorbachev has said: "We need democratization as we need air to be able to breathe."

4. The wall, this symbol of confinement, is the visible proof of the inner discord of our society. It stands in the way of peace with the outside world. To justify its

existence, the confinement principle requires the projection of the image of the imperialist class enemy from which it must insulate itself both on the inside and the outside. It was recently resuscitated when those arrested on 17 January and 25 January attempted to break out of the internal confinement. According to the logic of the confinement principle, the actions of internal critics must of necessity be directed from the outside and it is therefore best to expel them across the border.

Projections of enemy images are mutual. The 13 August 1961 events, for example, also need to be seen against the background of Adenauer's divisive policy of Western integration. That policy was also based on a very pronounced image of the enemy which was used to justify measures resulting in internal isolation in the FRG, e.g. the KPD ban and the decree against radical elements. This anti-communist image of the enemy is a well-nourished image. The best nourishment it gets comes from our own acts of confinement. Although the projections are not quite as powerful as they were, both sides are still following more or less the same pattern, i.e. they feel they must insulate and protect themselves against the enemy and because they assume the worst about him and must therefore resort to the worst possible means to deter him. Almost the only goal of a policy based exclusively on deterrence is to protect the inviolability of a nation's borders. The connection between isolation and deterrence is impossible to overlook. In addition to positive feedback, the two concepts combine to form an ever more powerful vicious circle.

5. This vicious circle will only be overcome if it is broken. But this can be done by the side which isolates itself. A start in this direction has been made by Gorbachev's courageous policy. The opening in the inner isolation of the Soviet Union was due to economic constraints. It has logically been accompanied by credible disarmament proposals which resulted in the INF agreement and, as a consequence, in a series of first steps in the direction of a relaxation of tensions and controlled disarmament. The GDR has supported this policy by making distinct contributions of its own. The joint SPD/SED document and Honecker's visit to the FRG have had a positive impact on the internal situation here in the GDR clear evidence of which was provided on the occasion of the Olof Palme memorial demonstration in particular. But since we are not faced with economic policy constraints in the same way as the Soviet Union, the GDR is trying to play an active role in the relaxation of tensions in the foreign policy field while simultaneously retaining both its internal and external isolation. The January events, however, have shown that this illogical approach does not work. In my view, the big chance for socialism does not lie in isolation (under which conditions it was believed it would best be able to develop) but in gradual internal and external openings to help overcome perversion and stagnation and to bring socialism closer to the Marxist utopia. In its quest for survivable types of social life, our world urgently needs a viable socialist alternative to Western consumer capitalism.

Isolation as a principle of domination is a worldwide phenomenon. We are not the only ones who must overcome it. But here in Germany, on the dividing line between the two opposing economic systems, it is particularly acute so that overcoming it is of paramount importance for world peace.

6. Both the idea and the actual unfolding of the conciliar process run completely counter to the principle and practice of confinement. The conciliar process represents a marvelous opportunity to set examples for overcoming differences and achieving unity while respecting and preserving our self-determined identity. Our congregations will only be able actively to help and to heal as a result of this conciliar process, if we manage to overcome our inner and outer isolation.

7. Our Lord has entrusted us Christians with the mission of preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God to our endangered world. This message of salvation of God's peaceful kingdom in which all domination of man by man and all injustice will be overcome casts serious doubt on human structures of domination whose sense of justice which will always be temporary and relative. I would therefore say that we, as believers in the Gospel, must speak out against the principle and practice of imposed isolation as a principle and practice of domination.

Statement by Stephan Schack, Walter, on Military Service

At this juncture, I think it would make sense to improve the preparation of young men for military service so that they will be better able to cope with the situation and all the problems it involves. I think we have a lot of catching up to do in this regard.

Based on a proposal regarding pastoral care for conscripts and soldiers doing their military service which we submitted to various synods of the Protestant Church in the GDR in 1984, a number of groups working in various cities are trying to come up with new ways of dealing with this issue. These groups are holding weekend workshops to prepare men for military service and seminars which help those who are about to be called up to make the proper decisions.

Our work for peace also focuses on the demand for the introduction of civilian service. This initiative has been pursued in different ways in a great many places throughout the GDR over the past several years. I would like to make myself clear on this subject, since I consider civilian service the goal of service without arms. All other efforts in this regard amount to more or less dubious compromises.

I would like to use the term "civilian service" without, however, referring to some Western model. In my view, these models would not work in the GDR. We have to look for different solutions of our own.

Let me explain why I am in favor of an alternative to military service. My own motivations with regard to civilian service resulted from my personal experiences during my time in the armed forces and also from my thoughts about current political developments throughout the world which should make civilian service possible as an alternative to military service. It would represent a step toward conventional disarmament.

For another thing, I think that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a Christian who believes in the Gospel to belong to an army. And what I am referring to is our situation here in the GDR and not the situation in South Africa or Latin America. I am talking about us, in Central Europe.

I would like to see a kind of civilian service which is based on the realities of life here in the GDR. It should call on any young man who wishes to bear credible witness for peace to take account of these realities and the existing working situation, especially the difficult working conditions in the soft coal industry, in agriculture and soil conditioning or in forestry and not only in hospitals and old age homes. I would ask prospective members of such a civilian service: Where is your place in this land? Are you prepared to take part in a dialogue on labor policy?

For me, civilian service in the GDR would not amount to fulfilling a wish to copy a Western model but to service for GDR society or better still, service which helps socialism overcome difficulties. Only then would such service make any real sense to me.

I know it will take long to reach this goal but for the moment I have three wishes I would like to mention:

1. There is a need for stronger and better awareness among young people who face military service and also among prospective members of a civilian service. The churches should play a more active role in this endeavor than heretofore.

2. The ecumenical meeting should make every effort to promote creation of civilian service in the GDR as soon as possible. As has often been suggested in the past, a blueprint for such a civilian service should be worked out and submitted to the appropriate government authorities.

3. The ecumenical meeting should make a pronouncement on the type of military service appropriate for a Christian under the present circumstances—based on Christian tradition by which I do not mean the Crusades or the Christians in Germany but Jesus Christ and the Sermon on the Mount.

Statement by Michael Beileites, Taxidermist, on Uranium Mining

Uranium mining in the GDR is nothing new. Since 1946, the Wismut company, first under Soviet management and subsequently as a joint Soviet-German venture, has been mining uranium ore on GDR soil. Initially, the mining operations were concentrated around Johanngeorgenstadt, Schwarzenberg, Aue and Schneeberg in the western Erz Mountains. Today, there is a smaller mine in the Elbe Sandstone Mountains and a much larger one in the area around Gera and Ronneburg.

I have lived in Gera for more than 6 years. I am not directly affected by the consequences of uranium mining but I am concerned about the fact that such a major problem has not been talked about at all so far. Again and again, there are all sorts of incredible rumors about the Wismut Co. making the rounds in Gera and its environs. On the other hand, exact official information on the uranium mining operation and its impact on human beings and the environment is almost impossible to obtain. For this reason I decided to take a closer look at this subject. When we look at the consequences of uranium mining, we find that the nuclear energy obtained from uranium is not a clean source of energy, even if the power plants themselves operate safely. The impact on the landscape is not very different from that caused by coal mining. In the case of uranium mining, too, entire villages have had to make way for technology. The villages of Schmirnbau, Gessen, Lichtenberg, Culmitzsch and Helmsdorf as well as the old part of Johanngeorgenstadt may serve as examples of this. The landscape is dotted with huge dumps of ore tailings, with strip mines and piles of mud.

The impact of uranium mining on human beings and the environment is qualitatively different from that of other types of mining operations. Uranium is radioactive. In its natural state, uranium occurs in combination with other radioactive elements such as thorium, radium, radon, polonium, etc. The potential danger of uranium mining results from the fact that the uranium and its radioactive decomposition products are brought to the surface from underground and that these pass into the environment and the ecological cycle in the course of the various stages of the mining operation. Radioactivity in the areas concerned is of a long-term nature, i.e. it can last for an inconceivably long time. U-238, the most crucial of the isotopes, has a half-life of 4.5 billion years.

In the vicinity of Zwickau and near Seelingsteden, south of Gera, there are huge pools of mud where the radioactive waste from uranium ore processing plants has been dumped. In dry weather, the mud dries out on the surface and a fine dust begins to form. This radioactive dust which contains all the uranium decomposition products as well as some of uranium itself is then blown about in the wind. If the wind is strong enough, there are regular sandstorms. The inhabitants of Oberrothenbach

near Zwickau are particularly affected by this. They live close by the mud dump of the Crossen processing plant. When there is a strong wind, the inhabitants say, huge clouds of dust are constantly blowing through their village, causing the dust to enter the houses through the cracks in the windows.

Gaseous radon, which escapes from the uranium ore and the uranium waste, is invisible. But it is a decisive factor in the radioactive exposure of the respiratory system.

There is no such thing as harmless radioactivity. Any increase in the exposure to radiation, however small, results in a corresponding increase in the number of cancer cases. An appallingly large number of uranium miners die of lung cancer. Official statistics are kept secret but there is a great deal of concern everywhere throughout the region. The inhabitants speak of an alarming number of cases of cancer, leukemia and impotence among the miners as well as loss of hair and constant fatigue. It is unjustified to maintain that these fears are exaggerated or unfounded because the international professional journals report on virtually the same occurrences in connection with uranium mining operations.

There is also another, possibly even more important, aspect to the problem of uranium mining. Uranium is not only the raw material for nuclear power plants; it is also the basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Many of our compatriots, including some of our own church members, take part in uranium mining and thus in providing the materials for the production of nuclear weapons. This raises the question of our responsibility for peace.

The Ecumenical Council of Churches issued the following statement on peace and justice at its meeting in Vancouver in 1983: "The production and deployment of nuclear weapons as well as their use is a crime against humanity."

The statement also encourages individuals to refuse to take part in projects dealing with nuclear weapons or nuclear warfare. If we now cite this statement and thereby raise the question of how and where this applies to us and how it affects us, then we must not only start an open debate on military organization and military service but also on participation in the mining of uranium among other things. Not only the political leaders of the nuclear powers are responsible for the existence of nuclear weapons and the risks involved in the generation of nuclear power but society as a whole—and that applies in particular to those who participate in the mining and processing of uranium.

Uranium mining illustrates the connection between the problems of peace and the problems confronting the environment. The uranium mining example makes it plain that we are actively contributing to the development of the global threat.

HUNGARY

Weak Economy, Increasing Crime Put Strains on Interior Ministry

25000094 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian
16 Dec 87 p 3

[Interview with Police Brigadier General Sandor Kiss, Deputy Minister of the Interior: "How Does the Interior Manage Its Economy? Frugality Cannot Be an Obstacle To Pursuing Criminals," by Istvan Illes]

[Text] Our financial difficulties are known as well as the deterioration of our criminal statistics. How can the interior portfolio stand up to this double bind, and make ends meet? This and related questions were the subject of a conversation between Sandor Kiss, police brigadier general and deputy minister of the interior, and our reporter.

[Answer] Only by appropriate economic measures can we withstand the "double bind." The budgetary limits of our activities—which are of course determined by the ability of our national economy to fill the demands placed on it at any given time—are approved every year by Parliament. This year we expect to spend 13.7 billion forints, while next year's budget will be 17.5 billion forints. However, the apparent increase in the funds available to us will be offset by the price and tax reform. We can hardly expect criminals to temper their activities on account of the country's financial difficulties. I would rather think that these will actually contribute to an increase in criminal acts. Funds allocated from the national budget will meet our increasing needs only by their thrifty use; they will have to be augmented by a gradual and selective mobilization of our internal resources. This is no new matter for us, since we have been doing so for years, about 100 million forints a year. Thrift leaders and commanders devote this sum to the acquisition of new tools, and improvements in conditions of living and work.

[Question] Is the functioning of the organization hampered by lack of reserves?

[Answer] As I indicated before, we cannot talk about an optimal balance between the systems of tasks and conditions. The cost of maintaining our current operations is assured, but the situation is more difficult regarding the development of our financial and technical potential. The growth and change in methods of crime, and the appearance of organized crime call for improvements in the technical sophistication of the police. Contributions from the national budget to this demand are very modest. We attempt to allocate our resources judiciously, but even thus some of our development and procurement plans must be postponed. This situation can of course be maintained only temporarily, since on the one hand our reserves are limited, and on the other a prolonged setback of our technical progress will after a while actually interfere with our operations.

[Question] Honest, law-abiding citizens would like to see even more police on the streets, day and night, to be able to feel secure. Are there any financial obstacles to this?

[Answer] We acknowledge with pleasure this desire of the citizenry, since it implies a trust in our work. However, the size of the Interior Ministry staff is limited, and thus the solution is not merely a matter of funds. We first try to satisfy this request of the citizenship, which we regard as well justified, by re-grouping staff and to a lesser extent increasing their number, as well as measures in organizing services. We also try to make more attractive police work in public areas by wage increase.

[Question] Are employees of the Interior properly paid? After all, not only tax officers' moral integrity and impeccability is affected by their income.

[Answer] In discussing salaries and incomes we must establish the basis for comparison. In general I may state that wages at the Interior are adjusted to those in force in government in general. Our basis for comparison is the prevailing wage of workers in adverse conditions. Party and government organs also periodically examine the salary conditions in the Interior and when they are found wanting compared to the reference just stated, wage adjustments are made. This happened most recently last June when the difference became significant. I would like to dispel the occasional misconception that raises reached 40-50 percent, since in fact they were no more than the 10-15 percent accepted throughout the civil service. In connection with another misconception I would like to stress that workers in the Interior form no exception to regulations that apply to the population as a whole. For example, we too are affected by the personal income tax. Our employees are in no privileged position, and in fact in some areas suffer a disadvantage compared to civilians. It is well known, for example, that employees in the Interior are by the nature of their work not permitted to engage in other income-producing activities. In this sense we may observe a further restriction in the conditions of their income. Moral purity and impeccability are basic requirements with us, since a policeman must be free of the defects which he is expected to combat. I thus believe that, in this respect, we cannot make commitment to duty a function of earning power. Our interest is to keep our corps free of corrupt or law-breaking officers or clerks.

[Question] It is well known that serving in uniform is not amongst the popular professions today. What does the Ministry do to keep those who elected to work in the Interior?

[Answer] There are objective reasons for the lack of popularity of this profession. Compared to areas in civilian life, the load here is greater, the tempo of work faster, the demands for moral behavior and discipline higher, and a constant state of readiness must be accepted. Shifts of 10-12 hours are typical of duties in

public safety, traffic and criminal assignments. An irregular lifestyle, sudden calls for duty, adverse weather conditions and the need to resolve unexpected conflicts often causes stress. In addition to these loads and constraints, the lack of opportunities for a secondary income further dampens interest in this career. These factors hamper not only the retaining of present employees but also in ensuring the supply of replacements. Notwithstanding the above, no basic change can be foreseen for the future in these constraints. We therefore try to develop conditions of income, work environment and social and health services which at least partly offset the drawbacks of working at the Interior, and improve the lot of the employees. We consider it important to alleviate housing problems, especially for young people starting their career. For example, we provide limited opportunities for independent living in singles' housing, or contribute to subletting costs. We also assist some in setting up a home by providing interest-free loans.

[Question] Much value is given to sensible economies. But is it possible, or even permissible, to consider savings in an area where investments into crime prevention and the pursuit of justice may be returned manifold through savings to the national economy?

[Answer] We have been forced to apply sensible economies since the Government has been unable for some time to ensure the monetary basis for our work. We have applied saving measures primarily in the fields of energy utilization, and in self-maintenance, repair and renovation of buildings and technical equipment. We achieved significant successes in the utilization of surplus supplies and materials, in locating advantageous sources of supply, and in economic cooperation with other armed services. I hope what I explained makes it clear that thrift in our economy is not simply a matter of necessity for us, but also a means, and even the determinant of our economic viewpoint.

13240

'Democratic Centralism' Denounced at Gyor Conference

29000006 Paris *LIBERATION* in French
22 Mar 88 p 19

[Article by Basile Karlinsky]

[Text] At the Gyor conference, attended by the best East bloc economists, participants attacked the major principles of Stalinism. Notably they denounced "democratic centralism" as an obstacle to progress.

"Democratic centralism is a contradiction in terms. You can have either democracy or centralism but not both at the same time." If uttered in the West, this opinion would be harmless, but it clearly becomes subversive when it is uttered in the East bloc and, to make matters worse, uttered by a high communist official, in this case Lajos Borkos.

Last Sunday in Gyor, the director of the National Bank of Hungary addressed an invited audience made up of the best East bloc economists, brought together by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to study the causes which have led to the failure of all reforms started in the Soviet bloc countries since the death of Stalin.

No one in the audience blinked when Borkos ridiculed democratic centralism, that sacred cow of communist parties. No one flinched when Borkos came out and said: "Our biggest problem is that, by principle, there are no limits to the party's power. Why not leave definitions of foreign policy and defense to the party and leave the rest to the government?" The audience, which was indifferent, had heard other such statements since the opening of the conference on Friday.

After being in disfavor for 14 years for excessive reformism, Rezo Nyers, who, with his New Economic Mechanism, is the "father" of the 1968 Hungarian reform, has come back in force. From the opening session, he minced no words and set the "tone" for the conference. He argued for a radical revision of traditional economic and political structures inherited from the Stalinist era. The socialist economies, he stated, "should become market economies." He also denounced the central administrations whose reforms the party "swallowed up" or aborted by hindering businesses' market and freedom.

Istvan Petrovski, a high party official, echoed this sentiment: "The implication of the direction of change is that the party itself to directing policy but not involve itself in governing above the Cabinet, issue laws above those which come from the National Assembly (the Parliament), or run businesses instead of managers."

The Czechoslovak KGB, which had gotten wind of what would be said at Gyor, "dissuaded" Czech economists from making the trip. As for Zdislav Sulc, one of the theoreticians of the Prague Spring and currently unemployed, he was intercepted at the Hungarian border and brought back, under guard, to Prague, to be accused of spying. A group of Hungarian, Polish and Soviet participants issued a public protest. There is no precedent for this action, but it is symptomatic of the "temperature" of the assembly.

This conference, which is astonishing by the force of its criticism of the Stalinist economic-political model, could indicate that Hungary is thinking of trying reform again by having specialists from "fraternal parties" test its premises. Indeed it is this criticism which brought the conference about, and the return of Nyers, who had been removed from office in 1974 when, going against his advice, reform was "frozen," is a sign that the planned reform will be even more radical than the 1968 one was.

In addition to the conference, another indicator points in the same direction. On Sunday, in the government daily *MAGYAR HIRLAP*, Janos Barabas, the vice director of the party's Department of Propaganda, expressed the

wish that a "social check" be established over the country's course and he called for the eradication of Stalinist structures, in particular restrictions on the freedom of the press and citizens' economic and social activities.

In a thinly veiled way, he suggested that the elderly and ailing Janos Kadar, the country's current leader, had become an obstacle to necessary changes. "The counterproductive selection process which allows people who are not equipped for it to occupy high positions forever," he wrote, must be "interrupted."

Anniversary

On Saturday the Hungarian press reported on last Tuesday's banned demonstration to celebrate the 140th anniversary of the Hungarian insurrection of 1848 which was jointly crushed by the Austrians and the Russians. NEPSZABADSAG, the party daily, nevertheless estimated its size at "between 3 and 5,000 people" and said the figure of 10,000 put forward by foreign observers was exaggerated.

12789/12232

Nuclear Waste Disposal Provisions Detailed 25000144 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 24 Mar 88 p 9

[Article by Jozsef Hazafi: "Where Should Nuclear 'Garbage' Be Kept?"]

[Excerpts] Our domestic "nuclear dump" is scheduled to be completed 3 years from now, in 1991. The problem of finding storage for the highly radioactive material—the spent fuel—generated during the operation of the nuclear power plant has already been resolved. According to the terms of a recently signed Hungarian-Soviet general agreement, in 1989, after 5 years of waiting, they will begin shipping our spent nuclear fuel to the Soviet Union. The "only" thing Hungary has left to worry about, therefore, is finding disposal sites for its mildly and moderately radioactive secondary waste. These contaminated instruments, tools, protective clothing, etc., will be shipped to the Puspokszilagy isotope dump.

The nuclear power plant, however, also generates liquid waste, an estimated amount of 60 cubic meters per block a year. The plans, on the other hand, had only provided for 300 cubic meters of on-site storage capacity. Hence the accumulated waste can only be kept in Paks for 3 more years, which is why 1991 has been set as the deadline for finding a suitable site.

The actual planning of the nuclear dump already began back in 1976. In the course of the preliminary studies 18 potential sites had been examined. After the initial studies it was concluded that in order for such a site to be environmentally feasible it would have to be located within a 100-kilometer radius of Paks, with the added

stipulation that locations requiring the transportation of waste across the Danube be avoided. The Plains, therefore, were eliminated from consideration. It was also agreed not to allow nuclear waste to be shipped through Budapest. Another factor that needed to be taken into account was the location of international air corridors which further narrowed the scope of possibilities to southern Transdanubia.

Here they arrived at the vicinity of Sarbogard and its rhyolite tufa layers, Hódcs, with its so-called fish-scale marl formations, the granite basets of the Moragy block and the abandoned extraction chambers of its uranium mine.

Still, the findings presented to the State Planning Commission recommended Magyarreggy to be the future site of the isotope dump. However, after the decision had been made to store the dangerous cargo near the surface, Feked-Vemend, also known as Ofala, was designated as the new dump site where the Nuclear Power Plant Enterprise has already begun exploratory work and preparations for further research.

The terrain was judged to be suitable by geologists who also pointed to the need for further research aimed at determining with an even greater degree of certainty whether or not it was indeed the ideal area to have a nuclear waste dump.

By the end of 1986, the research had reached the stage where its findings could become the basis of a comprehensive study prepared at the Heavy Industry Technical University of Miskolc under the direction of Dr Jozsef Juhasz and published in March 1987. Every single parameter presented in the study had been measured two or more different ways, and the results thus obtained were found to be extremely close, clearly reinforcing one another. Before the final decision could be made, however, some new tests were recommended. These notwithstanding, the study has concluded that the Feked-Vemend region was suitable for the establishment of an isotope dump.

So far the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health (whose role is outlined in amendment No. 54/1987 to the order governing the implementation of nuclear energy law No. 1980/1 which specifies that the "Ministry of Health is responsible for regulating the licensing process connected with the storing of radioactive materials and wastes") has not issued the license documents necessary to proceed with the construction.

Of course it would be an exaggeration to claim that the people of Feked-Vemend are overjoyed at the prospect of having an isotope dump. It is a fact, however, that the Nuclear Power Plant Enterprise has pledged to use a certain percentage of the 1.8 billion forint investment fund earmarked for the project for upgrading the infrastructure of the area.

The solidification of liquid waste will be done with the help of a technology by the Nuclear Power Plant Enterprise from a West German firm. The liquid waste will be dumped into 200-400 liter steel-walled drums and turned into solid concrete by mixing it with cement. The acquisition of this technology cost DM 2.8 million. The idea then is to transport the waste to the isotope dump via Bonyhad-Ciko-Kismoragy- Bataapati. There it will be placed into a 13-meter deep, 8-by-10 meter wide concrete basin. Once the drums lined up side-by-side fill a section, the spaces among them will be sealed with concrete. After this is done a new line of drums will be started. When the 13-meter deep capsule is full, the basin will be given a waterproof protective cover of concrete, followed by a layer of soil. The walls of the basin will be water-tight, and the optimal composition of the space sealing concrete will be determined from the results of experiments conducted at the Technical University.

During the first year, 2,000 to 2,500 200-liter barrels will be shipped here from Paks.

9379

Writers Association Said To Seek Compromise With Authorities

25000142 Budapest KEPES 7 in Hungarian
6 Feb 88 pp 34-37

[Interview with Tibor Cseres, chairman of the Writers Association, by Zoltan Brady: "Everyone Is Responsible for His Own Published Works"; date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpt]

[Question] In the government's opinion, the Writers Association functioned for years also as a forum for dissent. And certain speeches, some of which tended to be personal, were likewise considered objectionable. Moreover, the government did not approve of the governing body's composition. Thereupon the minister of culture and education imposed restrictions. What were these restrictions?

[Answer] Among other things, the government took over the administration of our international relations.

[Question] What was the Writers Association's response to this?

[Answer] We requested full restoration of the association's scope of authority. At that congress, incidentally, there were indeed speeches which degenerated into mutually offensive personal remarks; and some writers also made statements that might have sounded offensive because the speakers worded them somewhat crudely and perhaps rashly. We know that similar statements have been made also in other areas of our political life, and perhaps more sharply in some instances than at the congress of the Writers Association. It was a mistake, in

my opinion, not to give this congress adequate press coverage. The press reported merely that the governing body of the Writers Association had elected the association's chairman and secretary general, identifying them by name. Which implied that the other members of the presidium, and a large proportion of the governing body's members, were felt to be not acceptable to the government.

[Question] Twenty-eight writers resigned from the association. And it was rumored that a rival Writers Union would be formed.

[Answer] Yes, there was talk of that. Of the 155 party members in the Writers Association, only 20 resigned. The aim was to have all party members resign, and with more than a hundred writers it would have been possible to form a Writers Union. But the writers' general mood was not amenable to this idea. Indeed, some of the 28 members who resigned have since rejoined the Writers Association.

[Question] And what about the writers who have not rejoined?

[Answer] I said that eventually, under suitable conditions, the Writers Association would not rule out considering also their readmission.

[Question] How have the differences been narrowed to relax the tension between the government and the Writers Association?

[Answer] On behalf of the presidium, I expressed our willingness to cooperate, with the tools available to us as writers, on the government's consolidation program. That is a compromise that I as chairman have been urging we adopt, because I believe this to be the only feasible way of preserving the Writers Association. In November, I wrote a letter to the minister of culture and education, offering to represent the Writers Association at any conference the ministry would sponsor, provided the association's scope of authority was fully restored. I attached also a work schedule, in the introduction to which I repeated my January offer: cooperation with the government once the association's scope of authority has been fully restored, and our desire to cooperate even though we would continue to argue in writers' workshops and to express what was on our minds.

[Question] Can that actually be called a pledge of loyalty?

[Answer] I consider our offer an honest compromise: the government lifts the very severe restrictions that the minister published in NEPSZABADSAG in January 1987, and at the same time the Writers Association is allowed to continue to function.

[Question] Let me reveal something else. When I contacted you to set the date for this interview, you specified that you would give KEPES 7 an interview only after the publication of Bela Kopeczi's article. In other words, you knew beforehand that an article by the minister of culture and education would be published. Did you want to adapt or respond to his article?

[Answer] All I wanted was to know what the article would contain. And I would have liked it to appear in NEPSZABADSAG, the same paper where the restrictions imposed on us were published. In the end the article appeared in UJ TUKOR, rather than in NEPSZABADSAG. But we found the minister's article reassuring, especially the fact that it contained a brief passage from my introduction to the work schedule mentioned earlier.

[Question] Open warfare between the government and the Writers Association appears to have ceased, without a peace treaty.

[Answer] Whether this is compromise or pre-ailing reason, it may all amount to the same thing. Obviously, the government's response to our January 1987 offer at that time was merely a gesture of rejection. We made another offer in November. This time there was willingness to compromise, or reason prevailed, also on the part of our government. Our offer, too, provided certain opportunities for cooperation.

[Question] The Writers Union of the GDR held its congress in Berlin recently, and you too were there. Also according to Hungarian news reports, the tone of the writers' debate was sharp.

[Answer] The tone of the plenary session was muted, but the sessions of the four sections resembled the style of our congress.

[Question] What was the GDR government's response?

[Answer] The government did not respond to the proceedings in the sections. In the summation, the contributions to the debate sounded more moderate and flexibly reflected cooperation with the government.

[Question] We are living under a loyal one-party system. There are many writers active and speaking out in the Writers Association who hold views different from the standpoint of our government. Indeed, many of these writers are publishing also in Western periodicals that do not meet with the approval of official policy. One gains the impression that there is pluralism within the Writers Association.

[Answer] The Writers Association has 615 members who think in 615 different ways. Neither the leadership of the Writers Association, nor even the government is able to influence or prescribe a writer's thinking. But we do have a say in evaluating a writer on the basis of his works. This

is something that the government, too, has very wisely accepted, i.e., that it is unnecessary to ban writers because of their political or other statements. Everyone is responsible for his own published works and may be brought to account only for what he as a citizen has published.

[Question] And now there is this "Spiro affair." Has it not been exaggerated somewhat?

[Answer] It is a misunderstanding, rather than a scandal. It stems from the fact that misinformed accounts and distorting or half-baked commentaries have spread about the debate before the governing body of the Writers Association. We neither wanted to nor could intervene in them.

[Question] Spiro's poem appeared in MOZGO VILAG, which has a small circulation. However, a Toronto newspaper also published it.

[Answer] Evidently with Gyorgy Spiro's permission. In Hungary, UJ ELET also published the poem, but inaccurately. That is why I believe that it would be expedient for KEPES 7 to publish this poem, and also Spiro's four contributions to the debate before the governing body of the Writers Association, which so far have not been reported in the press. (Footnote 1) (The editors wish to note the following: We have read repeatedly those portions of the minutes that have been made available to us and record Gyorgy Spiro's contributions to the debate before the governing body of the Writers Association. He spoke in the debate four times. It is our considered judgment that we would be presenting his true standpoint, and keeping our readers accurately informed, only if we were to publish also the views of the speakers for and against him in the debate. This would require publishing the minutes in greater detail, if not verbatim. In our opinion, however, this ought to be the task of the literary journals, for it would exceed the scope of KEPES 7.) These are his replies to the friendly admonitions of Ferenc Karinthy, Miklos Meszoly, Peter Nadas and Istvan Vas. The association's 50-member governing body debated this issue on the spur of the moment. As a member of the governing body, Spiro was present and we heard his views.

[Question] I read in Bela Kopeczi's Christmas article that you have submitted your work schedule for this year.

[Answer] The work schedule contains the proposals of the section chairmen and lists the debates, meetings and conferences they intend to hold. Furthermore, we are planning also meetings of the governing body and of the presidium, on timely issues. We will be receiving foreign delegations and sending our delegations abroad.

[Question] Hungarian literature is not limited to the works of writers living in Hungary. How is the Writers Association aiding the situation of writers living beyond our borders?

[Answer] I am able to cite two examples of this. We have protested against the official ignoring of writer Sandor Kanyadi in Romania. And we have awarded a prize for outstanding literary work to writer Lajos Grendel in Czechoslovakia, for his novel that has also appeared in a Hungarian edition.

[Question] Are you maintaining contact also with Hungarian writers living in the West?

[Answer] We are now playing host to Gyorgy Ferdinandy, and we have invited Gyorgy Faludy as well. We would also like to interview Sandor Marai, now 87, to find out whether his opinion of Hungary has changed.

[Question] The main topic at the 1968 [as published] congresses of the associations for the arts has been the amount of state subsidy and its distribution.

[Answer] Our subsidy, too, has been cut. But we will attempt to manage more prudently what we do get, and there have also been lay-offs.

[Question] A tax expert said on television that writers have not requested tax abatement. No fixed time can be set for the "production" of an artistic work.... What can you tell us about the interest-representing activity of the Writers Association?

[Answer] The trade union handles the tax affairs of writers. But there is a tax rule in force that tax abatement may be claimed for a longer period of time in the case of works that are produced over several years. However, the truth of the matter is that only 2.5 percent of the writers attain annual incomes of 400,000 forints or more. Half of the association's members are earning less than 50,000 forints a year. In other words, their standard of living is below the average.

[Question] There are views to the effect that our literature is drab and undistinguished because, among other reasons, it is intensive and clique-minded. Many published works are gathering dust in storage, for readers are already able to be choosy. Book distribution is coping with bankruptcy, despite its 33-percent profit margin.

[Answer] The rumors could be true. I myself am not a member of any clique. Consequently, I have experienced neither the advantages nor the drawbacks of belonging to a clique. Fortunately. If there are unsold books gathering dust in storage, for that I blame first of all the policies of the publishing houses. As a result of the subsidy cuts, I hope, fewer books will be published that deserve to gather dust. On the other hand, it is to be feared that many valuable works will not see the light of day. Yet I

am confident that, even under the difficult circumstances, the publishing houses will be able to identify the works that must be presented to the readers.

[Question] A new concept has been added to our vocabulary in recent years: arcade literature. Are you not afraid that much of the works disseminated there are luridly sensational junk, often tactless, and will undermine literary taste?

[Answer] Our openness can hardly prevent the dissemination of arcade literature. After all, any work may be published that is not pornography or against the regime. Incidentally, it is very difficult to control quality.

[Question] I have the feeling that there are quite a few writers of modest talent whose books have been published one after the other up to now, more or less as a government subsidy; sales of their books have been boosted through ads and good reviews; and their books have been bought by the libraries, only to lie there on the shelves unread.

[Answer] This will no longer be in the interest of any publishing house. I believe in natural selection, and not artificial selection.

1014

Moderate Dissident Konrad Interviewed by
Yugoslav Weekly
28000091 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
23 Feb 88 pp 33-36

[Interview with Gyorgy Konrad, Hungarian novelist, by Jovo Paripovic, in Subotica on an unspecified date: "Where the Choice Has To Be Made Between Hot and Cold"]

[Excerpts] In the novel "Gubitznik" [The Lover] of Gyorgy Konrad, one of the most distinguished representatives of the new wave of Hungarian prose in the sixties, there stands this sentence: "You stride in the tracks of someone else's footsteps in a direction whence no one will be able to return." It was this experience that decided the writer to take his own road. Not an easy one at all. ("In Budapest I am unable to just be a writer, I am preoccupied not only by creativity itself, but also by difficulties. Like it or not, I overstep the boundaries and prohibitions, since my common sense cannot behave according to the established rules of the game.")

Gyorgy Konrad belongs to the so-called ~~hard~~ core of the Hungarian democratic intellectual opposition and free-thinkers gathered in the so-called "democratic forum," which has more and more frequently been entering into a dialogue with official bodies, posing them "awkward questions." (They are even adopting, we have recently heard, proposals for amendment of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Hungary.)

Konrad tells about his book being confiscated and destroyed here and there, but "the police have not been mistreating me," and in libraries it has the status of "prohibited material" and a special permit is required for reading his books. He does have a passport (he just made a lengthy visit to the United States), but silence reigns in Hungary concerning him and his work. He is unemployed, and, he says, "he extends himself as far as he can—over the blank page of paper." While he publishes his books in Hungary, if he is successful, on his own, abroad they are translating and publishing him. ("For me, Prosveta's publishing my novel 'Gubutnik' is like a kind of homecoming—my work has won the rights of citizenship even in a socialist country.") Following graduation in the department for Hungarian language and literature in the School of Philosophy at Budapest University in 1956, he began at age 31 to write his first novel "Posetilac" [The Visitor], which was published in 1969 (translated in 12 countries). Then came the novels "Osnivač Grada" [The City's Founder] (1977), "Gubutnik" (1978), "Vrtna Zabava" [Garden Frolic] (1985), and he recently completed the manuscript of yet another novel. He has been writing essays (published in the collections "Put Inteligencije ka Klasnoj Moci, Iskustvenje Autonomije" [The Intelligentsia's Road to Class Power, the Temptation of Autonomy] and "Antipolitika" [Antipolitics]), and he has been publishing virtually all of them abroad. He says he has no desire to change the world, but is trying to understand it, and he emphasized that he is "perhaps the author of his own life," but "for all of 50 years the Hungarian state has been my coauthor with its big allies in the rear."

[Question] You say of yourself that you are a Communist—anti-Communist whose life is an adventure because you do not deny your own truths.

[Answer] Today I would no longer call myself a communist anti-Communist. Perhaps I am neither one nor the other. I am a thinking, independent, Central European, Budapest, Hungarian Jewish citizen. Aside from my writing, I have in my life found myself facing one rhetoric or another in the various periods of my life. In my childhood I confronted the rhetoric of anti-Semitism, the rhetoric of a state which had set out on the road of fascistization, and then as a son of the bourgeois class the rhetoric of Stalinism, and finally, today I face the paternalistic rhetoric of state socialism.

[Question] Might you be considered a dissident?

[Answer] My position is that in a democracy every independent man is a dissident. I am a dissident even among dissidents. I consider it my right, and I expect this from others as well, to think with my own head, to have my own opinion about things. That is the most important thing today.

[Question] But it seems you also try to teach those other people, who think differently, to respect one another.

[Answer] There is no doubt that in democratic political institutions people by and large can play only their own roles. I support every form of democracy with my sympathies under this sky of ours. I believe that state-socialist bureaucracies are passing phenomena. Democratic transformation occurred somewhat later in this part of Europe than in the northwestern European states. It has only now reached southern Europe as well, but democratization is today the strongest tendency in the world, not only in Europe, but also on other continents. In that context it might sound almost like rhetoric for me to say that I am an advocate of democracy, but it really seems to me that that system is the least unpleasant, although even it has quite a few defects.

[Question] You did not join many of your colleagues in choosing the West.

[Answer] More than 200,000 people left Hungary in 1956; most of my friends, a majority of my schoolfellows among them. My staying is certainly related to the fact that on the one hand I am an optimist, that is, I think that sooner or later we will become free even in our own city, while on the other hand for a writer the reality of language and then physical reality are more important than the reality of the senses—I love Budapest and I have no desire to leave it.

[Question] Don't you miss the positions and privileges of a "state intellectual"?

[Answer] In the early sixties and seventies I was still able to publish my novels legally. Now I publish them myself. But a period of liberalization seems to be coming, and perhaps in a few years I will again be an author that is legally published. I do not believe that the presence or absence of a government stamp on a book can have an effect on it. I do my job, and whether or not or when they accept me is not my problem.

[Question] Socialism is historical reality but at the same time an undying utopia, you have said somewhere.

[Answer] Those societies which have called themselves socialists would not be able to rid themselves of that attribute even if they wanted to, since those socialistically committed people who live in these systems are accustomed to that language, to that system of institutions, since their lives have been lived in that history. That is, socialism has become the historical reality of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, like it or not. There is no escaping that history. In that sense, socialism, that socialism that actually exists, does not contain any utopian element at all, since we do not live in utopia.

Yet what has made socialism attractive to most people is some kind of idea of solidarity, that is, to use a biblical expression, that the widow and the orphans should be protected and helped. At the same time, that idea has also been an expression of personal human dignity, the aspiration that people not be overwhelmed by their own

institutions. For Marx, the most dangerous institution threatening men was capital, which appropriates the surplus value of labor. It seems to me that toward the end of the 20th century we have been witnesses of a kind of appropriation, we have been witnesses of expropriation by the state, that is, of a transformation of the human habitat into institutions which are out of our control. Man's aspiration to get back his right to make decisions, to have the right to his own goals, if you like, to his own ideology, his own view of the world, to live with guaranteed human rights, I view as one of the stages in the lengthy process of human emancipation. For me, socialism is not a model that has been set down once and for all. Today's generation likewise has the right to define what it considers to be socialism, just as previous generations had that right and exercised it. There is no justification whatsoever, then, for one generation to hold another in captivity.

[Question] You have mentioned Marx. All kinds of things are sworn to in his name and covered by his ideas, but you once made the witty observation: Where in Eastern Europe could Marx go without being arrested for plotting against the state?

[Answer] My nephew recently took his own life in Oxford. He was a member of the party already at the age of 13 and later became an official, but very soon he came to understand many things. He published a small satire in the student newspaper at the Karl Marx School of Economics of Budapest University in which he described how Marx came to that school named after him and listened to what was being taught to the students as Marxist political economy. He listened and listened, and finally he could not restrain himself and put up his hand to speak. They threw him out of the school and arrested him. Soon they also expelled my nephew from the school, and then from the party as well. Marx was a radical democratic thinker and he certainly would be astounded to see the diverse versions of those monarchoid paternalisms which have developed in Central and Eastern Europe under his enlarged photograph.

[Question] Let us go back to the development of socialism. What do you consider to be the third period of socialism if the first, as you say, is Stalin's time, and the second what came after him?

[Answer] The third period of socialism, as I conceive it, will be postpaternalistic. If the societies of Central and Eastern Europe are to be able to become part of the third industrial revolution, they will have to take strides into that third period of their own history. If they do not do so, they will become peripheral states on the eastern edge of Western Europe, a kind of European Third World. The third industrial revolution signifies a liberation of man's fantasy, initiative, and enterprise. In the eastern part of Europe today there is no big capital behind enterprise, here it is a question of human capital, and it is the most mobile. Those little cooperatives, little work

communities, which even in Hungary have been springing up like toadstools after a rain, are today the most dynamic enterprises. We are talking, then, about a mixed economy. What characterizes this third period of socialism is precisely the broad range of forms of ownership and management and especially the fact that all forms of enterprise are equal. There is, then, no enterprise that is preferred by law. It is the forms of enterprise that compete on the market rather than the enterprises themselves.

[Question] You also reflect about self-management in some of your essays. Is Hungarian society moving in that direction?

[Answer] Earlier I was among those who thought that an enterprise could be managed by a triangle: the self-managers, the professional management team, and the trade union. Many economists dispute the idea coming from the democratic opposition that the more liberal functioning of the enterprise should be supported by self-managed organizations. They say that this simply will not work and that a self-managed organization is a handicap in economic competition.

Hungarian self-management cannot boast of any particular results. Whenever such experiments have been initiated, bureaucratic control has always prevailed in the end. I think that in the fertilization of capital self-management has nothing to say as a form of organization. It is important that it not cloud over the function of the trade union. At the same time, in all other areas, from social welfare policy to culture and municipal administration, self-management has immense importance as a form of organization.

[Question] You consider the trade union to be the only way for the working class to enter the "anteroom of legal politics."

[Answer] Even today I feel that the trade unions could and should be the most effective defenders of the economic, social, and indeed even cultural interests of the working class. I do not think that there should be only one trade union in the country. Why should there not be several trade union organizations operating in the same enterprise and representing differing interests? The political party and the trade union ought not to perform the same functions. I think that the Polish Solidarnosc was overburdened with a multitude of political tasks which fell to it by default. The trade union has a specific role in a highly variegated political atmosphere. It unites the differing interests of the working class, but not only the "blue-collar workers," or, as you call them, the direct producers, but all those who work for salaries or wages.

[Question] You are well-known for objecting to divisions into blocs. In 1956 you called for United Nations troops to come to Hungary, and that caused you problems. You

have written in your essay "A Paradoxical Milieu" that "even the people of Budapest would have something to say between East and West."

[Answer] That "between" need not necessarily be political. In the end, the "milieu" is that place where every man lives. Once in Australia I saw a map of the world which had Australia in the center, Europe in one corner, and America in another. Why should Vienna, Budapest, Zagreb, and Warsaw feel themselves to be the outskirts, the outer edge, the periphery? Why should the two halves of Berlin feel themselves to be the border zone between two opposite civilizations? When we give it a bit more thought, our specific case is that we live on that dividing line and our way of thought is influenced by two cultures. We live where the choice has to be made between hot and cold, at the boundary between differing rationales—the statist and the individualistic. Our paramount political task is to find our own policy. It would be bad if Central and Eastern Europe could be used against anyone as a zone for preparing an attack. If that part of Europe is to be master in its own house, it somehow has to make a break with the present military-political reality in which the military alliance defines social reality. It ought to be the other way around: social reality should define the military organization. I think that a Central and Eastern European confederation might be a transitional solution. Internal democracy would prevail in it, with guarantees that the eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union, would find friendly neighbors in that federation.

[Question] How do you evaluate developments among Hungarian writers? Was that certain rebelliousness of a year ago only an appearance?

[Answer] The democratic identity of that professional organization is still a matter of dispute. The members of the highest forum of that organization are age 55 on the average, so there are grounds for talking about a gerontological organization. When those with the biggest reputations are elected, they are over 60 as a rule. Tibor Csere, a person who deserves everyone's respect and who heads Hungarian writers, is 75 years old. The writing profession has taken on a certain tribal attribute.

It is becoming a council of elders. We have had frequent occasion to feel this. Thus in 1956 it was very important that Tibor Dery, Peter Veres, Gyula Illyés, and Aron Tamási made a joint statement. A group of young writers is somewhat more lively, and it seems to me that a new generation is coming on to the scene. And that is all. The Writers Union certainly is not any vanguard of intellectual ferment in Hungary.

[Question] What is your view of perestroika? What have been its reflections in Hungary, do you agree with the observation that it began much earlier in Hungary than in the USSR?

[Answer] I agree. Definitely, in Hungary we have a process of reforms behind us lasting some 20 years now. The economic reform which was born as a conception somewhere in the sixties was cut short in Czechoslovakia, in Poland as well, while in Hungary it was brought to a stop, postponed for periods of varying length, and then again gained momentum, but at no time did it stop altogether.

However, there has also always been a fear of how this would be seen and interpreted in the other socialist countries, interwoven with efforts so that the liberalization of enterprise would be somehow accommodated to some kind of general socialist ideology. Thought was also given to the extent to which a political reform could keep pace with the economic reform. That question has been very relevant up to this very day. Proposals are raining down from the intellectual scene, there is debate about differing conceptions of political reforms. Some of those conceptions have been formulated by certain members of the very top party leadership together with intellectuals close to them, while certain other proposals come from the circles of the democratic opposition. Incidentally, there are very interesting points which those conceptions have in common, and from that standpoint we can look on perestroika and on Gorbachev himself with a sense that now we need no longer worry so much about our own experiments, since if now the Soviet Union is taking certain steps itself, then the steps taken in neighboring countries are less scandalous.

However, on the basis of what I know and what I have been hearing about the Soviet Union, I think that it will be far more difficult for Soviet society to move in the direction of the proclaimed reforms than Hungarian society. I asked a friend of mine if he believed in and hoped for a good outcome of the changes covered by the term "perestroika"? He answered: Can I hope for anything better? That is, on the market there is no choice; let us put our trust only in what we have. We have to hope that we will be able to travel our own road more freely. If the method of centralistic command is no longer applied, relations can be founded only upon a treaty. There is another problem: in our country it is being said from even the highest places that we have done quite a bit of that in our reforms. This creates an excuse for doing nothing. That is why the interpretation of glasnost varies; everyone interprets it in the way that suits him.

[Question] I would like to remind you of a detail from back in November 1956. When the tanks were rumbling in Budapest the director of the Hungarian wire service (MTI) sent a telex to the world which concluded: "We are dying for Hungary and for Europe." What do you think, will perestroika "return" Hungary and certain other countries to Europe?

[Answer] If we try to paraphrase today that MTI message from 1956, we might say that we have to live and think for Europe. Even then we will be thinking mostly of ourselves. We have been in Europe, and we find in

Europe a large portion of our habits, culture, and awareness of the world, but we will be in it more and more, since Europe itself has become small.

To shut oneself off today in a national state is equivalent to shutting yourself off within a single parish at the beginning of this century. Today it is quite obvious that Europe's cultural and political map does not consist of units separated by rigid borders, and every attempt to the contrary results only in certain grotesque dictatorships such as those in Albania or Romania.

The natural energy of every society today is working in the direction of a deepening of mutual contacts, of exchange, and if the conditions are not furnished for that, life will demonstrate all that clearly in its specific forms, from the black market to emigration.

At the level of illegal trade, even today we can speak with confidence about Central and Eastern European integration that has been achieved. Another example of the legalization of those latent tendencies is that I can travel here with a stamp (the interview was conducted in Subotica—author's note), which makes such trips possible; that certainly proves that I have become an adult. So that every time I do not have to raise my hand for the teacher's permission to go to the bathroom, having every time to explain why I have to go "outside." So at least to that extent I have become more of an adult. Becoming a European and becoming an adult is the same thing. The masses that applaud frenetically at the feet of an untouchable leader are not adults. I think that today it is not rebellious adolescents who are the agent of history, but rather the culture of adults who think for themselves and for others.

[Question] Perestroika is also bringing certain cases of rehabilitation, changes in assessments of certain events. Is anything of that kind anticipated in Hungary? Will the year 1956 in Hungary be given its true place in history?

[Answer] Were that to happen, we might talk about truly qualitative changes. On the 30th anniversary of those events all the official comments, announcements, official documentary films, and radio and television broadcasts—all of them were aimed at justifying the events that took place on 4 November 1956. Imre Nagy's grave has remained unmarked to this very day. Nor have the graves of those politicians and public figures condemned to death and executed after 1956 been marked either. But there is growing pressure from the democratic public for even this to be decently overcome. I suppose that in the course of political changes in coming years a more flexible approach will be taken even to that problem; however, this still is directly connected to certain changes of personnel in Hungary's top leadership.

Privately Funded 'Alternative' High School Approved To Open in 1990

25000141 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 5 Mar 88 pp 42-43

[Interview with Gyorgy Horn, principal of the Ferenc Rakoczi Business High School, by Endre Babut: "Our High School Will Be Directed by a Self-Management Organization"]

[Text] The issue of education has been one of the most difficult-to-manage "crisis branches" facing Hungarian society. Recently, after a series of educational reforms of often questionable outcome, we have been hearing more and more about attempts from below to establish new schools. How realistic, in your opinion, are the chances for such autonomous educational institutions to be established in a school system which to this day has remained strongly centralized? This was the question we have put to Gyorgy Horn (age 36), school principal, head of the Ferenc Rakoczi Business High School, who will soon be leaving his present post so that he can begin working on the establishment of a new business high school with several of his fellow educators.

HVG: A few months ago you submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Education requesting permission to establish a business high school to be run as a corporation or a foundation. What would make a practicing school principal to get involved in drumming up support for the establishment of a new kind of partnership-operated educational institution?

Gy.H.: We want to create an alternative school. A kind of autonomous high school which from the moment of its inception would be independent of the tutelage of state administration. In order to do this we need to step outside of the present ossified structure, rethinking virtually everything, including the organizational framework, management, curriculum and teaching methodologies of our schools. In an already operating and functioning institution this would be an impossible undertaking. Despite the fact that the 1983 education law declared them to be independent, there is not a single issue of importance on which our existing schools could make a decision on their own. Schools are not allowed, for example, to determine the content of what they teach, their program of instruction or their learning objectives. They do not have the exclusive right to select their students and teachers. In the majority of our educational institutions today, the autonomy heralded by the statutory provision remains pure fiction. Our schools today are institutions designed to implement the educational policies of a paternalistic system.

It is clear that the plan instruction system which heretofore has dominated domestic education is also incompatible with the idea of granting the schools economic autonomy. The amount of state funds allocated to the various institutions is for the most part determined on

the basis of informal ties. Decisions have been made without involving the public, and the resulting subsidies have created unjustifiable differences among individual schools.

HVG: According to the statistics, the amount of budgetary outlays earmarked for public education continues to be below the international average. Yet you seem to feel that the problems lie more in the way the moneys are distributed.

Gy.H.: Even given the present level of state subsidies we could improve the state of domestic education by giving our schools economic autonomy. As a first step, however, we need to make public the standards that are used to give local councils the central subsidies they need to run their schools. We need to guarantee every educational institution access to these funds. Only this will put an end to the prevailing "spahi" mentality of demanding more and more resources and living them up as quickly as possible. Long-term management today is virtually impossible. The amount, designation and disbursement date of state subsidies to the schools are extremely uncertain. The extent of the subsidies may be changed during the course of the year not only by the government but also by the local council acting within its own sphere of authority.

It should be pointed out that most of the subsidies allocated to local administrations from the state budget are earmarked for education and the maintenance and operation of health care institutions. Whenever a local council is faced with an unanticipated need for funds these are the two areas where they usually end up cutting resources. Transferring the budgetary responsibilities directly to the schools would fundamentally change the present system and would lay the foundations of autonomous management. In addition, we need to have some central funds set aside at the Ministry of Education which could be used, for example, to finance new initiatives under a competitive bidding system.

In order to strengthen the social position of our schools, it would also be a good idea to create a corporate organization of educational institutions designed to protect its members' interests, modeled after the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce whose function is to represent the interests of enterprises. This kind of a voluntary alliance of schools could lobby in the interest of public education, in other words, it would enable the schools to take a collective stand and to strengthen their horizontal ties.

HVG: All of this is still in the realm of ideas. What, in your opinion, are the realistic chances for—as you have put it—autonomous schools to be established under the present, purportedly plan-instruction based system?

Gy.H.: Since under the present conditions public education as a whole cannot be radically changed, we should begin by transforming some of its elements. We need to

create enclaves of autonomous schools. Self-managed educational institutions in which the faculty would decide what objectives it wishes to pursue. I find it absurd and unacceptable that while in the past few years large numbers of state enterprises have become self-managed, in the area of education administrative controls have not only not weakened, but actually strengthened during the two decades of economic reform. I am convinced that the teachers themselves could be placed in charge of the schools in which they work.

HVG: How can we create autonomous schools today? Theoretically there are several organizational alternatives. It is conceivable, for example, to have the parental households maintain these schools by providing the resources needed beyond the basic funds allocated by the state. Today, however, it is still legally impossible to organize private schools. The existence of legal obstacles is also the reason why we cannot have incorporated schools in this country. There is nothing, however, that would forbid educational institutions in Hungary from operating as foundations. This is why several of my fellow educators and I have opted to follow this route toward the realization of our jointly conceived concept. A couple of months ago, the Ministry of Education assured us of its support for our plan to establish such a high school.

HVG: Are you not concerned that instead of the state administrators your high school will now be at the mercy of your trustees' demands? What will your supporters be getting for their money?

Gy.H.: Naturally, we do not intend to sell our school to anyone. There are, incidentally, several enterprise-supported schools operating in Hungary already, e.g., the trade schools sponsored by the Paks Nuclear Power Plant and the Ganz-Hungarian State Iron, Steel and Machine Works. Our aim, however, is not to create a high school designed to meet enterprise manpower needs. Our high school will be run by a self-management organization, the faculty. The training concept, course structure and curriculum of our institution will be determined by our teaching staff. The resulting program will be what our school will offer to those who request it. The organizations that have contributed to the founding and operation of our institution, including the Ministry of Education and the Capital City Council on the one hand, and the sponsoring enterprises on the other, will all be on the school board which will function as the school's overseer and advisory body. The sponsoring enterprises will be given opportunities to propose certain trade-specific sub-programs. Participation in these elective courses, of course, will be voluntary. We will not even commit ourselves to orienting our graduates toward taking up employment with our supporting enterprises.

HVG: What kind of enterprises do you expect would consider it to be in their interest to support your high school under these conditions?

Gy.H.: We would like to attract enterprises which consider themselves to be active players in our increasingly market oriented economy. We are currently negotiating with Skala, Taurus, the State Insurance Agency as well as with the CHEMOLIMPEX Export-Import Enterprise for Chemical Industry Machinery and Equipment and the Hungarian Credit Bank. Our plan is to convince the firms participating in the foundation to contribute between 1 to 2 million forints a year to the founding capital for 8 to 10 years. We are proceeding from the assumption that dynamic firms are looking not only for administrative type of employees, but also for enterprising and creative specialists. In addition to preparing our students for college and offering traditional administrative training, therefore, our school will also consider it to be its duty to provide business-school type of economic specialist training for our enterprises. Theoretical training in this area will also be augmented by hands-on business experience, as we plan to set up in-house school cooperatives, a student bank, an insurance agency, a translation bureau and a duplication plant. This latter would, for example, be in charge of printing the textbooks which—at least in part—will be authored by the faculty of our school.

HVG: When will the first class commence in your little "enclave?"

Gy.H.: The Ministry of Education has given our nearly 20-member teaching staff the green light to begin work on our high school's training program, starting 1 September 1988. The "recruitment" of the faculty has already begun. We would like to start teaching in September 1990, probably in a vacant elementary school in Obuda which by that time will be ready for remodeling.

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POLAND

Constitutional Expert on Efforts To Draft New Constitution, Essential Changes

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[Interview with Kazimierz Dzialocha, Constitutional Tribunal magistrate and professor of constitutional law at the Institute for Constitutional Research at the University of Wroclaw, by Mariusz Urbanek: "The Shield and the Weapon"]

[Text]

[Question] The need to change the PRL [Polish People's Republic] Constitution is nowadays being mentioned increasingly publicly and frequently. This is being mentioned not only by lawyers but also by politicians. The probable date of promulgating a new constitution is even being mentioned as well—the bicentennial of the Constitution of 3 May 1791. Why is it that the old Constitution has suddenly been found to be bad?

[Answer] The doctrine of constitutional law has been referring to the need to change the Constitution of 22 July 1952 ever since the Polish October of 1956 [workers' bread riots in Poznan], and it has never since abandoned this postulate. There were times, as for example during the Sixth PZPR Congress, when it was explicitly stated that the PRL Constitution has already performed its role and work on a new constitution should begin, but subsequently this political conviction had weakened. Thus the basic constitution, with its good fundamental premises, has endured to this day. But let us bear in mind that it had been voted in an atmosphere which had to be and was gotten rid of. This constitution is burdened by the brand of history, the brand of the era in which it had been framed.

[Question] The brand of Stalinism, to speak plainly.

[Answer] The constitutions of the other socialist countries, our peers, have already been changed, all with the exception of the Hungarian Constitution of 1948, but that one has been so thoroughly amended that, properly speaking, it is a new constitution. All the constitutions of that era were burdened by the concept—deriving undoubtedly from Stalin—of the constitution as a balance sheet, a summation, of achievements on the road of socialism-building. They represented a profession of faith in the political system and were supposed to raise citizens in the spirit of loyalty to the idea. The international importance of the constitution as a way of mobilizing the world proletariat for the struggle for the ideas it contained was even mentioned.

Emphasis was shifted onto the indoctrinating and political functions of the constitution, relegating law to a tertiary role. Both our own and the other socialist constitutions of the initial era were characterized by proclaiming what are indeed very democratic assumptions of the system of society without, however, containing any effective safeguards for these assumptions. The new system of society was, as it were, to guarantee adherence to constitutional norms by virtue of its very definition. The situation turned out to be otherwise.

[Question] Why is it then that Poland alone among the socialist countries has not yet changed its constitution? Usually it has not remained at the tail-end, at least not among the socialist countries.

[Answer] For many years the dominant tendency in Poland has been to minimize the need for any change, even for the most basic changes, in the supreme law of the land, to avoid such changes until the very last. Following a period of euphoria [when he came to power owing to October 1956], Wladyslaw Gomulka began to fear any radical change. Only one of the many postulates of the Polish October was translated into reality: the reincorporation of the Supreme Chamber of Control in the system of state agencies. The others were postponed, as it turned out, "ad calendas Graecas." Later there

occurred the bad experience associated with the amendments of 10 February 1976, the most extensive amendments so far. Controversy had arisen concerning certain provisions then introduced. There was a stir which raised the hackles of the political decisionmakers, and ultimately the amendments turned out to be much more restricted than they could have been. The notion that it is better to do nothing than to risk adversarial criticism emerged victorious.

[Question] Nowadays the situation is different, is it not?

[Answer] In the 1980s legislation has usually gone so far as regards creating new institutions of political life, which even are influencing revisions of certain assumptions of the system of society, that the constitution in its ossified and unchanged state no longer keeps abreast of these changes. The return to the idea that the Sejm is superior to the Supreme Chamber of Control, and the establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Tribunal of State, and the Constitutional Tribunal as the guardians of the constitutionality and legality of the actions of state agencies represent changes that affect the pillars of the system of society, and so do such other changes as the appointment of the Citizens' Rights Spokesman and the passage of decrees on [autonomy of] state enterprises and on workforce self-governments. Even so, all these changes still are not reflected in the constitution. Even the pertinent constitutional provisions are laconic and incomplete. The clauses concerning the Tribunal of State and the Constitutional Tribunal should be much more extensive, but this is not possible owing to the narrow framework of the old constitution.

[Question] Cannot the abundance of democratic changes under way be accommodated in these clauses?

[Answer] Or perhaps, to turn this question around, it may be that the framework of the Constitution of 1952 impedes more fundamental and optimal changes. The notion I referred to, namely, the notion that ramified institutions acting as watchdogs of legality and constitutionality in public life are unnecessary under socialism, is taking its toll. The Stalinist period and the subsequent years showed how much this notion is divorced from reality. Hence also, in Poland, as probably in no other socialist country, strengthening the safeguards of the legality of actions of the state has been devoutly desired. Now that the Citizens' Rights Spokesman—for whom also, besides, no provision exists in the constitution—has been appointed, we are dealing, as somebody said, with an elegant law-abiding country.

[Question] It appears that our environmental protection laws also are the best in Europe.

[Answer] What is also needed is that all these safeguards be effective. Yet, some people already are saying that the Constitutional Tribunal, the Tribunal of State, and the Supreme Administrative Court represent attempts to pattern the Polish Constitution on bourgeois models that

conflict with the principle of unity of state power. Properly speaking, the contradictions between supporters of including and strengthening in the new constitution democratic solutions of the 1980s and representatives of conservative, bureaucratic-technocratic attitudes have appeared even now.

[Question] So then, a compromise?

[Answer] It would be bad if the new constitution were merely to represent a compromise between opposing tendencies, because this would not solve anything and would make it a fictitious constitution that would remain on paper starting with the moment it is framed.

[Question] All this time we have been talking about changing the constitution, but can this one word be construed as a completely new constitution or merely an amended one?

[Answer] Changing the constitution should mean, although this still has not been definitely settled, drafting a completely new supreme law of the land. There exists one more important reason in addition to the ones mentioned above: I remember when as a university student I carried the draft of that constitution in a May Day parade; at the time it was said that it would be our weapon and a protective shield against state deformations. But it hardly has been a weapon and a shield. This has impaired respect for it, and it has forfeited its authority in the legal and political awareness of citizens. This is, I think, another argument why we need a completely new constitution.

[Question] And yet, Professor, the basis for respect for law is its stability, the idea that it should not be and is not being changed depending on changing circumstances. In this context we would give up a constitution with a 40 year old tradition for a new constitution that would be a month, a year, or 2 years old. Modern Polish history has not taught Poles respect for the constitution. Before the war it had been abused at will, and similarly after the war it has been ruled by the caprices of the successive administrations.

[Answer] Indeed, Poland's experience in this field has not been most favorable. I believe that traditions should not be defended at any price.

[Question] Very well, let us then discuss what should that new constitution be like.

[Answer] This is the most important problem. By now we feel that the constitution should be changed, but we still don't know what it should be like. Of a certainty the principal changes should concern the subject matter of Chapter 2 of our present constitution, "The Socio-Economic System." Properly speaking, any and every one of the provisions of that chapter has to be radically revised. It had been framed at a time when the concept of an administrative-command, centralized system for

managing the national economy had been dominant, whereas now we have autonomous enterprises with worker participation in management and the state's monopoly on foreign trade has been broken. All the fundamental elements of the new system of management must be anchored in the constitution, and not in a generalized manner at that. The new constitution should moreover stress the principles of the self-organization of the society into political parties and public, professional, occupational, and self-government organizations. This should become a foundation of the future constitution.

[Question] The new constitution would not be considered new if it would lack a provision on the pluralism of political organizations.

[Answer] Revisions of the decree on assemblies have already been announced, and they should presumably take place ahead of the change of the constitution; this should create a new practice of public self-organization. And this, I hope, shall persuade people that there will appear a genuine, constitutionally safeguarded right to freely associate themselves. This is linked to the issue of the party's exercise of its leading role. So far there is nothing aside from the laconic prescription of the guiding role of the PZPR. At the least, the principle should be proclaimed that the leading or guiding role of the party is to be exercised within the framework of the mandatory legality, in consonance with the Constitution and the binding decrees, by analogy with the manner in which this is settled by the Soviet Constitution of 1977.

[Question] Professor, but the constitutional provision of the leading role of a specifically named party entails the necessity of standing in the voters' queue.

[Answer] It is a characteristic of a political party that it desires to gain power. In stable, democratic countries this is accomplished through elections. In Poland for some time now a coalition system for the exercise of power has been mentioned, and this raises the question of how the aspiration of the smaller parties toward autonomy should be translated into reality in these conditions. This is an issue which those concerned must decide among themselves. Such a decision will not depend on lawyers.

[Question] The framers of the new constitution simply cannot avoid the issue of the place of the Catholic Church therein.

[Answer] The practice of Polish public and social life demonstrates the great importance of the place occupied in it by the Catholic Church. Should this be somehow be made part of a law? Of a certainty, the church itself would not desire a provision regulating its political role, since it justly considers itself as an apolitical institution. We should also bear in mind the principle of the equality

of all creeds, which is mandatory not only in the countries—although, as was once observed by Stefan Rozmaryn, equal treatment cannot be to what is not equal.

[Question] And what about the issue of the opposition in the political system, and her place in the constitution? After all, this postulate is ever-present.

[Answer] I am not aware of any constitution that regulates the status of the opposition in any country, excepting of course the opposition to Her Royal Majesty in Great Britain. Here a general constitutional provision would be useless, while a specific provision is simply impossible; at best, what is conceivable some provision on the existence of an intra-systemic opposition in the preamble to the constitution defining the principal directions of activity of the society. I think, however, that room for opposition forces of this kind can be found by means of revisions in the laws governing the right of citizens to freely associate themselves as well as the right to participate in electoral campaigns. Should the postulate for a second Sejm chamber be achieved, and should representatives of professional-occupational and self-government organizations, elected in a manner different from that of elections to the Chamber of Deputies, sit in that chamber, an opening for the forces of citizens' opposition could be found there.

[Question] The most often voiced postulates pertain to penal law, which is a highly sensitive issue that offers a broad field for abuses.

[Answer] The proclamation in the constitution of the principle of innocence until guilt is proved and of the restriction of law enforcement to only what is specifically prohibited by law....

[Question] The postulates for establishing the institution of the investigating magistrate, depriving the public prosecutors of the right to order provisional detention, specifying the time limit for permissible provisional detention—which at present can be indefinite—and shortening in half the constitutionally specified period of time during which detention by the militia is possible.

[Answer] These are the most justified postulates and the ones basically eliciting the least reservations. For all this of course a place should be found in the new constitution. After all, this concerns elementary principles for defining the position of the citizen in a law-abiding country, such as are besides safeguarded by International Treaties on Human and Civil Rights.

[Question] Behind many postulates concerning the new constitution lies mistrust, desire to avoid in the future those on-and-off green lights or pluralisms which may be suspended at any time. That is why clear formulations and explicit safeguards are being expected.

[Answer] Any domain of law—penal, civil, and economic—should be based on fixed and unchanging foundations to be contained precisely in the constitution. Legislation usually should elaborate them so as to promote translating constitutional principles into reality. And so that the paramount principles of the constitution may not be forfeited, it should include a clause prescribing the direct application of its provisions by the state's agencies. This should concern at least provisions governing the rights and liberties of citizens. The citizen would no longer have to seek justification of his rights by perusing statutory decrees instead of the constitution itself.

[Question] This is linked to granting to the citizen the right to sue in court for violations of his constitutional rights.

[Answer] It may be that we shall yet reach a solution granting the citizen the right of directly suing against decisions of the government that affect him, on the grounds of their unconstitutionality.

[Question] The postulates concerning that future constitution are too many to be all considered. Still, it may be that the constitution will also respond to such proposals as restoring the crown on the head of the eagle [national emblem] or correcting the linguistic error in the appellation of our country: after all, "republic" [res publica] is synonymous with "people's."

[Answer] History teaches that there have been different kinds of republics, and this is supposed to be stressed by that appellation. Anyway, I wish this would be the only kind of problems faced by the framers of the future constitution.

1386

ChSS Favors People's Councils Changes
260002581 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
24 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] The Main Board of the ChSS [Christian Social Association] met on 23 February, with ChSS Chairman Kazimierz Morawski in the chair and a group of councilmen-members of the association from various regions of Poland participating. Proposed changes in the law dated 20 July 1983 on the system of people's councils and territorial self-government were the subject of the meeting. Its participants were in favor of the general outline of proposed changes, emphasizing that they amount to a further significant step on the way of democratizing the system of governance in our state.

9761

United Peasant Party Development, Participation in 'Ruling Coalition'
26000273 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 12, 19 Mar 88 p 3

[Article by Leszek Bedkowski: "A Shade of Green; None From Coalition Parties Have Monopoly on Legitimacy"]

[Text] On 21 March in Warsaw will begin the 10th Congress of the ZSL [United Peasant Party]. While existing since 1949, this party voted its first party program as late as in 1984! Thus there is nothing surprising in that not so recently many foreigners were sincerely amazed to learn that in the PRL [Polish People's Republic] there exist three parties, not one. It is hard to say, besides, whether the ZSL counts for much in the awareness of Poles themselves. When an opinion poll was finally taken, it turned out that the ZSL is ranked close to the bottom on the list of organizations and institutions enjoying authority and popularity. For example, according to an April 1985 poll by the CBOŚ [Public Opinion Survey Center], in answer to the question, "Who counts most in politics?" 1 percent of the respondents named the ZSL and another 1 percent the SD [Democratic Party] (19.5 percent named the PZPR).

Today within the ZSL itself the opinion is encountered that, in its nearly 40 years of existence, this peasant party has been too long one of the transmission belts of the worker party [the PZPR]. The very birth of the ZSL is causing considerable problems to those historians of the peasant movement who ambitiously try to explore the white spots on the green [green is the color of the Polish peasant movement]. The merger of the SL [Peasant Party] with the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] took place during the era of an abrupt regimentation of political systems in all the countries of people's democracies.

The Stalinist model had won. Surely it is only due to a caprice of history that a monoparty had not been established (although this fate already fell to the lot of the youth organizations associated within the ZMP [Union of Polish Youth]). This shortcoming of theory, so to speak, was rapidly compensated in practice. For example, already in the early 1950s, the Peasant Holiday (traditionally celebrated on Whitsuntide [which in Polish is termed Green Holiday]) had disappeared from the political calendar. Peasants were supposed to celebrate May Day together with workers. This was one of the symptoms of the loss of identity by the ZSL. This may have happened because, in the initial years of existence of this party, many experienced worker movement activists were assigned to it in order to strengthen it.

There were many reasons why the ZSL could not, failed to, but also certainly did not want to struggle for its own program and distinct identity.

The systemic principle, expressed in the PKWN [Polish Committee for National Liberation] Manifesto [of July 1944], that Poland is to be a state based on the alliance

of workers and peasants, was quite rapidly reduced to the role of a slogan. One of the alliance's partners was relegated to a marginal political role, as was the party that was to express the interests of the peasants.

The instrumental treatment of agriculture and the forced industrialization construed as the essence of socialism resulted in reducing the role of the "green party" to that of an "organizer of the productive feats of the peasant masses." As for the tacit acceptance of collectivization, the mistreatment of "kulaks" (rich peasants), and the seizure of harvested crops by administrative fiat, these measures represented a political loss by the young party which had had the potential for continuing the ancient tradition of the strong Polish peasant movement. Its radical factions had been spokesmen for the cooperative movement, but not in its form of collectivization by fiat.

In Shadow and in Silence

To be sure, throughout the period since 1949, a ZSL member has, for example, held the post of Speaker of the Sejm. As a rule, however, the ZSL has not been able to nominate its members to high offices. Since it held no effective power, it was not a springboard for personal careers. The green [ZSL membership] card opened no doors to many public posts. The ZSL not only did not count in public life but was not an attractive haven for the intelligentsia, public activists, etc. Thus, while Poland experienced its various shocks, the ZSL stagnated in shadow and silence. It is characteristic that when Wladyslaw Gomułka rehabilitated private farming after 1956, the ZSL caught its breath for several years. At the time, though, it was far from the coalition model being discussed nowadays. Yes, it was a partner [with the PZPR] in those times, but only so far as affairs of agricultural production were concerned. For it was then that the ZSL became a kind of "party of agronomists," reducing its field of view to influencing the technical and technological problems of agriculture and the countryside, but it still had no program of its own. Surely that is why the ZSL was not a political mentor of rural and agricultural institutions, including the cooperatives. The offices of chairmen of even ordinary cooperatives became part of the so-called nomenklatura of [appointments by] the local PZPR echelons.

In the second half of the 1980s the concept of "withdrawing land from the peasant class" began to be translated into reality. The scattered private farms were considered a vexatious snag to the surge of the then mandatory gigantomania, concentration, and centralization. But since land could not be directly appropriated, conditions causing farmers to get rid of it on their own had to be created. The stick and carrot method was used. The carrot was, e.g., a life pension for donating land to the state, the mirage of easy life in the city (characteristic of it is the TV series "Far from the Highway"). The stick

included arbitrary confiscation of "poorly tilled" land, preferences in funds and machinery for cooperatives and state farms, etc. Basically, this meant depriving the ZSL of its political base.

The position of the ZSL in those times was also influenced by the centralist-bureaucratic model of the state, in which the political center fuses with the central government, developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The political center was the PZPR apparatus, which in advance relegated the other parties to second rank. To be sure, their membership grew (e.g., in 1960 the ZSL had 258,000 members and in 1970, 413,000, and just before August 1980 [outbreak of Solidarity] 478,000), but that was at the price of considerable effort. The plans for expanding membership counted more than the actual program.

Greens or Reds

The ZSL also forfeited its identity owing to its unclear stance on the views of its members. The peasant movement had traditionally been attached to religion, although not necessarily to the church, as demonstrated by the extremely strong anticlerical tendencies, especially in "Wici" [synonym for prewar Union of Rural Youth, also the name of the movement's weekly]. This should have been respected by the ZSL, if only through a declaration of openness toward such views. The converse was true, with the ZSL's leadership adopting an unequivocally materialist look. In Warsaw the Greens were to all intents and purposes Red, whereas in the countryside ZSL members were active in parish councils and stood guard in front of church-cemetery graves.

This schism was deepened by the excessively hasty rejection of the traditional, meaning prewar, symbols and values of the peasant movement. The heroes of that movement were condemned to oblivion, while the reputations of accidental persons were artificially inflated. Some tendencies within the movement were totally condemned (PSL-Piast) while others were seen as having a strength they had never had. The reaction to the postwar PSL resembled that of an allergic rash, disregarding the fact that what had remained of it, tiny remnants to be sure, but still something, became part of the ZSL and that it had raised many rank-and-file adherents of the peasant movement. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's name was impugned, and a similar fate met many other "Wici" adherents.

The "unequal access to the table" complex caused many prominent ZSL activists to be overzealous, "more papal than the pope." Even the word "party" was avoided when it came to defining the ZSL; that was a word reserved for the PZPR. To be sure, "stronnictwo" [party, grouping] is a traditional Polish term, adopted from the outset by the peasant movement (the PSL in its various mutations, the SL, the SCCh), but now it was to refer to a lower rank in the political hierarchy, to some inferior

kind of party. It is thus nothing surprising that the expression "the peasant party" began in 1980 to be mentioned so loudly and with such relish.

A Tight Corset

A large number of rank-and-file adherents of the peasant movement have long been discomforted by the tight corset of the "party of agronomists." August was born elsewhere [i.e., among workers — August 1980, the rise of Solidarity], but the countryside too had some accounts to settle.

The Eighth Congress of the ZSL took place as scheduled in December 1980. That was not a good time, because history played a trick. The delegates were nominated and elected before August, but they were to deliberate in a different era. The documents of the ZSL include the diplomatic opinion that it was then that the latent energies of the ZSL, which in the previous periods had been suppressed by the burden of schematized standards of political life, were released.

Thus, among other places, the southern part of the country, where ZSL members cherished the memory of Wincenty Witos [populist peasant leader, 1874-1945] and his disciple Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, began to swarm with activists. Political and social life became more dynamic. Things began to be astir in the cities and in the PZPR, and so did they in the countryside, where radical claims were made by the new peasant unions [Farmers' Solidarity], which included many ZSL members and activists (e.g., Jan Kulaj, the head of Rural Solidarity). Peasants occupied the buildings of the ZSL (in, among other places, Siedlce). This naturally contributed to radicalizing the ZSL itself, as it would have ultimately lost its base of support had it remained aloof. Therefore, it adopted, without admitting it openly, certain postulates of the Ustrzyce-Rzeszow Agreements (the peasant equivalent of the Gdansk, Szczecin, and Jastrzebie Agreements).

In May 1981 the ZSL Supreme Committee recalled from his post Stanislaw Gucwa, the incumbent who had been reelected by the Eighth ZSL Congress, and elected in his place Stefan Ignar, a man who had once before already been "chairman of the renewal," because he headed the ZSL during the years 1956-1962. In 1981, however, his election was a compromise. Many people felt to be sure a sincere liking for the then 72 years old Stefan Ignar, a professor at the SGGW-AR [Main School of Agriculture—Agricultural Academy]. But in a way he was no longer real in that tempestuous year 1981. He may have served as a symbol, but young ZSL activists by then already spoke a different language.

They drafted a new ideological declaration and the first ever party program in ZSL history. They talked of the equality of [state, cooperative, and private] sectors, safeguards of land ownership by peasants, and the civic equality of peasants. But the time to pass such resolutions did not yet come.

In that year 1981 the ZSL Supreme Committee for the first time placed the Caucus of ZSL Deputies to the Sejm under the obligation of taking steps to add to the Constitution the amendment that "private farming is a permanent element of the socialist economy."

The Peasant Holiday regained its glitter, the peasant hymn "When the Nation Goes to Battle" was sung proudly, and a search was begun for [old] symbols, insignia, and accoutrements. Witos's name was rehabilitated, although for some time attempts were made in Warsaw to put forward a counter-candidate (perhaps Stanislaw Thugutt? [1873-1941, peasant-movement activist]). Nowadays Witos's portraits hang in the offices of the ZSL Supreme Committee, his statue (unveiled in September 1985) is standing in the Nation's Capital at the spot where Wiejska Street debouches into Three Crosses Square, and in 1984, on the 110th anniversary of the village chief from Wierchoslawice, the leadership of the ZSL traveled to the environs of Tarnow in order to celebrate it.

But this should not obscure to us the actual sequence of events. The ZSL began to explore its own identity chiefly through the economic approach. The political crisis of 1980 had its own importance, mainly owing to the replacement of the ruling administration, but the economic crisis, the bare store shelves, was more important. So-called self-sufficiency in food was turned into a primary concern of the state and the economy. The slogan "We can and must feed ourselves" was repeated at every step. Perhaps unconsciously, peasant-movement adherents became aware of the opportunity this afforded: food means agriculture, and agriculture means us. For this was a repetition of the happening in the mid-1950s: when the time of troubles comes, everybody depends on the peasant.

Toward the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 was issued the Joint Declaration of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee and the Presidium of the ZSL Supreme Committee, and in January 1983 the Central Committee and the Supreme Committee held a joint session for the first time in the history of the PRL. A common agricultural policy was developed.

This word, "common," is guarded by the ZSL like the apple of its eye so that it may not be dropped from the above phrase. If the policy is successful, that is reason for self-congratulation. For the time being, however, it is causing problems. The reason is that many of the promises and principles of that policy have not been translated into reality. The share of the food industry in investment outlays is not what was planned; industry is providing too little support, and the profitability of farm production is declining. Things have gone so far that in December 1987, by then already on its own, the Presidium of the ZSL Supreme Committee issued a declaration voicing its deep anxiety over the growing problems of agriculture.

Euphoria and Optimism

But let us once more consider the earlier years, the years of euphoria and optimism. The program discussions within the ZSL culminated in the resignation of Stefan Ignar from the post of chairman after as little as a few months. In November 1981 he was replaced by Roman Malinowski (then 46 years old, reputed to be a decisive man, joined the ZSL in 1956). Soon afterward the ZSL accomplished its first political victory. It won support from its partners [the PZPR and the SL], so that the Sejm amended the Constitution with the so-called Peasant Provision, prescribing the permanence of private peasant family farming. The adjective "family" was a compromise, because, as known, this actually concerned the issue of private ownership in agriculture.

It is interesting that in the years 1982-1984 the ZSL accomplished more than in 1981. The explanation may be twofold: the weakness of the authorities prior to the imposition of martial law [in December 1981] resulted in that many of the postulates could not be met; it appeared that those in power were not the authorities—and vice versa.

Secondly, the unhesitating support of martial law by the ZSL's leadership strengthened, as it were, its credibility as an ally. Besides, the countryside responded rather calmly to martial law. The unrest at several ZSL voivodship committees (e.g., in Tarnow) was resolved quite rapidly and radically, and certain voivodship boards of the Union of Rural Youth (ZMW) also were disbanded. (That organization has a checkered history! Once it detached itself from the ZMP [Union of Polish Youth], the adjective "Socialist" was attached to its name in the 1970s — SZMW [Socialist Union of Rural Youth], and subsequently it became part of the Federation of Socialist Unions of Polish Youth; August [1980, the rise of Solidarity] resulted in its recovering its autonomy and the name ZMW.)

The Ninth Congress was held in 1984. But while the preceding congress had been held too early, so to speak, to include certain planks in the program, this congress was held so late that many matters had been resolved in the meantime. The administration of Roman Malinowski offered several strong planks such as revising the Constitution, a post for the ZSL in the government, the outline of a coalition, and, perhaps above all, a kind of renaissance of agriculture. For while, e.g., in the late 1970s farm incomes were 15 percent below the incomes of employees of the socialized sector, in 1982 they were 11 percent higher but in the subsequent 2 years they again became lower, though not significantly.

The new Ideological Declaration adopted by the Congress states that the ZSL "is the political party of the peasant class" and sees its place in socialism-building while at the same time acknowledging the guiding role of

the working class therein. Further, it views adherence to the principles of the worker-peasant alliance as the most important political-systemic safeguard of socialism.

The historical base of the ZSL was markedly expanded by adopting such traditions of the peasant movement as attachment to the ideals of freedom, equality, social justice, democracy, tolerance of different views, respect for the rule of law, acknowledgment of solidarity with neighbors. The main emphasis, however, was placed on the goal — that constant goal of the peasant movement — of strengthening the political, economic, and cultural position of the peasant class.

The terms used — "party," "peasant class," and "coalition system" derived from the tumultuous discussions of the early 1980s and signified that a new political language of the ZSL was being born. The ideals of the Declaration were converted to practical guidelines in the ZSL Program (106 theses).

Regaining Identity

The course of the Ninth Congress indicated that the leadership of the ZSL specified the pace and scope of the recovery of its identity. The ZSL will advance in step with liberalization and renewal, without forcing the pace.

The results of this political line made themselves felt during the campaign prior to the 10th Congress. The countryside itself began to exert pressure on that pace. As was rightly noted, the claims of the peasants are not consumerist but chiefly production-oriented. They demand more coal, feeds, fertilizers, and machinery, and rank refrigerators and color television sets last. Thus their complaints have not decreased; on the contrary, they increased and dominated the pre-Congress discussion.

It was also rightly observed that in the theses for discussion by the 10th Congress the ZSL took no position on the basic issues; for example, with respect to the economy, on such issues as the reform in relation to a market economy, the scope and methods of centralized planning, the demonopolization of the economy, the capital market, etc.

Other problems also arise in this connection. Some members of the ZSL think that it should formulate more clearly its pluralist outlook. This has been said by, among others, Professor Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, a ZSL member, who has long been repeating that parties that are like identical twins are not needed in any system of society.

The ZSL could also make its own contribution to the discussion of the model of a coalition government. The aforementioned Prof Kozakiewicz defines it as follows: "None of the parties in the coalition assumes in advance that it has a monopoly on being right or on good ideas. The point is that the rightness of a solution or an

assessment is decided by its objective worth and logical or realistic necessity rather than by the identity of the source of that solution or appraisal."

An independent party should also offer more broadly its own opinion on the new democratic institutions, electoral formulas, positions of the Sejm, relations between the parties and the government, etc.

Thus the 10th Congress may afford another opportunity for strengthening the identity of the ZSL. To be sure, it is quite certain that its deliberations will be dominated by problems of the economy and production. But then it also is the role of any political party to integrate multiplicity of details into a coherent program that can be termed "protection of the interests of the social group represented."

[Box, p 3]

Peasant Party Participation in Government

One hundred and five ZSL deputies (23 percent) are sitting in the Sejm. Thus the ZSL is definitely overrepresented from the standpoint of the number of members of other parties and organizations as well as nonmembers of the party.

The Speaker of the Sejm (Roman Malinowski), who also chairs the Sejm Presidium and the Senior Assembly, is a ZSL member. Other members of the ZSL chair four Sejm commissions (Legislation; Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Industry; Social Policy, Health, and Physical Culture; and Transport and Communications).

The Council of State includes four ZSL members: Tadeusz Szlachowski (vice chairman), Zigmunt Surowicz (secretary), Witold Lipski, and Wladyslaw Szymanski.

ZSL members also are the chairmen of nine voivodship people's councils: in Ciechanow, Elblag, Koszalin, Nowy Sacz, Opole, Przemysl, Siedlce, Skierniewice, and Zamosc. This is definite progress compared with the 1970s when first secretaries of voivodship PZPR committees used to be ex officio chairmen of voivodship people's councils.

Of the 2,402 basic-level people's councils 414 are chaired by ZSL members. ZSL members also account for 18.4 percent of the combined membership of these councils—a proportion that is smaller than in the Sejm. This seems to prove the observation that has once been made that division of power is more readily agreed upon at the top than in the so-called field.

High government posts are held by the following ZSL members: Jozef Koziol (deputy prime minister) and Wladyslaw Michna (minister of environmental protection). The ZSL used to be represented by more members in the Council of Ministers, and until recently a ZSL member held the post of minister of health. In addition, eight ZSL members are holding the posts of deputy minister (three at the ministry of agriculture, and one each at the ministries of national education, internal market, culture and art, and finance, with one ZSL member, moreover, being a vice chairman of the Planning Commission). Of a certainty one more post will be staffed with a ZSL member—that of a deputy minister of health.

Eight voivodes are ZSL members (in Biala Podlaska, Bialystok, Bydgoszcz, Kalisz, Leszno, Lublin, Rzeszow, Sieradz). In addition, there are 38 vice voivodes belonging to the ZSL—in the voivodships whose voivodes are not ZSL members as well as in Lodz and Slupsk (in the latter there is a temporary vacancy).

As for those chairmen of basic-level people's councils who belong to the ZSL, they number 305 (bearing in mind that the number of these councils totals 2,402), of whom 15 in Siedlce Voivodship, 13 in Kielce, and 10 each in the Olstyn, Piotrkow, and Skierniewice voivodships. The number of ZSL-member vice chairmen is still lower, 120.

[Box, p 3]

United Peasant Party Membership

Toward the end of 1987 the ZSL had exactly 513,525 members, of whom about 65 percent were peasants, 25 percent white-collar workers, and 9.4 percent blue-collar workers. Eight percent of ZSL members have a complete or partial higher educational background and 23.5 percent secondary-school background. Only 14 percent are below age 29. Of the occupationally active peasants the largest group is that of the owners of farms measuring 5-10 hectares in area (33 percent) and 2-5 hectares (24 percent). A total of 32,341 ZSL circles are active in this country.

The largest number of branches of the ZSL operates in the following voivodships: Opole, Bydgoszcz, Kielce (more than 17,000 members each), and Lublin and Olstyn. The lowest number is found in the Lodz (5,000 members), Chelm, Biala Podlaska, Ostroleka, and Legnica voivodships.

**Security Service Chief on Service's Role,
Operations, Opposition**
26000269 Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish
No 14, 2 Apr 88 p 6

[Interview with Brigadier General Henryk Dankowski, under secretary of state at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Chief of the Security Service, by Iwona Jurczenko: "Does the Security Service Know Everything?"]

[Text]

[Question] Prince Fouche, the minister of police during the Great French Revolution, used to say that if he saw three people talking with each other on a street, he was sure that two of them were his people. Could you say the same thing about your employees?

[Answer] We do not practice such total approach, and besides we are not living in the era of the bourgeois revolution. The Security Service knows above all that an overwhelming majority of our society are law-abiding and do not act against the state since the state genuinely belongs to them. But I can guess your next question, because hardly anyone believes that we have so much manpower. Actually, like any other service of this kind in the world, we avail ourselves of the public's assistance, and here I wish to emphasize that in this respect we are meeting with considerable understanding and even good-will. This is most often due to the understanding of certain principles, such as the good of the cause, the political *raison d'etat*, the feeling of shared responsibility for the country's destiny, or generally owing to patriotic postures. We avail ourselves of the assistance of various individuals, sometimes, when the need arises, in a discreet manner, and often through official contacts. And, contrary to the frequent claims of hostile Western propaganda, I would deny that many people refuse us their assistance in specific cases.

[Question] And that is how the Security Service knows everything?

[Answer] Certainly not everything, because that is not needed, but just as certainly it knows plenty. Above all, the Service knows what it is supposed to know by virtue of its statutory duties; that is, it is quite familiar with the conduct of particular individuals or groups engaging in activities aimed against the interests of the socialist state, including activities conflicting with the law; it also is familiar with the principal causative factors behind all sorts of perils, including eventual social tensions, reasons for nascent social conflicts, and factors affecting public mood. When the situation so requires, the Security Service, disposing of the necessary resources and methods, can in practice learn everything necessary about an individual, a group of persons, a problem, or an occurrence, in order to avert or eliminate a peril or familiarize itself thoroughly and objectively with a situation.

[Question] Concerning what matter, for example?

[Answer] Let us say that at an enterprise that is important to the state's economy there occur certain irregularities, the mood of the workforce is bad owing to a faulty organization of labor or low wages, or there occur stoppages owing to lack of supplies. Thus, some disturbances are bound to arise there, let alone disturbances reaching an intensity that may lead to open conflict. One of the tasks of the Security Service is to uncover such malfunctioning mechanisms and causes of abuses and to protect that enterprise, meaning to act so as to eliminate the irregularities and their causes in order to prevent their exploitation from, say, anti-state positions. After all, it did happen in the past that such situations were exploited to provoke social conflicts, and we all are familiar with their consequences.

[Question] Just how does the Security Service differ from the Citizens' Militia other than the fact that the militiamen generally wear uniforms while SB [Security Service] personnel wear mufti?

[Answer] A SB member may also wear a uniform, and that is not the main point. The principal difference is in the tasks performed, although I wish to emphasize that close and continuing cooperation traditionally exists between the Security Service and the Citizens' Militia. The duties of the Citizens' Militia include chiefly safeguarding law and order, traffic safety, and combatting ordinary crime, including economic crimes. The Security Service is a specialized organization responsible for safeguarding the state's external and domestic security. Our tasks thus chiefly include counteracting the penetration of this country by foreign services and centers that are hostile toward Poland; combatting terrorism, sabotage, and all other kinds of attacks against our state, inclusive of the curtailment and elimination of the activities of structures of an anti-state nature, and lastly combatting serious criminal actions directed against the basic political and economic interests of the state. We also perform tasks relating to the protection of state secrets — tasks not limited to national defense but also extending to the national economy, science, and innovations, and also tasks of safeguarding the personal safety of the persons exercising supreme state and political offices.

[Question] Meaning that the SB is a kind of political police?

[Answer] That would be a great oversimplification because our tasks are broader. One of our basic tasks is to reconnoiter the groupings, problems, and occurrences that may harbor perils to the security of the state, to national unity, to our *raison d'etat*, or to the national economy.

[Question] You were speaking of reconnoitering oppositionist structures?

[Answer] I am speaking of groups which undertake anti-state activities. I would prefer not to call them "the opposition," because, generally speaking, in principle, the opposition contends with the other ruling party without aiming at changing the sociopolitical system of the state. By contrast, the principal goal of the groups I am speaking of is to struggle against the authorities and for a change in the political system. This may be exemplified by the 1980-1981 period. Our task is to neutralize the activities of such groups, prevent lawbreaking, and, above all, take steps to promote favorable changes in the state's sociopolitical situation. Even when we are dealing with a group that is unequivocally hostile politically, we focus our efforts on either winning over or neutralizing that group without harm to national security, and it is only as a last resort that we employ repressive measures. That is why in so many cases we hold talks of a preventive-explanatory nature with individuals whom we warn that they are involving themselves in activities contrary to law, instructive talks pointing out that there really exist many other, creative possibilities for "discharging" energy, and ultimately warning talks.

[Question] You mean like this: "Take care. We know about you?"

[Answer] These talks are held so that those individuals can be made aware that their activities are within our purview. If we know that persons active in illegal structures are organizing a demonstration whose actual purpose is to provoke disorder on the streets, then we are forced to resort to more resolute means envisaged by law, including detention, among other things. It sometimes happens that persons attempting to organize illegal street demonstrations feel gratified that this has been rendered impossible and at the same time they saved their "face" in their community. For the leads reach beyond the borders of this country. Certain so-called leaders of anti-state structures are paid in hard currencies. No such payments are made disinterestedly, and the amounts can be substantial.

[Question] As regards the scope of your tasks, does not it include some general preventive and educational considerations?

[Answer] That's right. And as regards the Security Service such considerations are not ranked low and neither are they generalized. Within the Service, preventive activities mean above all gaining adequate insight into a situation, its perils, the possible variants of public behavior in certain external situations, etc. For example, consider the reaction of the most significant social groups or workforces of major enterprises to the price increases. This involves, of course, appropriate preemptive measures to prevent the rise of related conflicts. As for our educational activities, these consist chiefly in making it clear, e.g., through individual talks or via the

media, that particular patterns of behavior, especially those inconsonant with law, cause measurable social damage. In addition, this is also a form of preventive activity.

[Question] Can this interview also be regarded as educational activity?

[Answer] Well, if I had information that you are engaging in activities inconsonant with the law, I would during this interview undoubtedly explain to you the significance of your actions, as I am doing now. But then you would not be asking me questions.

[Question] No way! For I would then forfeit the unique and fascinating opportunity of telling the chief of the Security Service, "Excuse me, but I am here to ask you questions." What does the Security Service do with the information it gathers?

[Answer] It is first subjected to the necessary operative analysis and assessment, because the point is that the information be fully credible and concern fundamental problems. Afterward, it is forwarded to political and administrative authorities at various levels, depending on the nature and importance of the problem. If it concerns such matters as the impending intentions of anti-state groups, irregularities in the performance of some domains of the economy, causes of the rise of adverse public mood, economic damage causing social discontent, or sometimes individuals who underfulfill their official obligations or abuse their office, then such information is transmitted to appropriate authorities with the object of taking the necessary countermeasures. There also exists information concerning violations of law associated with the conduct of hostile political activity or other transgressions of interest to the Security Service. We utilize such information by verifying and elucidating it.

[Question] Suppose, for example, that you obtain adverse information on individuals who constitute precisely such "appropriate" authorities themselves? I refer here to, e.g., the case of Rurarz or Spasowski.

[Answer] Let me make it clear from the outset that persons entrusted with executive state offices must first prove themselves through their actions. Hence, it is difficult to assume in advance that they would engage in activities harmful to the country. However, certain exceptions, such as those you named, do occur, of course. Preliminary information of this kind is, naturally, subject to being verified. The point is that no one should incur moral injustice [no one should be guilty until proved]. If the information is corroborated, legally envisaged proceedings, including punishment, are set in motion. Let me remind you that the abovementioned ex-ambassadors, Rurarz and Spasowski, have been sentenced to the death penalty by courts. Reports containing information that is not verified are destroyed.

[Question] But there exist various secret "dossiers" containing such information.

[Answer] There never were any such "dossiers." There are records of steps taken on particular cases, problems, or occurrences, as well as records on persons with regard to whom investigative proceedings are under way.

[Question] So there never were such "dossiers"? Not even in the so-called dead past?

[Answer] Not here at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As for the dead past, why don't you ask historians?

[Question] But aren't telephone conversations tapped? Everyone says so. For decades it has been a favorite game of Poles to guess the service rank of that third, silent party to the telephone conversation. And the more important a person feels, the more he is certain that his phone is being constantly bugged.

[Answer] This is another myth, or even obsession. We are not that curious. True, we have the technical possibilities for wiretapping telephone conversations. But it should be borne in mind that our activities in this respect must be consonant with the law. I refer to the provisions governing penal proceedings and the Act of 1983 on the Office of the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Scope of Activities of Its Subordinate Agencies. Such wiretapping is moreover limited to cases in which it is actually indispensable and necessary, such as those of persons engaged in espionage, terrorism, or homicide.

[Question] The availability of such varied and extensive information is bound to be a major psychological burden on the Ministry's personnel, but at the same time also they must relish the power represented by that knowledge.

[Answer] Above all, they are aware of their great responsibility. This is particularly binding upon us, and that is why we pay so much attention to our personnel selection. The Security Service is chiefly staffed with officers having a higher educational background and trained in a variety of fields, graduates of civilian and our own ramified educational institutions. We endeavor to ascertain that they be absolutely law-abiding individuals, ideologically sound, responsible, objective in their assessments, and aware that any biased interpretation of facts or persons may harm not only the cause but also the people. The personnel of the Security Service are aware that theirs are highly important tasks and at the same time that their labor is often thankless, that they have to experience on their own or in the company of a handful of persons even their greatest accomplishments (or defeats). The Service's achievements are not subject to loud propaganda and advertising. SB personnel must be available on a 24-hour basis, for they are perfectly aware that they serve the nation and their fatherland. I am convinced that I am not being grandiloquent in thus

talking of them. Of course, there occur isolated instances in which SB members have to be discharged owing to violations of Service rules or of law.

[Question] Still, after years of such service, do not SB members become convinced of their omniscience and infallibility?

[Answer] I must admit that continual dealing with evil entails certain deformations. One may cease to believe others, or one may trust too much a person who provides tendentious information. That is why criticism and constant verification of the decisions taken must remain the ruling principles. The system of hierarchic, multi-level subordination binding on our Ministry, and hence also on the entire system of internal monitoring of actions, is such that we observe no deformations you refer to.

[Question] At the apex of that system, and hence also at the top rung of the entire information ladder, there is the chief of the Security Service. We have already mentioned that knowledge is power. General, do you have a sense of that tremendous power?

[Answer] The Ministry is headed by the minister of internal affairs, and it is he too who stands on the top rung of that information ladder as you put it. So far as I am concerned, above all I am aware of the complexity of our social, political, and economic life. This is bound to result in a feeling of great responsibility, considering that the most varied information on these topics is concentrated within the service which I head.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

1386

Court Replacement for State Economic Arbitration Office

26000258a Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
24 Feb 88 p 2

[Article by (MU): "What Are Economic Courts Going To Be Like?"]

[Text] The organizational and systemic arrangement of future economic courts was discussed on 23 February at the Ministry of Justice. A preliminary draft of the law prepared by one of the teams of the Commission for Reforming the Civil Law was the point of departure for the discussion chaired by Minister of Justice Lech Domagala.

The resolution of the 6th PZPR CC Plenum and the implementation program of the second stage of economic reform impose the duty to start work on a new system of resolving economic disputes. These documents envisage replacing the currently operating State Economic Arbitration Office by independent courts. The

draft mentioned above intends them to be general-jurisdiction courts within which economic courts would operate as separate organizational divisions of voivodship and district courts.

First Chairman of the Supreme Court Prof Adam Lopatka, Chairman of the Legislative Council Prof Zbigniew Radwanski and Chairman of Team 10 of the Commission for the Economic Reform Prof Ludwik Bar also came out in favor of this concept. Representatives of the State Economic Arbitration Office taking part in the discussion objected to the concept. In their opinion, so-called special-jurisdiction courts, systemically and organizationally independent of the general-jurisdiction courts will have better opportunities for proper operation. Deputy Chairman of the GKA [Main Arbitration Commission] Witold Pawelko promised to furnish within a week the outline for a draft with such provisions.

The ultimate wording of the draft law on economic courts will be decided by the Presidium of the Government, which will be provided the conclusions following from the discussion to date.

Kazimierz Malecki, undersecretary of state in the Chancery of the Council of Ministers, took part in the proceedings.

9761

Council of Ministers Opens Hard Currency, Products Auctions
26000258r Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
23 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] A draft executive order on authorizing hard currency and product auctions was reviewed at a meeting of the Committee of the Council of Ministers for the Implementation of the Economic Reform. The committee came out in favor of setting the hard currency and product auctions in motion and recommended finishing work on the financial issues associated with the purchase of hard currency funds. The committee evaluated positively the operation to date of the system of transferring the title to use retained hard currency allowances among units of the socialized economy by means of hard currency auctions.

9761

Social Policy Academic Conference
26000258f Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
23 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] The fundamentals of social policy are not changing. However, the ways enabling us to fully implement them should change. This may be the conclusion after the first day of the scientific conference "Social Research and Social Policy" held in Warsaw.

The conference was convened on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Institute of Social Economics of the SGPiS [Main School of Planning and Statistics].

The focus of the morning session was, in particular, research for the purposes of social policy against the background of development of social thought in Poland and with regard to current needs of economic development.

In the afternoon, the issues of prerequisites and the most pressing problems of social policy in our country were discussed, among other things, the housing issue, environmental protection, health condition of the populace and the role of family benefits.

9761

Education Workers' Wages Discussed
26000258a Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
29 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] On 27 February Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Koziol met with the leadership of the Association of Polish Teachers headed by Chairman of the Main Board Kazimierz Pilat. Issues of working conditions and wages of employees of education, as well as long-range measures to improve the salaries of this professional group, were the topics of the conversation. Minister of National Education Henryk Bednarski and Minister of Labor and Social Policy Ireneusz Sekula attended the meeting.

9761

PZPR Writers Group Meets
26000258b Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
29 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] On 27 February, a meeting of the National Party Group of Writers devoted to the "Situation of the Book Publishing and the Writers" was held in the building of the PZPR CC. Among other things, the need to implement persistently the resolution of the PZPR CC Politburo on book publishing of February 1987 was discussed. In the opinion of the group, these determinations are not being implemented with adequate persistence and efficiency by the organs and institutions set up and obligated to do so.

Secretary of the PZPR CC A. Wasilewski, Minister of Culture and Art A. Krawczuk and Secretary of the Committee for the Economic Reform J. Malkowski attended the meeting.

9761

ZSMP Discusses Controversial 'Family Life' Book

26000258j Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
2 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by P. W.: "Young People on the Textbook 'Preparation for Family Life'"]

[Text] On 1 March, a meeting of young people concerning the textbook "Preparation for Family Life" organized by the Warsaw Board of the ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] was held in Warsaw under the slogan "Nothing About Us Without Us." Along with a 100-strong group of young people from high schools, parents and experts, including the author of chapter 3 of the textbook Prof Maria Trzwinaka, took part in the discussion.

Participants of the meeting were in agreement regarding the need to introduce in classes a textbook preparing young people for adult life. Opinions differed as to whether the textbook (currently suspended by the Ministry of National Education), its layout, placing of emphases and the illustrations it contains will satisfy the hopes attached to it.

9761

Local Radio Broadcast in Bydgoszcz Region
26000258k Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
2 Mar 88 p 2

[Text] Tuchola (Bydgoszcz voivodship) got itself a city radio station. Radio Tuchola began broadcasting on 1 March. For now, it has only one drawback—in order to listen to it, you have to go outside your house, because the radio operates only through loudspeakers placed in the street.

9761

ROMANIA

Deprivation, Repression, Emigration of Citizens
29000004 Paris *LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS* in French
15-17 Mar 88

[Article by Jean-Francois Richard]

[Text] Our special correspondent in Romania describes daily life in that totalitarian country, governed by a tyrannical dynasty.

In that country, electricity is a luxury almost out of the reach of the common mortal, gas is counted out in drops, food severely rationed, and yet, the people lack the very essentials. In the winter, heating is a rarity reserved for the privileged elite.

In short, of all the communist countries, where everyone knows how difficult living conditions are, Ceausescu's Romania is without question the worst for a people put to a harsh test.

[15 Mar 88, p 18]

[Text]

King Ubu's Failure

Bucharest—"There is nothing in common between them and us, the people." "Them" obviously refers to Ceausescu, his family put in all key government posts, the party militia and the omnipresent political police, the Securitate. For Ioana, a young Romanian woman from Bucharest, the gap has never been wider between the tiny caste of privileged elite and the rest of the population, combining all generations or social classes. "No one believes in the system any more," she adds, "not even the party members or leaders. They pretend, they bury their heads in the sand, but they know it is a total failure."

And what a failure! Of all the Eastern bloc countries, Romania is the most flagrant fiasco, not only because of the blind, brutal repression, but also because of the cruel living conditions imposed on the population, especially in the wintertime. "An entire people is struggling to survive," says Verze, a former economist from Transylvania, who adds with bitter irony: "Not starving or freezing to death is already to resist the tyrant!"

Electricity: A Luxury

The tragedy of the Romanian people actually began in the early 1980's, insidiously at first. In order to conserve energy, the government started by cutting electricity, gas or hot water in buildings for a few hours each day. But "The movement suddenly took on speed in 1984," recalls Alexandru, a building official in Banat Province. Responsible for managing a moderate-income unit housing about a dozen families, a decision by the "Great National Assembly" was sent on to him prescribing a 30-percent reduction in gas and electricity consumption. Then an order "defined" the 30-percent: The 10 families that had previously used 300 cubic meters of gas a day (in the winter) would have to be content with 297 a month!

However, the people were still living too well for the government's taste. Buildings periodically began to see a flurry of little official notices: "Gas cut off because of the freeze." Then, to lend credit to the grotesque explanation, they went so far as to wrap certain gas pipes and some building supervisors would occasionally be instructed to "reheat" the pipes with oil lamps. Such brakes in service then led to numerous accidents when the pipes "thawed." In the winter of 1986-1987, for

example, two buildings were seriously damaged by gas explosions in the city of Timisoara (Banat Province). Several persons were injured and at least one killed.

Electricity has itself become an often impossible luxury. A joke is now circulating in Romania on the subject: Introducing himself as a scientific genius, Ceausescu declares himself to the inventor of a new discovery: being able to spread darkness faster than light!

Electric power is often available only for short periods of time, especially in the provinces, for example, from 0500 to 0800 hours, 1100 to 1300, 1700 to 1900 and 2100 until midnight. Furthermore, it is rationed monthly. In the city in wintertime, that rationing authorizes only from 22 kW for one room to 42 kW for four rooms. If these meager quotas are exceeded, the price of electricity is tripled or, more drastically, the power is simply cut off. One old woman in Bucharest explains with resignation that such rationing does not even allow her to use the vacuum cleaner any longer!

Hot Water Disappears

The lunacy of energy conservation also affects public services. It is pitiful to see the long lines forming at the tramway stations, the dim light bulbs that barely illuminate the main railroad station in Bucharest or the evening entertainment that must come to a halt at precisely 2100 hours, when restaurants, movie houses and heaters are required to close. Bucharest itself is plunged into darkness. The little streets often have no lights and only the main thoroughfares still have one out of every two streetlights lit. This has put fear in the hearts of Bucharest residents: Did Ceausescu not just free from 20,000 to 30,000 common criminals on his birthday?

Romanians cannot get warm or have light and can barely wash. Hot water often disappears for several days in a row, even in the tourist hotels, and in the best of cases, is available only from 1800 to 2000 hours. The lack of hygiene results in disease and lice are spreading like wildfire in many schools.

Meat Not To Be Found

Ceausescu and his family tribe are freezing people to death, but starving them as well! Why stop a good thing: At one of the biggest markets in Bucharest, near the Gare du Nord, barely a tenth of the merchants are usually present. As far as fresh produce is concerned, one sees only apples and carrots. What is more, at 100 lei a kilo, carrots are out of reach for most people! A laborer makes only 1,500 lei a month, a skilled worker from 2,000 to 3,000 maximum. Meat is nearly impossible to find, especially in the winter. Furthermore, the Great National Assembly officially limited its consumption in December to 12 kilos a year per person. At best, one finds bones or chicken feet at Bucharest butcher shops. The rest is exported to the USSR or the Gulf countries.

Deciding to laugh about it, Ana, a Romanian who speaks Hungarian, jokes: "They have now gone so far as to sell bones, either fresh or smoked, so we can choose what kind of soup we want to make!"

After the Brasov riots in November, a few rills of salami reappeared. Dubbed parizer, this is actually only vegetable meat. "At room temperature," Alexandru explains, "it spoils in a matter of hours. It turns green and is inedible. Not even the dogs want it." This does not stop the "butcher" from slicing it up to avoid any storage, however, or the militia from searching the compartments at railroad stations to prevent any salami traveling from one city to another. "They have run out of things to use against us," Alexandru comments.

Rationing

Other essential foodstuffs are rationed: flour (1 kilo a month per person); soybean oil (1.5 kilos); sugar, actually saccharin (1 kilo); and butter, which is only margarine (50 grams). And this is the maximum authorized, which must apparently often be divided in two. As for the "free" products, they can be found, but usually at exorbitant prices. The average price of coffee, for example, is about 1,000 lei, nearly the minimum wage.

Probably a condemnable capitalist luxury, automobile traffic is barely tolerated. At the threat of the first snowflake, it is banned for reasons of safety. Moreover, finding gas is a challenge. Each Romanian owning a vehicle has the right to 30 or 35 liters a month and only 15 in the winter. Obviously, he must always buy it at the same station. If, out of some strange quirk, he should decide to travel, he can have only 10 liters and only in provincial capitals. Consequently, is an attempt to plan for hypothetical and, at best, meager vacations, one stores up. The people store up and the gas thus given off occasionally explodes. But what does it matter? Ubu is king in Romania.

One might believe that the peasants do not endure the same poverty, but one would be absolutely wrong. "Inventory takers" count every head of livestock once a year, down to the last rabbit or chicken. Anyone trying to conceal a little chicken from the comrade counter is, in addition to the heavy fines, singled out for public prosecution in the press.

Farmers are also assigned production quotas, quotas that are often impossible to meet. Rodica, a former food official, explains: "You sometimes see egg producers buy them on the market. Then they sell them back to the state to make their quotas because those quotas forget, for example, that hens lay few eggs in the wintertime."

And what about the women? Based on a barbarous pro-birth policy, their very privacy is violated. Without even speaking about contraception, which is obviously banned, every woman must submit in the enterprises to gynecological examinations to detect the first sign of

pregnancy and prevent illegal abortions. Legal abortions are only allowed on two conditions: when the woman is over 45 and has had at least 5 children: "We are treated like broodmares," Ioana observes.

Broodmares who work 6 days out of 7, often from 13 to 14 hours a day and who, during their few hours of leisure, are often forced to stand in line. Bureaucracy is king in Romania and it takes 3 hours to buy a simple train ticket or 6 to fill up with gas.

How can such shortages and such rackets be explained? The answer is absurdly simple: A kind of obsession with size has prompted the "beloved son of the people" (Ceausescu) to launch huge projects (iron and steel, petrochemistry) or exaggerated expenditures such as the construction of his palace in Bucharest. Never mind that his industry is a useless, costly monster; it must be maintained. So one rations energy, which is traded with the USSR for food products, or one sells the latter to certain Arab countries to buy raw materials or spare parts. The "genius of the Carpathians," another title Ceausescu has bestowed upon himself, has shown his true colors, the colors of an incompetent who tyrannizes his people in order to justify his most flagrant errors.

[16 Mar 88, p 19]

[Text]

In the Claws of the Securitate

Bucharest—The car, a cream-colored Dacia, came to a screeching halt a few dozen meters behind us. The street was dark, not a soul could be seen and no one got out of the vehicle. It seemed odd and we therefore decided not to go to our appointed meeting place a few blocks further on immediately.

We started down another dark street. A few minutes later, a figure could be glimpsed behind us. We came to a quick stop in front of the only lighted store window in the street. The silhouette immediately disappeared behind a cypress tree. We took off again; it re-emerged. There could be no question of going to the meeting, for the dissident would thus be compromised. On the way back, the cars behind us played strange games.

The next morning, another incident took place. We met with one of the best Romanian tennis players in order to watch him practice, first going by taxi to his home so he could pick up his things. On the way, the taxi driver sharply took him to task: "What are you hatching with foreigners?" The tennis player was embarrassed, unable to ignore the fact that the taxi drivers collaborated with the Securitate.

Arriving at his residence, he had us wait outside in the courtyard of the building. But scarcely had he disappeared inside when a man in a hurry, wearing the typical leather coat of the "Securists," went in after him. We

came back out of the building and a Securitate car, identifiable because of the yellow plates, was parked on the other side of the street. It was empty.

We waited for half an hour, but the tennis player, who needed only a few seconds to pick up his things, remained invisible. He would never re-emerge from the building.

Tourist Statute

That evening, we had to catch a train for a provincial city. When we returned to the hotel to pick up our bags at about 2100 hours, the "receptionist" took us into a small room. Our bags were there, along with four men who immediately blocked the exit.

"Your passports, please," their chief said.

He took our passports and left the room. When he returned, he told us in impeccable French: "Please follow me so that we may make a few verifications."

Was something wrong with our papers? Absolutely not, but he wanted us to follow him, him and his accomplices. I asked him who he was. He begrudgingly showed me an official card, covering his name with his thumb. One could only make out his rank: captain. He insisted we follow him: "I would not like to have to use force."

I refused, stating that we had done nothing wrong, and asked to be allowed to contact the French Embassy. The captain looked quite annoyed and again left the room. He returned 2 hours later and "asked" us to go up to a hotel room for the "minor verifications." We agreed. All four began to search our baggage, once, twice, three times, four times. Our caretakers took out what interested them (unused film, map of the city, harmless addresses, and so on). The captain took everything and returned several hours later with a report of his discoveries drawn up in French. "It would help me a great deal if you would sign this simple report."

Currency Trafficking

I refused to sign anything. The captain then told us that we were not allowed to leave the room and that he would return a few hours later to ask us to leave the country. I asked if we were being deported and for what reason. It "is not a deportation, only a polite but firm request." What was the reason? Because we "did not respect the tourist statute." I asked what statute governed tourists. According to what the captain said, it was reportedly contained in Article 1 of the Romanian Constitution, but he was unable to summarize its contents.

The next morning, I tried to make a phone call, but the line had been cut. Our guards soon returned, all four of them. The captain told us he was going to question us separately in another room.

When my turn came, I found two more Securists and the captain's superior, obviously a colonel. He did not speak French and the captain acted as interpreter. The latter showed me another document, written in French, which was "all there was left to sign to facilitate things." I read it. It was a statement in which I admitted "being in illegal possession of Romanian money," meaning that "I confessed" engaging in currency trafficking! I refused to sign, again demanding to be able to contact a French diplomat.

The captain angrily refused. He called me a "liar," got excited and added that I "would do better to follow the example of my colleague who had signed," that I "was complicating things" when "just a little signature would fix everything." I still refused.

To Budapest

His superior intervened and the captain translated. This time, I was being accused of "trampling Romanian law and violating the interests of the socialist state."

Then my guards took me back to the first room. These ensued an edifying lesson in "socialist morals" on the Romanian conception of tourism. Then the captain suddenly announced: "You are free; you can continue your trip." But what about his "polite" invitation the night before to leave the country? Oh, no! There could no longer be any question of it; he had changed his mind. After 15 hours of searches and questioning, we were therefore free. Free? Yes, if one did not count the good dozen Securists following on my heels, like so many infatigable bloodsuckers instructed to make me respect the mysterious "tourist statute," a tourist statute that seemed not only to apply to Romania, but to Hungary as well! Arriving in Budapest (Hungary) 2 days later, I would continue to see the Gestapo-style leather coats revolving around me. One of them, furious at being spotted right in downtown Budapest, tried to jostle me out of spite. Furthermore, the tail was useless. In Budapest also, I was to discover in a book being carried in my baggage a thin lead strip containing three sheets of steel glued to page 29. Without question, it was a beeper enabling them to follow me. As the Romanians sadly remark: "Only one thing works in Romania: the Securitate."

[17 Mar 88, p 18]

[Text]

The Exodus Toward Hungary

Budapest—"I know an Orthodox priest, 100-percent Romanian, who fled here to Budapest with his entire family and a large part of his parish." Elena, a Romanian refugee who has spoken Hungarian for a dozen years, cannot get over it. "And yet," she adds, "everyone knows of the traditional hostility between Orthodox Romanians and Hungarian Catholics."

Such cases remain the exception among "purebred" Romanians, who for the most part do not speak Hungarian and who make up on 12 percent of all refugees.

And yet, it shows the extent of the malaise, especially since the real exodus of Romanians to Hungary, particularly those who speak Hungarian, has steadily grown since 1985. Official statistics are not very reliable, but one can estimate that some 20,000 Romanians have passed through Hungary, 6,000 of them (essentially Hungarian-speaking) to settle there and the others on their way to Western nations, particularly Sweden, Austria, or the FRG. In addition, 6,000 Romanians have applied for tourist visas for Hungary, unsuccessfully to date.

"This is the first time we have seen an oppressed nationality from one Eastern-bloc country flee to a 'brother country'," says one Budapest dissident about Hungarian-speaking Romanians. "But the situation of Romania's Hungarians has truly become intolerable," he says.

Like all Romanians, those who speak Hungarian must first endure the privations and repression of the "Grand Conducator", Nicolae Ceausescu. But they must also suffer the consequences of the chauvinistic and narrow nationalistic policy of that so-called "genius of the Carpathians."

The regime, practicing the well-known scapegoat policy, seeks to blame the Hungarians for all evils. Even more perniciously, it attacks their identity, imposing a Romanian "colonization" of Transylvania, a province bordering on Hungary that was attached to it until World War II.

"We must endlessly suffer all kinds of humiliations," reports Judit, a new refugee. Regarding school attendance, for example: "To open a class in Hungarian, it takes at least 126 pupils, which is already a large number. But if there are 30, they try to convince five families, with the means you can imagine, to place their children in Romanian schools."

Hungary was caught by surprise by the scope of the refugee phenomenon. In a bind, the government put up its hands, thus giving the illegal immigrants *de facto* authorization to remain in the country. Hungarians naturally, but also most Romanians, a sharp thorn in relations between "brother countries."

The Hungarian regime of Janos Kadar can scarcely keep the refugees out because the Hungarians are particularly sensitive to the problem. This also made it possible for Hungarian dissidents to organize a demonstration of solidarity with the refugees on 1 February, in front of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest. Given the popularity of the refugee cause, the government has even

announced the formation of an interministerial committee in their behalf. Nor did the announcement come at just any time. Rather, it coincided, on 25 February, with the visit by Soviet President Andrie Gromyko.

And yet, it would appear that the government is willing to release aid amounting to 230 million forints (about \$500,000) and is even said to be anticipating possible modification of legislation to normalize the situation of the illegal immigrants.

Hungarian dissidents are also interested in pure Romanian refugees. Thanks to their support, some have managed to escape near certain deportation. In the interview below [not reproduced] of a leader of the Romanian group "Free Romania," one also learns that the Hungarian Government is considering the possibility of granting them status as political refugees, which would be a veritable revolution in the Eastern bloc.

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Controversial Book on Freedom, Revolution Discussed

Reviewer Presents Book's Ideas, Criticizes Editor
27000054 Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA
in Romanian 14 Jan 88 p 8

[Article by Z. Ornea: "Editions—N. Iorga on the Idea of Liberty"]

[Text] Everyone knows that in N. Iorga we have one of the exceptional personalities of Romanian culture. So it is that when his works, in any area of his creative activity, are made available to today's generations, all copies are immediately snapped up. This is impressive proof of the enormous esteem which this scholar enjoys in the Romanian conscience. This astounding mind, touched by the brush of genius, arouses admiration and wonder when we read the impressive number of titles (of books and articles) in his bibliography. The scope of the substance is probably more impressive than the number of titles. As a matter of fact, it is difficult in reading and rereading it to say if there is any sphere of human sciences or arts in which Iorga was not a creator as well as a consummate connoisseur. Although his poetry and dramatic work are modest, Iorga unquestionably is one of our great prose writers in his memoirs, in extraordinary travel writings, journalism, oratory, and in a fair number of scholarly writings. As regards the writing of history, there was virtually no sphere of the evolution of human existence which has not been recreated in books and studies by our savant. Political life proper, the military, the economic (agriculture, trades, commerce), the artistic, and the literary, education, printing, church and religion, everything in general came within the range of his observation. And it is a question not just of a Romanian phenomenon; he was just as competent in the universal sphere. There was, however, one area which held no attraction for him, philosophy, although it is

clearly to be seen that he was familiar with the principal works of the history of philosophy. With the frankness which characterized him, Iorga did not shrink from giving evidence of this, as for example in a lecture delivered in Paris in February of 1931. "Xenopol was first and foremost a thinker whose views on history not only exceed my competence—since I am no philosopher and have never tried to be one—but also my curiosity and my interest in these matters, without doubt useful but so different in nature" (in "Generalitati cu privire la studiile istorice" [General Remarks on Historical Studies], 3d Edition, 1944, p 181). This viewpoint, which was also a methodology of explication, is also clearly seen in a book published in 1928 under the title "Evolutia ideii de libertate" [Evolution of the Idea of Liberty], which was relatively recently republished by the Editura Meridiane [Meridiane Publishing House].

The book was originally a university course presented in 1928 to students of the School of Literature of Bucharest University. The 18 lectures represented the chapters of the book. The first three chapters, a stenographic record of which was not made, are reproduced on the basis of a summary made by a student, while the others exactly reflect the thought of the great professor as he himself expressed it. What we find impressive above all in rereading these lectures turned into a book is precisely the stupendous erudition of the author in his treatment of the topic studied from antiquity to the end of the last century, from the resources of knowledge deposited in his altogether extraordinary memory. Such topics are usually studied from a philosophical or sociological viewpoint. Iorga, being consistent to his methodology and conception, deals with the question in a strictly historical perspective. He says it quite openly, at the beginning of the first lecture. "Philosophical definitions have come to an end. The only useful study remaining is study from the historical viewpoint." The publisher of the edition on which we are commenting, Ilie Badescu, believed that Iorga, in designing these lectures, "was to renounce any desire for a theoretical system beyond the historical and to found a historical theory of the idea of liberty." We think that he is wrong. Iorga renounced nothing, because he had nothing to renounce, because he was never tempted—refer to his 1931 statement cited above—by the "desire" to erect a "theoretical system." Nor do I believe that in adopting this course he proposed to build a "historical theory of the idea of liberty." He simply traced the evolution of the concept (he gave it an even less pretentious name, "notion") of liberty throughout history in order to emphasize the "different meaning" which it assumed "in keeping with the moral atmosphere of each epoch." It is, of course, possible that after five decades this historical excursion has acquired meanings not divined by the author, but I also believe that it is not right to place the thought of this scholar far beyond his intention, just as I do not think that this work is, as its editor states, "the exponent of a revolution in historiography, of a paradigmatic change in the socio-historical sciences." The editor, a sociologist by training

and profession, transfers this important work from historiography to theoretical sociology, examining it almost exclusively from the viewpoint of the latter, which was not that of N. Iorga. Such an approach, which often is a revealing one, would not be in the least objectionable, provided that it were not narrowly exclusive or made obscure by exaggerations. Iorga obviously made his historical excursion around the evolution of the idea of liberty in accordance with a certain viewpoint. He believed that the idea assumes relevance if it is analyzed in its threefold aspect, "liberty of labor, political liberty, and liberty of thought." Of course, someone else could (or could have) examined the question from the perspective of other explicative criteria. Iorga preferred those announced, pointing up the often antinomian relationship among them in one period or another of human history. Indication by certain historical facts of the way in which one or another of these aspects was embodied in the real was even the purpose of this university course. And the remarkable demonstration is making headway everywhere. The moral ideal, according to Iorga, is the type of human community which is organized so that it allows combination in a harmonious whole of all three aspects of the idea of liberty. And who is it who does not know, if he is the least informed about the layers of Iorga's work, that this ideal is encountered especially in the organizations of the peasantry, in which land is owned in common, political leaders are elected, and the right to an opinion is "legitimized" by tradition? The scholar has observed the manifestation of this ideal of peasant liberty from antiquity to the assumption of its modern aspect. He evidently also dwelled upon its forms in the Romanian lands, with their freeholder or landowner villages, a continuation of the famous "ethnic Romans," who trace their origins back to the Roman era. Whenever he takes up such phenomena, Iorga's pages vibrate with admiration and nostalgia. His editor, the sociologist Ilie Badescu, is familiar with the question and its impact on the modern theories of the type of peasant civilization which deserves just as much attention. Even though it is a slight exaggeration to say that Iorga evolved, on the basis of the ethnic Romans who continued into the Middle Ages and even beyond, a "sociological model" valid for investigation of the Middle Ages, it is indisputable that Ilie Badescu adds to the metropolitan theory with its relationship between center and periphery as formulated by the present-day American sociologist I. Walerstein.

In this university course, as everywhere in his work, Iorga's perspective is holistic. Even the ideal type of peasant civilization, as observed from the historical viewpoint, was preferred precisely because the entire organization was organic here. In Iorga's view, nothing is more damaging to the social structures than the abstract formula created artificially according to laws (including constitutions) derived rationalistically from the heads of thinkers. As the scholar never tired of demonstrating, such pieces of legislation are not an expression of the will of the governed but artificial armchair creations always

harmful to individual or collective liberty. The contractualist theory of Rousseau had an intransigent adversary in Iorga, who considered it to be a reformist theory which did not evolve from tradition and which produces reprehensible social upheavals. We know that Iorga favored the route of slow evolution, in which progress comes slowly and in the process of tradition. Any disruption of this gradual process would cause serious abnormalities, and the revolutionary route did not appear to him to be the appropriate one. Lovinescu attended his courses at the beginning of the century and was shocked by the professor's negative criticism of the French revolution and its supporters from Rousseau to Robespierre (see "Istoria miscarii 'Semanatorului'" [History of the "Semanator" Movement], 1925, pp 186-187). We are not surprised to find this criticism again in the book on which we are commenting. The scholar resolutely rejected the idea of revolution, consistently preferring that of slow evolution. On the basis of this viewpoint he totally rejected the French revolution. "It follows," said the professor, "that the French revolution, coming at the end of rationalism, did not result in that liberation of mankind which was constantly spoken of. In fact, whatever its intentions, the French revolution confused and brutalized all of society in all spheres" (p 293). In place of this revolution, Iorga preferred the American one, which was carried through "with historical traditions," "with slow developments," "following established usages." We are not interested here in the question of whether we can really speak of an American revolution—opposed in somewhat bizarre fashion to a real one—which nevertheless inaugurated an era in the history of mankind. This is so because our great historian viewed any kind of revolution with suspicion, including the 1848 revolution in Romania, which he condemned and found impossible to accept. This condemnation is especially well known and is given the consideration due it. Iorga's last editor believes, on the contrary, that he "redeems" such opinions by interpreting them, but does so in a disconcerting manner. In the introductory study (pp 48-49) he states nothing more nor less than that in fact "Nicolae Iorga's criticism of the French revolution accords with the criticism made of the French revolution by Karl Marx himself." But who does not know that Marx criticized the failures and the lack of consistency of the French revolution but constantly praised it because it accomplished "unchaining and installation of modern bourgeois society," paying homage to those who "broke the feudal foundation into pieces and cut off the feudal head which grew on it" ("Optprezece Brumar al lui Ludovic Bonaparte" [The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte]). Is it correct, is it scientific to place an equal sign between such diametrically opposed opinions of two thinkers? It would be more proper to say that Iorga's opinion is in accord with the pamphleteering book by Taine, "Originile Frantei contemporane" (The Origins of Contemporary France). But no, the editor prefers Marx. The matter does not stop here. Iorga's view—from the very beginning of this university course—to the effect that "philosophical definitions have come to an end" and

that the only useful research is historical, is validated by that expressed by Marx and Engels in "Ideologia Germana" [German Ideology], as if they also had reached the conclusion that "speculative philosophies have come to an end," another work of Engels and even an opinion of Lenin being cited in support.

The same "opposite sign" procedure which we have also found used by this author in a book of his which has been discussed, disputed, and contested even by sociologists, is consistent with the editor's argument in his notes with the opinions which hold N. Iorga to be a romantic mired in the past. According to Ilie Badescu, such opinions are unfounded, since Iorga did not oppose the modern trend of industrialism and agreed with the ideas of the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1930's, which was concerned with humanizing the factory environment. We are not familiar with the details of the Chicago School's assumptions (we are convinced that Iorga never even heard of them), but his romantic obsession with the past and reserve toward the industrial trend are certainties which can easily be verified in the majority of his writings, to the end of his life. He once exclaimed "I am not a man of my time," being like Caragiale a man with an "old" way of thinking. For example, whoever reads his notes on his trip to America (1930) immediately realizes that his sentimental and ideological preferences lay with the world of the village and traditional patriarchal settlements and that he censured the "immense industrial Moloch." Could the evolution of modern structures have been stopped, in its industrial phase, in favor of the patriarchal quiet of the village of days gone by and of a city dominated by craftsmen organized into guilds? The question is merely rhetorical, but the great scholar, obviously without proclaiming the need to return to the past, emotionally was partial to the latter, regarding the former with a jaundiced eye and condemning it. Is this not a romantic conviction rooted in the past, one which is in perfect harmony with the conservative holistic view of the evolution of social structures? And what does it have in common with the postulates of the Chicago School? Did those American sociologists condemn industry and industrialism in favor of craftsmen organized in guilds? In theory any new reading of a text through the prism of theories of recent or older date is always profitable, provided only that the prism and the association of ideas are plausible. What is the use otherwise? And what sense is there in constantly looking among the ideas of Iorga, admittedly very important ones, for anticipations (priorities) of concepts formulated by Max Weber and Gurwitsch or establishment of risky analogies with opinions of Karl Popper, G. Sorel, and F. Braudel?

I am far from believing as a result of these observations that the critical apparatus of the edition (introductory study and notes) is devoid of real merits. Both are substantial, well-informed, and often truly useful. The sociological rather than the historiographic viewpoint predominates in this critical apparatus, just as the editor's interest is absorbed in an effort to link some of the

scholar's opinions to those of an authority in the area of sociology or philosophy. When they are not entirely eccentric, such methodological procedures, as I have said, do yield useful results. The same may not be said of the size of this critical apparatus, which runs to a total of 163 pages, as against the 269 taken up by the text of N. Iorga.

I would not give these figures if the discussion were not very often excessively descriptive and replete with questionable associations. Unfortunately, space does not allow us to cite even a few of them. Another reviewer of the edition, who also probably found a disproportion between text and commentary, termed it "a book which is a dialog between the great scholar and his editor." A dialog, even over time, is sometimes welcome, but here it is often eccentric, being transformed into a long, overly insistent monolog. From the philological viewpoint the text is accurately presented, since the peculiarities of the scholar's language are carefully preserved. I also found oversights or omissions in the careful comparison which I made as usual with the text of the first edition, grammatical and orthographic, and I compared only 10 pages. It was astonishing to find the author's name given (on the cover and the title page) as Nicolae Iorga, knowing as we do that the scholar published all his books (including this one now re-issued) as N. Iorga. This was the express desire of the author, and any editor or publishing house has the obligation of respecting it without deviation. However, aside from such omissions by an editor making his first attempt of this kind, the edition is almost a good one.

Ilie Badescu took the commendable initiative of restoring this important work of N. Iorga to present-day readers. The initiative of the editor and the Editura Meridiane are to be congratulated.

Editor Responds to Criticisms

27000054 Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA
in Romanian 18 Feb 88 p 19

[Article by Ilie Badescu: "A Picturesque Iorga"]

[Text] There are books whose fate in a culture eloquently illustrates the fate of the culture within a given period of history. Such books are of symptomatic value because they have the gift of revealing many things to be found outside their pages. I remember the book by Alfred Schurtz, a low-level postal official in Germany who emigrated to the United States. He made bold to publish, during the years immediately following the war, a book of essays, of reflections inspired by the heritage of Weberian theory. The book appeared to be an obscure work. It resulted in an explosion. The thought of A. Schurtz gave birth to a new current in American sociology, sociological phenomenology. Such a book probably would not have had such an effect in other cultures. One symptomatic book in our culture was "Evolutia ideii de libertate" [Evolution of the Idea of Liberty] by Nicolae Iorga, which we have had the pleasure of republishing.

The surprise it caused us was overwhelming. Several months after its appearance we find ourselves in the rather unusual situation of returning to one of the questions which Iorga raises in his work, that of revolution. We will not be able to examine the entire breadth of Iorga's theory here. Nor will we refer to his classification of revolutions or his criticism of the French Revolution. Proceeding from this criticism by Iorga, we will refer to something else, the way in which the scholar "read" historical epochs and the way in which we understand his work when we read it. Nicolae Iorga believed that the spirit of the French Revolution originated in a broader current inherited from "classical antiquity." Contact with classical antiquity develops a new historical attitude, a new cultural model which consists of comparing an abstract idea to a "natural ideal" intended to be an "eternal standard" for all mankind. In essence it was not a question entirely of the inclination to use the ideas generated by one epoch to judge another epoch, but also of belief in the extrahistorical rationalism of the abstract idea. This is the cultural ethnocentrism of the age which, desirous of escaping the constraint of absolute monarchy, contrasts with it an abstract model of liberty deriving from "the illusion of an antiquity supposed to have been lived for liberty." "In order to understand classical antiquity, we should not consider it in absolute terms," Iorga warns us, "but as one of the forms of human civilization, and, of course, when we consider it in this way we must view it against its background, understand it in its relation to certain ideas, which we name with words taken from antiquity but which had entirely different meanings at that time. N. Iorga extracts and considers the meaning of the idea of liberty (idea, not "notion") as an historical meaning valid for one form or another of human civilization. Whenever someone transfers it from one form of civilization to another, he violates the requirement of historicity of human forms and creations, falling into a unique ethnocentrism which Iorga never tired of condemning, as is clearly to be seen from the foregoing quotation. Iorga's "reading" of historical epochs never violated the postulate of historicity which we would be justified in calling the principle of historical relativism. We are faced with a special problem raised by utilization of any cultural heritage, the problem of the reading.

These reflexions of ours have been occasioned by the significant presentation made by the well-known literary historian and journalist, Z. Ornea, of the edition of the 18th lecture of Nicolae Iorga, on "Evolution of the Idea of Liberty." Several pages before this, in the same issue of ROMANIA LITERARA, another critic and literary historian also presenting a problem of literary heritage, the heritage of Eminescu as viewed by Pompiliu Constantinescu, delivers a proposition which is also extremely significant in our case: "Eminescu as necropolis or Eminescu as acropolis?" Exactly the same problem exists with regard to the heritage of Iorga, "Iorga as necropolis or Iorga as acropolis?" (as today's generation wants him to be). We must, of course, make ourselves quite clear. It is not a question of not being angry—with

anyone—when he expresses objections, sometimes justified, sometimes roundabout, sometimes unfounded. What is under discussion, we say, is the concept of the reading. It is generally a good idea to keep in mind a well-known law which governs any kind of reading. Before the object of a reading is defined, the latter is very clearly defined by the reader. This explains how strata upon strata of different readings can be superimposed on the same work over time. Hence the danger also exists that works may fall into a relative position from which they can be extricated only by the object of reading itself. From the philological viewpoint, Z. Ornea makes justified observations about our edition. The list of linguistic errors probably could have been increased by comparison of more than 10 pages. However, we did not try, as any editor does, to restore Iorga's text (in the note on the edition we stated that we did not adopt all of Iorga's spellings). As regards the notes, they are organized as are the notes to any edition. Commentaries on the Bible or any other important book, including Marx' "Capital," can only have the status of adjoining commentaries when the text is reproduced. What other purpose could have been served by these notes and the Introductory Study in the case of the Iorga edition? I simply wanted to revive the question of the Iorga's topicality. Now when it comes to Iorga's topicality, we believe it to be fresh. Perhaps without intending to, or to be more precise, by sacrificing tradition, Z. Ornea comes fairly close to the subject. The well-known journalist does not discuss the ideas of Iorga but rather the question of interpretive classification of the conception and style of thought of our great historian. In fact, what would he have us do? Repeat, in connection with Iorga's ideas, all the clichés (and "labels") which have been applied to the man regarding his way of thinking, and to his work regarding scientific reality nearly a century ago, starting with that of Lovinescu and ending with that of the great Calinescu, who in turn considers Iorga to be devoid of ideas. Or should we accept the thought launched by the great philosopher Lucian Blaga, that N. Iorga is a very learned man whose genius was stifled by quantity?

The portrait of the book which I edited and of its author, as viewed by Z. Ornea, does not escape the confines of these clichés. Moreover, the critic seeks support for them in the pages of Iorga. In the chase after quotations, however, it sometimes happens that the eye loses sight of the text, the idea, and so a pompous regal autonomy is conferred on the context and thus the quotation. I also could take the quotations which Z. Ornea reproduces, somewhat pompously, from Iorga's texts (the lectures especially) and the discussion would proceed in a different direction; that is, it would ~~be~~ the point. Whatever Iorga may have said in that text (which we will not examine at this point) and in that context, to believe, when you oppose with invincible tenacity the text under discussion (from the work edited), that the discipline of history (as practiced by N. Iorga) is below the level of

idea, that its bearing on philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and other human disciplines is minimal, and moreover antipathetic to them, is to transform Iorga into a mere technician of history.

We arrive at the paradoxical situation that we have, in this view—which, as we see, is that of Z. Ornea—a litterateur, either talented or a genius, but not classified as such in Romanian literary history, but we have no historian. N. Iorga, member of so many academies, lecturer at so many universities in the world, initiator of disciplines, just as I have tried to argue, and promoter of ideas and techniques at the level of Europe? For which reason we consider him to be of debatable topicality. Laboring under the difficulty of this astounding innovation, because of this book and several others, we have considered him to be a man of epistemological reconstructions in the science of history.

As a result of reading the 18 lectures in the context of his other important work, confining ourselves to the area of questions raised by sociohistorical research today, I was so bold as to formulate the thought—annoying to Z. Ornea—that this work could become one of epistemological “fashion” in this sphere. In order for this to come about, however, we must free ourselves from the bondage of the clichés and the “labels” which the layers of readings have placed on the man and his work. Some of them are reproduced by Z. Ornea and we will not repeat them here for lack of space. Nor can I dwell here on Iorga’s theory of inorganic revolution, which we consider to be a major theoretical finding in European sociology. I will merely point out in passing that in his criticism of the French revolution, Iorga agreed, *a posteriori* of course, with the criticism which Marx himself made of the French revolution. Who among those who have read Iorga’s text do not know that Iorga, like Marx, criticized “the lack of consistency, the failures of the French Revolution” (Z. Ornea), although he did it differently (as is quite normal). Rather than the expression “lack of consistency,” Iorga used “lack of depth,” which is closer to Marx’ idea. He qualified it as a “revolution on the surface.” (Do we need more quotations? I prefer to leave it to the reader to examine the entire text of Iorga.) But who of those who have read Iorga’s text carefully is unaware of this? Iorga examined the continental movement of the revolutionary wave arising in France, pointing out the new forces and currents superadded to it in other regions of the continent. Why does Iorga criticize the French revolution? First of all because it did not act consistently with respect to the three criteria of liberty: liberty of labor, social liberty, and liberty of thought. But did the French Revolution create anything? Of course it did, asserts Iorga. It created the “first liberalism,” which is thus “French in origin, and there is none other than this,” stressed Iorga. The bourgeoisie has created other liberalisms, but it too “abandoned its liberal aspirations,” says Iorga, “in the generation which created 1848.” But Iorga does not say that the French Revolution did not change the face of the world. On the

contrary, points out this historian who was the principal “child” of this revolution, liberalism spread over all of Europe, causing a general “change of face.”

Z. Ornea’s objections may, of course, be genuine. There are several points on which his interpretation is the right one. It remains to be discussed whether Iorga’s “holistic vision” is obsolete. It remains to be discussed whether Iorga’s romanticism is to be utilized. However we may take it, we are forced to take account of the holistic idea and its functional systems in the history of European culture. By proceeding in this way we escape the terminological errors resulting from an anachronistic mindset of the time which entails interdiction and invitation to silence (such as “this is a question of a romantic viewpoint, ergo holistic, ergo conservative, ergo mired in the past, ergo reactionary, ergo responsible for all the historical evils of this society.”) As regards romanticism, it is well for us to remember that classification of sociological historical theories and philosophical concepts on the basis of the two “paradigms,” classical and romantic, is a commonplace in the European history of ideas. Romanticism was a “movement revitalizing European culture in postrevolutionary Europe,” as it is characterized by the American Marxist sociologist A. Gouldner. The romantic paradigm allowed decisive advance by the language of the human sciences toward the “logic of polarities” and hence, by way of the Hegelian dialectic, toward the materialist dialectic of society. Marx himself is identified with this theoretical series appearing in the field of pulsation of the romantic paradigm. The romantic dimension of the Marxist view has already been pointed out. The same Marxist sociologist referred to above examined the “sources of Marx’ romanticism” and the decisive share held by the “romantic component” in his thought. We can also speak of an holistic component in the viewpoint of Marx, to the extent that he conceived of society as a “social organism of production” and not as a simple “mechanical aggregate of individuals.” As we clearly observe, this component enabled Marx to separate himself from the contractualism of the utopian socialists and to prevent positivist, universalist, and unhistorical uses of his concept. Passing over the time of birth of sociology in Germany, which was entirely romantic, it is almost a truism for us to say that Max Weber was himself a sociologist of romantic vision. The new science of culture, anthropology, is decidedly romantic. The modern methodologies are romantic in origin. The Chicago School (A. Strauss, E. Goffman, H. S. Becker) is a romantic one (it is well deriving from the tradition of romantic composition: A. W. Small, W. Y. Thomas, R. E. Park. Ethnomethodology (a new trend in American sociology) is also cast in the romantic mold. And so on. A sociologist of the left such as G. W. Mills also holds the Romantic viewpoint. In particular, the assault on traditions and historicism in the name of abstract extrahistorical principles represents extension of the reaction against romanticism.

Hence the situation has been definitively established, because, it seems to us, Z. Ornea hastens to describe it by

resorting to a well-known rhetorical reflex, "it is known that..." that is, "it is known that Iorga is an organicist," a "conservative," a "romantic," etc. etc. He seems to wish to suggest that everything has been settled in the matter of Iorga's works. Where can this attitude have come from? Generally speaking, Iorga's romanticism is a good and valid expression of the reaction against positivism. Iorga is against positivist sociology, not against sociology as such, which, to be valid, must be holistic and historical. Did K. Lamprecht not introduce this innovation into German culture? P. P. Panaitescu observed this so long ago as 1928 in connection with the new methodology introduced into the science of history by K. Lamprecht. "This sociological or psychological method was called by Lamprecht 'cultural history,' because he places institutions (urban and rural life, artistic production, legal and administrative organization) in the foreground, relegating political history to the background. On the other hand, also as a consequence of his theories, Lamprecht considers the nation, the creative element, to be in the foreground in history, with only the state, the product of society, in the background." How, then, can we approach Iorga from the direction of sociology? Should we not, if we accept the advice of Z. Ornea, identify the truth about the type of sociology which N. Iorga developed in reaction to positivist sociology. The line which Iorga followed assimilated the Kantian idea which rejected "dogmatic uses of the intellect" (I. Kant) (an idea also further developed in the "laboratory" of romanticism). Following Eminescu, Iorga as well may be identified with a certain type of "obsession with the past." Unfortunately, the question is kept in the vague area of tolerant finger pointing. It remains to be discussed whether some viewpoints and ideas, which now have labels on them such as "obsession with the past," are really obsolete, in other words, whether history is following an absolutely fatal course and human initiatives are nothing. This fatalism, itself out of date, also deserves to be examined. From a fatalistic perspective such as this, to which it seems to us Z. Ornea also subscribes, there is nothing more to be undertaken in history (such a position is that of linear evolutionism rejected by many, even Iorga himself, as we tried to point out in the introductory study). The industrialism with its excesses which Iorga denounces, should have been forced by the historian to bow its head (otherwise we would have been forced to bow our heads, to consent to all the consequences of implacable, fatal unfolding of events, etc).

Space also does not allow us to take up again the similarity between the criticism made by Iorga of industrialism and the criticism of the Chicago School. However, we do not understand Z. Ornea's scarcely restrained irritation with such comparisons. (What is strange is that the Chicago School is part of the romantic sociological trends and thus, at least on this basis, Z. Ornea should have approved my comparison). We note, however, that the personality of Iorga contradicts the cliché. He is not a mere compiler of facts or mere narrator. He is an "architect" of history. How could we

otherwise explain him at some of the crucial moments of the biography of his thought? He was an architect of the idea of Romanian national unity, at a time when few believed in its success, an architect later on the continental scale of a theorized attitude against fascism when fascism was breaking down frontiers and was beginning to destroy nations.

As regards the question of reading, it must be pointed out that no one can prevent another person from having a mental image of Iorga based on the standard of truth which he has arrived at regarding the man and his work. Hence it is important above all to restore his text and, of course, to try other hypotheses and other ways of conducting a dialog with him, in time and over a certain period of time. I am glad that Z. Ornea welcomes this initiative and I wish to thank him for his observations. But we want an acropolis for Iorga, not a necropolis. This is the Iorga whom I believe we need today.

6115

Reporter's Impressions of Brasov
27000069 Bucharest FLACARA in Romanian
No 13, 1 Apr 88 p 18

[Article by Carmen Dumitrescu: "The Old City Is Very New!"]

[Text] "Baudelaire described travel as the poetic act par excellence. That statement makes me exclaim enviously that today the roads, train stations, and airports are full of poets and that the world has never before known such a poetry traffic. It is generally thought that traveling helps the traveler get away from himself. I have never been able to travel without violently finding myself again."

I hope that Octavian Paler will forgive me, but it was with these thoughts from his new book "Life as a Bullfight" in mind that I got off the train in Brasov—I was finding my own convictions again. It is under the influence of those thoughts that I look at Brasov. It is the same mountain town, invaded by spring, its mountain-tops still covered by a thick layer of snow. The streets, spotlessly clean, bear all the unmistakable marks of the influence of the Codlea florists. The children, romping without a care for their spelling books, "fly" about in the chairs that carry them ecstatic between heaven and earth. With innocent viles they try to wrest from the grandparents, weary of so much play at their age, a few minutes of indulgence in the crystal air at the foot of the Timpa mountain. I am walking toward the old city with Margareta Krausa, deputy chairman of the Brasov Municipal People's Council, who also shares the thought that "travel is the poetic act par excellence."

The architects of Brasov incorporated old, traditional elements from the very first planning stages, when they began the reconstruction of the old city square, where past centuries are still very much alive. For example, the

"Merchants' House" dates back to 1545. It has been restored several times to make it withstand time and space. Today it is a welcoming and pleasant spot for the Romanian and foreign tourists ceaselessly getting in and out of cars. Surprisingly, the stores are marked by the same poetic air, in various forms. We stop at the most prosaic establishment, a small restaurant. On the door it says "Luncheon," but inside the mirrors, stained glass windows, and elegant furniture made in Brasov and Codlea give us the feeling of being in a theater. The tables are separated by flowering "fences." It is a fairy-tale atmosphere unique among all the restaurants of Romania. The light, tinted according to the time of day, is pleasantly filtered down from rustic ceiling lights. The service, beginning with the food and including attitude, is faultless. Six warm dishes are served with elementary, although not always perceptible respect for the customer. All the other shops that have been or are now being restored in keeping with the same unified architectural principle, bear related and distinguishing features, like brothers. After the first rush of impressions, the traits that stay with the passerby are wooden or ceramic ceilings, headlights in original shapes and colors, functional but tasteful furnishings, and informative displays for the customer.

I made the rounds of these small shops several times. I note their names for your information: Spicul, Casata, Cadouri, Discuri, Nivea.

I go in for a cup of hot tea, because an icy wind is beginning to sweep the streets. The tea kettles are boiling and elegant cups are laid out as if for a tea party for friends and family. On the tables, the tea "menu." You may be astonished, just as I was... Various kinds of snacks are served, on choice, with the hot tea. Similarly, coffee comes with several kinds of cakes tasting of mother's kitchen, and a plant extract or cordial drink. These two non-alcoholic drinks and the short breaks on a busy day are so enjoyable that the restaurants are full, but at the same time free of ostentatious crowding, noise, stress, and smoke. The personnel who serve tea and coffee perform their duties flawlessly, something the customer seldom encounters. The waiter comes to the table with a smile, offers the customer a chair and suggestions, speaks in low tones, listens patiently, and shows no signs of irritability. None of the cold ceremony of public establishments. A truly civilized trade...

The "Nivea" shop, which carries both Nivea products and other cosmetic products manufactured in Romania, is done all in white. All the furnishings, lights, shelves, pots of cream, and deodorants have been filtered through the unsurpassable eye of architects and designers who established the sovereignty of the pure color, and sensitively filled the shelves with what we need for our personal care, thus giving us the impression of purchasing a work of art. We go to a stylish shop for a bottle of scent or a toothpaste.

The efforts put into esthetics and into the special customer service are rewarded by our pleasure in and sincere admiration for a job well done, for work that radiates intelligence and imagination from the designing board to sales.

At the sweets and drinks shop, the candy displayed in huge colored glass jars tempts even diabetic passers-by to buy. If he does not have children there is always a nephew or a neighbor for whom it is worth "lugging" a bag of sweets. From the door of each store you hear a polite "Good Day," which in turn prompts an invitation to "Please come back," which the people of Brasov will undoubtedly do. I was sharply reminded of the tone of voice of some sales people in Bucharest and of their reproachful looks.

One trip is not enough to exhaust the impressions and gather all the possible observations. Just as I was about to conclude these notes I remembered something else. Like in the peasants' homes, next to the ceramic tile stoves there are small benches for the chilled customer who, after running errands in the city on a winter day, can have a rest and warm up. Even in summer, the tired customer can sit down a few minutes and catch his breath.

In this Brasov square, which will become even more attractive after it is entirely paved in mosaic, each element was set in place with the great and kind thought: "Let us make each day a holiday."

And that is what we have here, a thing of beauty and substance, and looking down on us are 16th century buildings still standing. Our wholehearted congratulations!

12782

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Armed Forces Staff Use of ADP Assessed
23000066 Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK
in German No 3, Mar 88 pp 146-147

[Article by Ist Lt Martin Huettner: "East German Armed Forces Using Information Technology To Rationalize Staff Work"]

[Text]

Description of Hardware in Current Use

There are major changes going on in the NVA in that computers are being introduced at the workplace.

For the most part, these are AS120/5130 and PC1715 models built by the Robotron VEB combine which are 2.5 MHz cycled microprocessors with a Z80-compatible 8bit, a 64K memory and two 5.25-inch, one megabyte diskette drives.

In the GDR, the AS120/5130 is classified as an office computer and the PC1715 as a personal computer. Since both of these units only have a 64K memory (quite small by Western standards), they are of only limited use in performing data-intensive and instruction-intensive functions and can only handle scaled-down versions of large-scale software programs.

These 8-bit computers are thus not comparable to the standard Western 16-bit computers which have a 512K memory and more RAM capability.

Description of Software

As always, hardware and software are used to enhance efficiency in gathering, processing and disseminating information.

The focus of the NVA effort is on large-scale data management. This data is the subject of other office activities both of a textual nature, e.g. messages, reports and commands and of a mathematical nature, e.g. statistics, analyses, calculations and general computations. These activities are performed for the most part with the help of standard software of Western origin. The REDABAS relational database system being used is quite similar to dBase II, a software package in wide use in this country [i.e. the FRG].

Equipped with a program language of its own, this system offers far more options for the development of specific software solutions than traditional data management systems. A dialogue language is an outstanding REDABAS feature which allows even an inexperienced user to develop application programs of his own with less effort than other comparable program languages.

The performance limits of this system of 254 characters per field, 32 fields per data record and 65,535 data record per file make it possible to solve a number of data management problems, e.g. warehousing, personnel records and inquiries, scheduling, etc.

A program named TEXT 30 is used for word processing. It offers a wide variety of makeup, editing and text composition possibilities; but the program does not provide for a calculator function or a command for printing multiple copies.

At this time, the NVA uses two tabular calculation programs developed for commercial purposes in the West, i.e. Multiplan by Microsoft and Supercalc by Sorcim. The basic principle of everything calculator software has to offer is on-screen transmission of calculated data in the form of tables. The type of grid used is up to the user; in principle, the computer keyboard is used to replace the pencil.

In the application of sophisticated spreadsheet programs such as Multiplan and SuperCalc sufficient hardware storage capability is of the essence. But it is in this very regard that both the AS120/5130 and the PC1715 fall short.

In theory, a Multiplan spreadsheet, for example, consists of a matrix of up to 63 columns and 255 lines. But since the Multiplan operating system and each of its active program modules take up about 40K, the spreadsheet can occupy no more than 24K or roughly 20 columns of 25 to 30 lines. This not only results in a substantial reduction in size but also in a hard-to-read display because small-format spreadsheets do not leave much room for explanatory notes.

Evaluation and Future Outlook

The workplace computers are being introduced in an isolated fashion, i.e. they operate as so-called "stand-alone systems." Input, output, storage and processing take place independently from other PCs and/or a central computer facility. At most, provision has been made for physical exchange of data and/or diskettes. But a system of higher-efficiency central data storage coupled with decentralized access and sharing of accessory equipment such as printers, plotters, graphic screens, etc. in the manner of a PC network does not exist.

Computers and their users constitute an independent organizational unit. This autonomous position with regard to data storage and processing could be viewed as a source of power, i.e. the user, operating at a low level of the hierarchy, might be tempted to enlarge his decision-making powers with the help of his workplace computer—an intriguing possibility within the Eastern command structure.

The hardware being used places restrictions on the handling of the software and the data inventory. Integrated software which combines word processing, tabular computation, data banks, graphics and possibly telecommunications as well as time schedules in a single package and thus optimally structures and provides access to the diversified data flow among the staffs requires a lot of storage capability, i.e. about 192K or more. One will have to wait and see how quickly efficient Eastern hardware can be developed and made operational in this field. The robotron A7100, which is compatible to the Western (IBM-PC) standard is already being tested in the R&D stage. This particular computer, a 16-bit, 5MHz cycled microprocessor compatible with the Intel 8086, has a random access memory of 256K to 768K and 5.25-inch, 10M hard disk memory.

In any event, initial tests have been conducted and flaws have been corrected. Although the present system is capable of transmitting data inventories with the help of

special conversion routines, e.g. from tabular computation to word processing programs, the error margins are usually high and both the processing speed and the user-friendly aspects of the system tend to suffer.

The known inferiority of Eastern technology in terms of hardware as well as software should not lead one to underestimate the importance of orgware. Generally speaking, orgware refers to all the ideas and methods which serve to develop an organization, to call it into being and adapt it to changing conditions—some of which ADP can handle for reasons of economy.

In closing, we might note that the NVA has taken an important step forward in this field. It is taking optimal advantage of the available hardware which is not too highly developed by comparison with Western technology. The foundations for the introduction of efficient hardware/software combinations sometime in the future are being laid right now

09478

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1988 Federal Budget Published

24000077a Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech
12 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by Julius Jombik, CSc, First Deputy of the CSSR Minister of Finance]

[Text] In December last year the legislative bodies discussed and approved drafts of the state budgets for 1988. That created the foundation which enables the state budgets, as the key instruments of fiscal policy, to exert influence on further development of the national economy, increase the standard of living of our population, strengthen their basic social securities, and fulfill other, socially important, tasks. The goal of the fiscal and budget policy is to make further progress in realizing the Main Directions of Economic and Social Development, decreed by the 17th Congress of the KSC.

The starting point for drafting the proposals of the state budgets and the budgets of the national committees were, in accord with the principles of the fiscal policy, the tasks of the Eighth 5-Year Plan for the development of the national economy and the CSSR budget outlook for the years 1986-1990. At the same time, however, it was also essential to take a look at the results achieved during the first two years of the Eighth 5-Year Plan. The developments in 1986 and 1987 showed that despite the fact that many volume indicators of the state plan were fulfilled or exceeded, the tasks which characterize the qualitative side of the replacement process have not been fully implemented. This is manifested mainly in the failure to achieve the objectives in expenditure and the creation of profits, in the unfavorable situation in inventories, and in insufficient sales of products on domestic as well as foreign markets. Shortcomings in the area of research and development, capital investment, and supply and demand persist.

All these problems and failings converge in the failure to fulfill the objectives in asset formation and thus cause tension in the state budgets as well as in the financial management of the enterprise sphere. Two main sources of revenue for the state budgets are not fully realized—levies from economic organizations and turnover taxes. The enterprise sphere shows a deterioration of their ability to pay as a result of it, and asset formation and rapidly increasing requirements particularly where inventories are concerned.

The Federal Government last year adopted a number of measures aimed at overcoming unsatisfactory trends particularly in asset formation, enacting the planned wage increases, and limiting the excessive consumption of assets in both the enterprise and the budget spheres.

The enterprise sphere needs to reduce its present excessively high inventories by Kcs 24-25 billion by the end of 1988. Other measures were adopted for the purpose of achieving harmony between investment needs and asset formation.

In the budget sphere, the federal government decided in the middle of last year to freeze selected types of noninvestment expenditures of the budget organizations and a portion of noninvestment subsidies given to economic and cooperative organizations at 1 percent of the budgets approved for the year 1987. Analogous measures were also adopted in the CSR and SSR state budgets and those of the national committees. The purpose of these measures is not only to ensure an end balance in the management of the budget in 1987, but at the same time to increase the pressure aimed at achieving careful management of budget resources.

For the financial as well as other economic organizations, and for enterprises especially, this development means the necessity to concentrate their main attention on an effective formation of financial assets and a more economical expenditure of budget resources, with the aim to ensure a realistic balance of cash flows and a balance in the state budgets in particular.

Basic Budget Ratios

The approved draft state budgets provide financing for tasks prescribed in the state plan for the development of the national economy for the year 1988. In accordance with the law on the Eighth 5-Year Plan they thus ensure a balance between resources and needs of the entire budget system as well as of its components, that is, the state budget of the CS Federation, the CSR and SSR state budgets, and the budgets of the national committees.

The total volume of revenues and expenditures of the state budgets and the budgets of the national committees is planned at Kcs 393.9 billion, and in comparison with the budget for 1987 it is being increased by Kcs 12.3 billion, that is, by 3.3 percent. The key portion of this increase in the budget revenues comes from an increase in the levies from economic organizations which are based mostly on the challenging tasks prescribed for asset formation. The tax on wages is also being raised in connection with the planned growth of citizens' income from their work. On the other hand, the planned revenues from the turnover tax are declining because of insufficient sales of consumer goods in the domestic market as a result of their inadequate volume and quality.

The major cause of the increased expenditures of the state budgets is the noninvestment expenditures of the budgeting and disbursing organizations, particularly in the area of social services and activities on behalf of the public having a significant influence on the standard of living. In spite of the problems in the formation of

budget revenues, the state budgets will provide this year financing for more tasks for the development of our economy, for ensuring our defense capability, etc.

For example, noninvestment funding for research and development will reach almost Kcs 21 billion in 1988, and in comparison with the 1987 plan will increase by 4 percent. Of that, payments from state budgets will amount to Kcs 8.9 billion and those from internal resources of the economy sphere Kcs 12.2 billion. The funding from the state budgets will ensure partial financing of tasks of the state plan for research and development, and the budget also provides for needs that will arise during the course of this year in connection with the implementation of the Comprehensive Program For Research And Development of CEMA Countries by the Year 2000.

The share of the revenues of the state budget of the CS Federation in the total revenues of the state budgets will reach 34.6 percent, while its share in the total expenditures of the state budgets will be 19 percent. The total amount of grants from the state budget of the CS Federation to the state budgets of the republics is planned at Kcs 140.2 billion, and in contrast to 1987 will increase at a comparable level by 3.1 percent. The share of these grants to the expenditures of the state budgets of the republics and including grants to the budgets of the national committees, which in 1988 will reach 34.5 percent, reflects the planned objectives in the development of revenues and expenditures of the individual components of the budget system.

Special-purpose grants to the state budgets of the republics are designated for the defrayment of price subsidies and price support, financing of selected investment projects with national import (for example, subsidies for comprehensive residential construction, the system of water-works on the Danube) and for other purposes. General grants, which comprise 51.4 percent of all grants, are directed for the most part at the area of public services consumption defrayed from state budgets of the republics and budgets of the national committees.

Relations With Economic Organizations

The key role in ensuring a balanced budget is performed by the development of the financial management of the khozraschet sphere, particularly an efficient formation of financial resources and their use for levies to the state budget and an economical way of meeting essential requirements for development and services.

The total profits of the economic organizations this year should reach Kcs 170.5 billion, that is, Kcs 15.6 billion (10 percent) more than in 1987. Kcs 12.7 billion of this increase is to come from a relative decline of total expenditures in relation to output. In order to accomplish this difficult task, it will be necessary to reduce the

share of total expenditures for output by 1 percent, the share of expenditures for materials by 1.4 percent, and financial expenditures by 1.5 percent.

Contrasting with these objectives of the plan are the results achieved in 1986, when total expenditures were relatively reduced by 0.7 percent and material expenditures by 0.9 percent. As a result, the contribution of the relative reduction of expenditures to profit formation in that year was only Kcs 8.4 billion, that is Kcs 2.8 billion less than planned. Even worse were the results in fulfilling the planned qualitative tasks in relative reductions of expenditures during the past year, when as a result of considerable overruns of the planned shares of material and financial expenditures for output, the plan for profit formation was not fulfilled, with all the consequences for balancing the financial management of the enterprise sphere as well as for the revenue formation of the state budget.

Of the planned volume of budget grants for investments in the economic organizations in the amount of Kcs 10.4 billion, the largest portion is scheduled for the construction of the Danube water project, for the construction of facilities for supplying drinking water, for specific construction in organizations managed by national committees, for renovation and increase of the vehicle fleet in transportation, and for ensuring the intensification of output in select agricultural organizations. Within the structure of financing investments in economic organizations, the share of internal resources of these organizations is being increased, particularly allocations from profits, and the share of grants from the state budget is being reduced. That should help increase the pressure for shortening the time of construction of individual projects, limiting construction in progress, and for timely introduction of capacities into production while adhering to their planned parameters.

Noninvestment grants given to economic organizations out of the budget system will increase in comparison with the 1987 budget only by Kcs 0.2 billion and will reach the total sum of Kcs 42.3 billion. The bulk of these resources, almost 62 percent of the total volume of these grants, goes for price subsidies and price support directed for the most part to the agricultural complex.

In comparison with the budgetary prospects for the Eighth 5-Year Plan, there has been a moderate reduction of noninvestment grants, which is connected with the realization of the objective to gradually limit their scope. In the 1988 budget some grants were reduced (for example, price of surface water), and some other grants were discontinued (for example, price of ammonia). More extensive changes in the volume of noninvestment projects, however, will not be feasible until they are done in conjunction with the rationalization of the price system.

On the other hand, it is necessary to defray from budget funds the growing losses, particularly in municipal mass transportation where the budget grants will increase by 2.1 percent and will reach Kcs 4.4 billion altogether. Similarly, provisions will be made for increasing grants to compensate for differences stemming from the implementation of a dual price system for products where greater output is in the national interest. This concerns mainly the spare parts base of the electrical engineering industry, where these grants will reach the amount of Kcs 198 million.

Standard of Living

The state budgets and the budgets of the national committees provide the financing necessary for the realization of objectives for the improvement of the standard of living, designated for the current year. This year, noninvestment budget expenditures for social services and actions on behalf of the public are to reach the total amount of Kcs 176.3 billion, which means an increase in expenditures of Kcs 7 billion, that is by 4.1 percent compared to the 1987 budget. This sum thus comprises 45.3 percent of all planned budget expenditures. The greater expenditures for these purposes reflect the impact on the entire year, social measures already implemented during the past year, also wage adjustments made especially in education and cultural affairs, and reserve funds for pension adjustments planned for 1 October 1988.

More than half of the planned budget resources for these purposes—Kcs 93.7 billion—is earmarked for social security. Planned expenditures for pensions in the amount of Kcs 57.8 billion count with a year-round impact of the increase of the lowest pensions which are the only source of income, enacted 1 October of last year. The expenditures for medical insurance in the amount of Kcs 28.8 billion reflect measures effective since 1 July of last year for the benefit of families with children, i.e., increase in the maternity supplement, extension of the period during which it is paid, and extension of the period of providing support for nursing a member of the family. Concurrently with these measures the conditions for giving loans to young married people were also amended. Together with the resources for the planned second stage of the pension adjustments effective 1 October of this year, financing will be provided also for measures aimed at realizing the decisions of the 17th Congress of the KSC concerning the social area, stemming from the resolutions of the Presidium of the KSC Central Committee, the CSSR Government, Presidium of the Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Presidium of the SZM Central Committee of April last year.

National committees count on almost Kcs 7 billion in the 1988 budget for social security purposes. The increase of these resources by 4.7 percent in comparison with 1987 provides also for an increase of the norms for meals in homes for pensioners and measures concerning special diets.

Kcs 29.4 billion of noninvestment funds will be expended for education, which is an increase of 4 percent over 1987. This sum also includes the monies for salary adjustments of teachers of all grades in the amount of Kcs 555 million, implemented last year. The budget provides financial resources for planned educational projects in connection with the state operational plan for this year.

Noninvestment expenditures for health care are being increased by 5.4 percent and will reach the total sum of Kcs 29.2 billion. The main tasks, including their budgetary provision, are concentrated in the area of health care managed by the national committees, where expenditures are to amount to Kcs 29.2 billion. The high rate of growth of these expenditures is strongly influenced primarily by the dynamics of expenditures for medications and special health care materials which have grown by 8 percent, that is, by Kcs 651 million, and their total volume will reach Kcs 8.8 billion. In connection with the state operational plan, noninvestment budget expenditures in the health care area will make provisions for the growth of output, particularly an increase of the number of beds in hospitals by 1,673, increase in the number of doctors in ambulatory care by 343, etc.

Noninvestment expenditures for cultural matters will be increased by 3 percent, and their total sum should reach Kcs 5.3 billion. These expenditures contain funds for wage adjustments, implemented last year in the amount of Kcs 100 million. Other budget expenditures are earmarked for speedier renovation of cultural monuments and municipal conservation areas.

Budget expenditures for residential construction and management will reach more than Kcs 29 billion. In spite of the fact that the amount of residential construction in 1988 will increase in comparison to 1987, and altogether 97,647 apartments are to be finished, the total expenditures of the state budget in this area will decrease as a result of changes in the structural forms of residential construction. The reason for that is an increase in the share of cooperative residential construction, for which the state budget contributes only a portion of the total cost, and, on the other hand, the share of state residential construction fully financed from the state budget is being reduced. To defray the losses of state residential management enterprises, a total of Kcs 5.6 billion is being allocated, that is 1.3 percent more than in the 1987 budget.

Our experiences from the developments in financial and budget management during the first two years of the Eighth 5-Year Plan unequivocally show that fulfilling the tasks required by the state budgets for 1988 will not be a simple matter either. The basic problem will be the tension between budget revenues and expenditures under the conditions of an insufficient formation of financial resources and the enormous pressure to use them for planned as well as above-plan needs.

The year 1988 will be very important not only for accomplishing the tasks of the entire Eighth 5-Year Plan, but also for preparations for the restructuring of the CSSR economic mechanism, to which the financial agencies make a significant contribution. The aim of the proposed measures in the area of finances is to significantly increase the active influence of financial instruments aimed at efficient formation and use of resources in all areas of the replacement process and a strengthening of the economic balance. Serving that purpose will be systemic measures concerned especially with the improvement of financial and budget planning, deepening of *khozraschet* and self-financing, limiting undesirable redistribution processes, fundamental adjustment of the system of taxation, levies, and grants, increasing the self-sufficiency of individual components of the budget system (especially budgets of the national committees), a new system of financing and incentives of the budget and disbursement organizations, and the next stage of restructuring of the foreign exchange-financial mechanism of CEMA.

12605

Use of Wages To Increase Economic Efficiency Discussed

24000077b Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
10 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] Three years ago, rules of the second stage of the Program to Increase The Economic Efficiency of The Wage System [ZEUMS] began to be put into practice in some economic organizations. By the middle of last year, already 2,400 organizations, employing almost 4 million workers, have been implementing the second stage of the program. The program thus included a substantial portion of workers and technical-managerial personnel in the main production branches. However, many other organizations are still only getting ready for the changes.

In order that all organizations enter the new 5-year plan with the same starting wage base, the remaining organizations have to change over to the second stage by 1989 so that there will be time left to adapt to the new conditions of the economic mechanism. At the same time it will be necessary to remove all shortcomings which have been brought to light by the implementation of the program thus far.

In January the Presidium of the KSC Central Committee discussed the effectiveness of the ZEUMS program to date, and evaluated the proposal for a future course of action up to the year 1990. How were the changes in the wage system reflected in economic results? An analysis shows that more than 80 organizations where the second stage of ZEUMS has already been implemented overfulfilled the plan for profit and an equal number of organizations achieved a higher than planned growth in labor productivity. From the point of view of these indicators, the program unquestionably contributed to a higher efficiency and quality of work. But we should not put too

great a value on these results, because they are arguable. Such good results notwithstanding, we must not forget that, for example, more than half of the organizations did not fulfill the indicators of reducing material consumption. Most important, however, none of the measures concerning wages have shown the results they should have.

Program ZEUMS thus also generates criticism. To begin with, we have not succeeded in simplifying the entire wage system. The tangle of individual rules and directives is often a hard nut to crack even for the employees of the labor and wage units themselves. For the workers it is sometimes almost impossible to calculate their wages on the basis of the various premiums or to find their way in the complicated point system of personal evaluation. A wage system which people do not understand too well, loses its effectiveness.

For that reason the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Services and other central agencies were given the assignment this year to fundamentally simplify the regulations for using the various forms of wages and to give enterprises full responsibility for using them effectively. It will involve primarily a simplification of conditions for using piecework, share, and mixed wages, and abolition of minimal limits for curtailing premiums. In accord with the new re-organization of the economic sphere and functioning of the law on state enterprise, the ministry will also broaden the authority of organizations in the wage area. The complexity of the wage system would not be so much of an impediment if it would contribute to greater differentiation of wages and to basing them more on merit. In spite of an abundance of resolutions of all kinds, we have not succeeded in resolving what is precisely the main goal of the wage system modifications, namely differentiation of good and poor work, even after program ZEUMS was put into effect. The differentiation of earnings has increased somewhat, to be sure, from an average dividing line plus or minus 5 percent to 9 percent, but that does not reflect the actual contributions and differences in the productivity of individual workers. In this respect program ZEUMS is a disappointment to many. What is the reason for that?

In many places the thinking was that ZEUMS will mean a blanket increase of wages. However, it was said from the beginning that an enterprise will have to deserve every koruna. An inadequately efficient economy did not permit a substantial increase in the level of earnings, and thus means were not available to act according to the deeply rooted idea that good workers should have increases and earnings of poor workers should be kept as is. Because many organizations did not create sufficient resources, basically only changes in the wage structure occurred—when the basic component in the workers' categories increased, the adjustable component decreased by the same amount. To achieve real differentiation, it would be necessary to take something away from the poor workers, or at least make them do a good job for their wages, but the courage to do that was

lacking. It was not the program that disappointed, but its implementation. If there is a lack of courage on the part of managers from the foreman up to really differentiate in every workplace, than regulations, no matter how good, will not help.

In order to have the wage system function more efficiently, there must be the determination to use the existing options to the full extent. The same way as it is done in the teamwork and compensation organization. It is precisely those collectives which use this advanced method of work organization that can better differentiate between the results of good and poor workers. And they do not need new wage regulations in order to do it, they find the present ones sufficient. It thus appears that it is the direction of the development of work collectives that can bring about a fundamental change in compensation as well as in their productivity and social development.

Organization by teamwork fosters workers' interest in production assignments, in becoming true managers in their workplace. Most work teams have better economic results than collectives which do not use this organizational form. Almost half of the collectives can manage their tasks while reducing the absolute number of workers. It appears that if people are given enough space to act, they can handle even the most difficult jobs.

Organization by work teams shows its advantages also for the planned restructuring of the economic mechanism and for deepening of the democratization and rights of the work collectives. The collectives have already started to apply some new elements of the restructuring ahead of time, such as being able to elect their leaders, negotiating agreements about completing assignments, and having a stake in final results. The work teams are precisely where it will be possible to realize a number of the planned measures. Much then is being expected from greater use of the work teams.

At this time about 11 percent of the total number of workers are members of collectives, and thus the supposition that by the year 1990 approximately one third of production workers should be working according to the work team system, is realistic. In no way, however, are we talking about making these numbers absolute.

Even now one can find cases where the work team is not based on a thorough detailing of the *khorraschet* and creation of necessary conditions for the development of the collective, but the management often is interested only in complying with the required number of collectives which, according to the wishes of the superiors, should be included in the work teams.

That is also one of the reasons why in the past the economic contributions of the work teams declined, even though their numbers grew. Pressure for quantitative growth reflected negatively in the quality of the work teams' output. That must be reversed at any cost.

Introduction of the work team organization must be approached from the point of view of searching for tools to resolve problems of production and social development of the collective, and not as an effort calculated to benefit because this type of organization is "in" at the moment.

On the other hand, we cannot allow constant delays in expanding the use of the work team form of organization. Many collectives are demanding on their own initiative that it be introduced, but the management often gives them the explanation that the conditions for it are not yet present and they must wait. However, the conditions will not create themselves on their own. There are not a few enterprises, where a work team is there only for the show, and often in a sector which is not a very important one, such as the plant kitchen. They consider the work teams as something of an "external experiment" which they can use as an endless lesson. But today we are not talking about experimenting any more. There are enough experiences with work teams. Every enterprise must create work teams as a key component of enterprise subdivision management. If only because the change in the economic mechanism is immanent and it is not possible to introduce a new way of management in an enterprise which uses the old way of managing work collectives.

12605

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Business Deals Concluded at Spring 1988 Leipzig Fair Cited

23000070 Bonn INFORMATIONEN in German
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[Text] Some 9,000 exhibitors from more than 70 countries took part in the Leipzig Spring Fair 1988 (13 through 19 March). Nearly a half a million visitors were counted during the fair, which had as its motto "Integrated Measurement, Testing and Control Technology—The Path to Increasing Productivity." The focus was on products in the areas of electronics, electrical technology and the chemicals and metal industry; there was particular interest in computer-controlled planning and production technology. There were more exhibitors from the FRG, including West Berlin, than in past years; nearly 900 companies were present, including 30 first-time exhibitors. Approximately 240 small and medium-sized companies were present at mixed stands.

The high level of participation by exhibitors from the FRG was somewhat in contrast with the current German-German trade situation. As the minister for economics announced at the beginning of March, German-German trade has declined from the 1985 "record" of 16.7 billion clearing units (VE = DM) to 15.2 billion VE in 1986 and 14.5 billion VE in 1987.

It is true that during his visit to the fair, SED General Secretary Erich Honecker mentioned to FRG exhibitors the figure of 15.2 billion "clearing marks" for 1987. However, this figure includes around DM 700 million that was cleared in trade between the two German states by way of third countries—meaning other Western industrialized states—and in "hard" currencies. For that reason, this amount is not listed by the FRG in the German-German trade balance.

In a statement on German-German trade during the fair, the German Congress of Industry and Trade (DIHT) in Bonn said that the reason for the stagnation in that trade was the "orthodox financial policy" of the GDR. Despite a major need for investment, the Congress continued, the GDR is unwilling to accept credits from Western banks, and is thus limiting its own supply options. The DIHT considered it a positive development that well-known textile firms from the FRG had concluded licensing agreements with partners in the GDR, including Schiesser, Boss, Triumph and Adidas. In the future, Salamander (shoes) will reportedly expand its existing production in the GDR to include sporting shoes. Moreover, building machinery producer Hanomag concluded a cooperative agreement during the fair with the GDR combine Baukema. A similar agreement is being planned by Beiersdorf of Hamburg. The engine deal with the GDR concluded years ago by the Volkswagen plant with a total volume in the magnitude of around one billion VE will reportedly be concluded by the middle of the year with investments of up to 200 million VE.

On the whole, no major agreements in German-German trade were announced during the fair. According to a DIHT summary, such agreements are instead "within the framework of expectations," and they justify "slightly positive expectations for the future." There are reportedly good prospects for further agreements over the course of the year in metallurgy, the food industry and plant construction in the area of energy production. "Restrained optimism" is said to be the outlook among chemicals, iron and steel as well as machine tool manufacture. There are reportedly concrete expectations in motor vehicle construction; in contrast, a "subdued mood" is said to prevail in the textile, food, beverages and tobacco industries. The DIHT's conclusions:

"Too often, there is a lack of flexibility in GDR production, which has caused nearly perfect agreements to fall through at the last minute. In contrast, the financing leeway left unclaimed by the GDR in other areas continues to be an obstacle to many transactions. In general, a trend to use the Leipzig Fair increasingly to make contacts in other CEMA countries is being seen among exhibitors."

GDR Trade With CEMA and Western Industrialized Countries

In reports by the GDR media on the fair, cooperative agreements by the GDR with its CEMA partners once again received the greatest amount of coverage. Around

40 percent of the GDR's foreign trade volume is with the USSR alone. Cooperation between the two states has been set out in "170 government and ministerial agreements and 33 branch programs"; there are currently 119 direct links between combines in the GDR and Soviet enterprises or research facilities.

It is striking that there was no mention of value or quantity in the reported agreements this year. Instead, "reciprocal deliveries" were noted relatively frequently. For example, such reciprocal deliveries (which more or less correspond to one another in value) were agreed upon between the GDR and the USSR in equipment for tool machines and in agricultural engineering, whereby the GDR is to supply automated equipment, agricultural machines and tractors, while the USSR supplies computer-controlled tool machines and agricultural machines. Furthermore, the GDR will supply the USSR with installations for producing fiber optical cable for the Soviet postal and telecommunications system, products from the metallurgical refining industry, teletype and measurement technology, railroad cars and refrigerator cars (which guarantee the "optimal transport" of foodstuffs in outside temperature ranges of between 50 degrees above and 50 degrees below zero), as well as electronic equipment. For the district heating of the Byelorussian capital of Minsk, an East Berlin combine will supply a monitoring and control facility; from the modernized shipbuilding program in the GDR shipyards, several ocean-faring ships and coastal vessels, as well as ship engines, will be exported to the USSR. On the other hand, the GDR will get "extensive imports" of metallurgical products from the USSR, such as hot strip, shipbuilding plates and steel pipes.

After the USSR, the CSSR is the GDR's second largest CEMA trading partner. During Honecker's visit to the CSSR fair stand, it was announced that in 1987 trade between the two states for the first time exceeded the value of three billion rubles. During the fair, reciprocal deliveries of commercial and specialized vehicles as well as of armatures were agreed upon; in addition, the GDR will supply surveying equipment, pumps, compressors and bridge cranes.

Reciprocal deliveries of rolled steel (pipes, bright steel, hot strip, thick plates and body sheets) were agreed upon with Poland; furthermore, the GDR wants to import power plant equipment. Electrical equipment, dairy armatures and hydraulic technology are to be exported to Hungary, and electric motors and camping and sporting goods are to be imported from there. Bulgaria is to receive equipment from Leipzig's Takraf combine for Bulgarian open-pit mining as well as air conditioners for a microelectronics factory, marine diesel engines and assembly-line facilities; in addition, reciprocal deliveries of metallurgical products were agreed upon. Teletypes and x-ray analyzers are being delivered to Romania for the chemicals industry there.

Among the agreements with Western industrialized countries that were announced, GDR exports predominate. In the presence of the competent ministers Michel Noir and Rudi Georgi, the reciprocal delivery of tool machines with the French company Ernault-Toyoda [as published] was agreed upon. According to this agreement, the GDR will supply equipment for the production of lathes and processing centers; France will deliver automated equipment for manufacturing in the engineering industry. Furthermore, printing presses, agricultural technology and machines for processing food, beverages and tobacco are to be exported to France, and equipment for economizing the GDR chemicals and motor vehicle industry is to be imported from France.

Reciprocal deliveries were concluded with companies in Austria (metallurgy, mechanical engineering, luxury foods, consumer goods). Printing presses are being exported to Sweden, the United States and Japan. Electrical technology products are to be supplied to Norway,

Finland and Sweden. Dutch companies will take part in the modernization of the chemicals industry in the GDR (hydrogenation facility in Rositz). A long-term cooperative agreement was concluded between several GDR foreign trade enterprises and the newly-formed Swedish-Swiss concern ABB.

The repeatedly announced cooperation in the area of environmental protection did not take concrete form during the fair in German-German trade nor in agreements with CEMA partners or Western companies. All that was announced was that the "Schwarze Pumpe" gas combine and the Japanese company Mitsui Mining want to cooperate in the purification of waste gas. A statement signed in Leipzig provides for the joint development of "highly active cokes" from brown coal, which can purify waste gas, steam and water.

12271

YUGOSLAVIA

Various Youth Subcultures Examined
28000095 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
27 Mar 88 p 11

[Article by Nina Ozegovic]

[Text] It is unlikely, but true: because of the exaggerated stories about the darker the public has in the end learned about a new subcultural group. This unfortunately has only confirmed the old rule that the subculture is talked and written about only when outrageous events occur or are trumped up. But it lives in its ghetto, it develops parallel to and simultaneously with the bourgeois culture and the elite culture, it has its own values, its trajectory, its symbols, its critics, its style of dress, its followers, and above all its music.

Because it is ignored or even belittled, little is known about it in the broader or established strata, so often frightening epithets are grafted onto it. The public fear is even intensified by the lack of professional literature that would explain the phenomenon of subcultural groups in a rational and sober way. Nevertheless, over the last few years individual or group surveys have been quietly announced, books have been translated. This can probably be laid to the fact that a generation which itself belonged to some informal group of that kind not so long ago has reached positions of authority. A book by the British culturologist Dick Hebdige, who says that "the subculture only dramatizes the crisis of the present society" and represents a "symbolic challenge to a symbolic order," made its appearance in our bookstores a few years ago. Last year a group of Belgrade authors published a voluminous study about informal groups of young people. They classified them by categories, they defined their ideological aspirations, family status, behavior, interests, and fashion. After that, the youth subculture gained legitimacy.

But it emerged much before its legitimate entry into history both abroad and in our country. Back in the gay fifties, writes Slovenian author Zarko Petan, a kind of subculture took shape by way of resistance to traditional and recognized social values. While the official modern things were the fox-trot, the tango, and the waltz, trucking and rape were glorified underground. Brilliantine was purchased through connections, and it was not recommended to walk in tight pants. A social anathema ensued. The sixties brought the politicized student movement and the frikouska, hippy subculture, and toward the end of the seventies there was the well-known Zagreb incident, the Big Ben case. Then the public learned for the first time about hasomani, sminkeri, and steneri, Zagreb subcultural groups between which there was strong antagonism and relatively large differences.

Badage for Young People

At approximately the same time, the first discussions were organized and rock and roll began to be talked about as a way of life. The young Zagreb sociologist Benjamin Perasovic believes that the followers and adherents of various styles and trends showing not only a different taste in music, but also specific styles, particular value orientations, and even their own orientations in political theory, date from that time. Nevertheless, he mentions, all this is relative, especially when it comes to divisions and classification, and those characteristics should be taken with reservations. That is, over the last several years there has been an unusual process taking place: all the subcultural styles have been mixing with one another, the old have been dying out, new ones have been emerging which last a short time, and in the end it is very difficult to define the precise boundary between groups which until that time were separate. What is more, there is a big question of what is merely a fad and what is an authentic subculture manifested as social criticism, an independent expression, or separate direction.

All agree on one thing. The subcultural groups are groups of contemporaries in which young people undergo socialization and identification, sometimes to a greater extent and more uncritically than in the family, the school, or the youth organization, which, it seems, is not exactly popular. Why is that so? Every classic textbook in psychology and social psychology views subcultural groups as a kind of substitute for a disturbed family situation, maladjustment in school and in society generally, in the world of adults. They offer a refuge, since they are a shelter from situations that are frequently repressive, Perasovic says, and that is why we should become accustomed to them, study them, not condemn them, not react hysterically and in the terms of a campaign. It is important that the subculture be discussed calmly, that there be a dialogue, since they are not harmful in and of themselves; on the contrary, they are useful because they develop a pluralism of interests.

And the darker, who have been mentioned and accused so much, are only one of the subcultural groups, a direction in which young people attempt to express themselves that is equal to the others. Just like the punk rockers, sminkeri, skinheads, heavy metal fans, hackers, yuppies, remnants of the remnants of the hippies, fervent soccer fans best known as the Bad Blue Boys, Red Devils, Torcida, or Ultras, alternativists, hooligans, hard-core, rockabilly, or certain other new groups. Belgrade researchers still mention the transcendental meditators, members of religious sects, the omnians.... However, they do not gather around particular styles of music, banda, or clubs, although every member probably has his own musical favorites, but that is not the primary cause that brings them together. There are also the most recent trends which since the fifties has chilled people to the bone, and these are the neighborhood gangs. Thus in

Zagreb there are the Trajani, Utrinjani, and Marticevci, which express the neighborhood they come from, but at the same time they might belong to any other subculture.

Without Flags

The subcultural groups are quite informal, they do not have a strict organization, they do not have flags, they are not registered, and often they are very heterogeneous. Some groups are in fact held together by a common ideology, but some only by psychological need, rituals, favorite music, or other external characteristics. According to Mike Brake, a British researcher of subcultural groups, style implies appearance, image, and slang. The style differs from group to group, it defines membership, it becomes a particular answer to the world of traditional authorities. Style is a statement about oneself, it becomes a kind of identity card.

Subcultural trends are not equally common in all regions. This depends on mentality, dominant religion, socioeconomic relations, migrations. For example, in Slavonia the hanomani and heavy metal fans have held on the longest (they are still around today), while there have hardly been any of them in Split. At the same time, there are many fewer fans of newly composed folk music in Croatia and Slovenia than in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. What is more, they change rapidly, and very often accepted fashion later takes over the iconography of style from subcultural trends. Simplified and with the details cleared up, of course. Fashion is incidentally a very specific concomitant of informal groups. Because of their age and schooling and rare opportunities to affirm themselves in the adult world, young people express their commitments and opinion most easily and rapidly through their clothing.

Music, especially rock, has always been a principal point of support for subcultural groups. But recently this is being lost to some extent, since certain more recent groups are emerging that have been formed around different interests. They include the hackers or the fans of newly composed folk music, which, it is true, are tied together by music, but newly composed folk music. Some such as the hard-cores or the funk rockers, who have almost disappeared, have a need to develop a strong information network, and they publish independent fanzines, their own newspapers, or fliers. With a limited circulation, of course. Although all the groups have a need for classical types of leaders, some are recruited, as in the case of the fans or certain other groups, as ideological leaders, those who initiated the style in comic strips, literature, music, or painting. Of course, there are both negative extremes and deviant phenomena, which are then taken in bourgeois society as an example to be pointed at. It is then forgotten, of course, that someone as far back as Socrates said that "young people are not well brought up, they make fun of authority, and they have no respect for their elders." There is a mystification about subcultural groups, they

are turned into a bogeyman, when actually they represent a space that has been naturally conquered in which it is comfortable to spend a few years, to mature, and then to go off to certain other groups which are more or less uniform.

Punk Rockers

SIGNIFICANCE: The subcultural event that was a watershed in bringing together political commitment and cultural manifestations—music, lifestyle, and appearance.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Rebellion against established norms, institutions, and the bureaucracy, political commitment, a critical attitude, radicalism, the demand for change, rebellion against traditional morality.

APPEARANCE: The principle "make your own statement," of violating all norms, excessiveness and aggressiveness, torn pants, T-shirts saying "Fuck off," "My way," miniskirts, short aggressively dyed hair combed up straight, leather, the color black, mesh stockings, gaudy details—safety pins, dog collars and chains, black sunglasses, old sport coats, heavy makeup, and badges.

MUSIC: At the beginning the groups "Sex Pistols," "Damned," "Clash," "Sioxie and the Banshees," in our country "Pankrti," later stratification, a loss of distinctiveness in style and the emergence of subspecies, hardcore, for example.

BEHAVIOR: Collective spitting at concerts, contemptuous attitude, "a state of spiritual absence," dances—the Pogo and the Robot.

MEETING PLACES: So-called ghettos because of social repression, punk concerts, and at one time the clubs "Kulucic" and "Lapidarij," where concerts were given.

Sminkeri

SIGNIFICANCE: Most important are appearance, making a statement, great interest in esthetic values and especially money.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Conformism, elitism, preference for status symbols, power and prestige, concentration on material values, apolitical attitude, adaptiveness, society is perceived as an audience, reproduction of parental values.

APPEARANCE: Elegance, expensiveness, modernity, refined details, importance of the trendy trademark.

MUSIC: There is no official music of the sminkeri, they go for the current hits, elektro-pop, and disco.

BEHAVIOR: "Behavior after the example of the world around," they like to charm, to draw attention, to win approval, to organize a "party," not a bash, the girls stick together and gossip.

MEETING PLACES: Recent little cafes and disco clubs, "Saloon."

Fans

SIGNIFICANCE: Passionate commitment to one team to which they also symbolically belong and in whose wins and losses they participate emotionally, large numbers, marked aggressiveness, worship of the team but not the players, so that there are the followers of the Dinamo soccer team known as the Bad Blue Boys, the followers of the Crvena Zvezda soccer team known as the Red Devils, and the followers of the Hajduk soccer team known as Torcida.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Identification with the team, they are not critical of their stars when they get rich and fade away, they glorify strength, masculinity, and bravery and ethnic prejudices (according to a study of Dragan Popadic) as a kind of cult, contempt for intellectualism, fanaticism, and traditionalism.

APPEARANCE: Nothing specific, except that at games they wave banners, caps, and other symbols of their teams, they are recruited or belong to other subcultural groups as well.

MUSIC: Same as above.

BEHAVIOR: They follow all the sports periodicals, they always defend their team, and they are ready to get in a quarrel because of it, they swear loyalty to their team "to the last breath," they write graffiti, after their team wins, they march down the middle of the street shouting and singing, they drink, that is part of the game ritual, the more extreme ones clutter their houses with blue or red forks and plates, they paint their walls the color of their team.

MEETING PLACES: A few hours before the game they gather either in neighborhood or stadium cafes, frequently even on soccer fields.

Darkari

SIGNIFICANCE: Specific Zagreb subcultural group that arose as the result of the general crisis of society, the family, and the value system in which it is difficult to satisfy one's own needs, a product of inflation, general helplessness, and the discrepancy between expectations and possibilities, a consequence of frustration and the impossibility of making an active response, a very heterogeneous group that has not been studied.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Emphasis on hopelessness, irrationality, chaotic value system, exhibitionism, flight into mysticism, intellectualism, and nihilism.

APPEARANCE: The color 'black' (which Spaso Cankovic says is a higher level of estheticism) and the predominance of form.

MUSIC: Alternative music, the groups "Sisters of Mercy," "Bauhaus," "Joy Division," and "Mizar" of Skopje; this term does not exist in the world, something similar in Great Britain is referred to as "Gothic."

BEHAVIOR: They read Baudelaire, Poe, Camus, and Sartre, they withdraw into their own world, they are peaceful, they go to school regularly and to quiet parties.

MEETING PLACES: In 1980—KSET, in 1984—Jabuka, where there was a place to listen to dark music, and in 1987/88—the Lapidarij on Tuesdays.

Skins

SIGNIFICANCE: A copy of European skinheads in the late sixties and of the domestic authentic patriarchal fan subculture, a quite recent group, not widespread at present.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Collectivism, aggressiveness, glorification of masculinity and aggressiveness, ethnic prejudices, passion for soccer.

APPEARANCE: Short green jackets with orange lining, short haircuts, they carry the Confederate flags.

OTHER: Relative.

Hard-Core

SIGNIFICANCE: A blend of punk music and "peace and love" ideology, sprang up as an answer to the dying out of punk as a desperate attempt to reestablish it, radicalized punk, heterogeneous, disagreement among theoreticians.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Political, commitment whether in the peace movement, the environment movement, or other areas, no recognition of authority, not even those on the alternative scene.

APPEARANCE: At the beginning of 1983—black leather jackets from which they hung things and on which they wrote things, militance, uniformity (Marijan Ogrinc), but today plaid shirts, blue jeans, deliberate everyday appearance (Benjamin Perasovic).

MUSIC: Hard and harsh sound, raspy singing, groups "Disorder," "Vrisak generacija."

BEHAVIOR: Pronounced fanzine culture, they do not eat meat, the most agile Zagreb hard-cores do the program "Independence" on Youth Radio.

MEETING PLACES: Concerts and clubs.

Fans of Newly Composed Folk Music

SIGNIFICANCE: A quite recent group that has sprung up in an urban environment, but with strong reliance on rural, patriarchal, and traditional values, heterogeneous and unstudied.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Passivity, nostalgia, formalism, dominance of the material over the spiritual, glorification of the family, marriage, and emotions, apolitical, uncommitted.

APPEARANCE: No particular outward signs, ready-made clothing, the style associated with Trieste.

MUSIC: Newly composed folk music—Lepa Brena, Vesna Zmijanac, Nada Obric, Halid Muslimovic....

BEHAVIOR: They read the yellow press, they go to athletic events, they like sitcoms, Ckalja, Snezana Savic, they regularly follow the television schedule, they copy their parents in later years, they do not stand out, they melt into the crowd.

MEETING PLACES: Not specific—movie theaters, cafes, and parties at home.

Yuppies

SIGNIFICANCE: "Young urban professional people" emerged in America and are not very widespread in our country, since the conditions simply do not exist for their development, implies youth, success, professionalism on the job, and life in the city, mainly technomangers and academic degrees.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Up-to-date ideologists refer to them as the bourgeois right, they have a preference for professional status symbols, intellectualism, industrious materialism, formalism, cosmopolitanism.

APPEARANCE: Trendy, but no particular emphasis on anything except details which are "in" at the moment, for example, a Rolex watch, a Versace dress if it is in fashion, "Missoni" shoes.

MUSIC: Determined by the current trend, new and up-to-date.

BEHAVIOR: They read trendy and up-to-date magazines, they buy well-advertised items, they study foreign languages, they go to college, they travel around the world, they go to fashionable ski resorts, they surround

themselves with expensive things—VCR, [linijama] ...but only particular trendy brands, they furnish and decorate their apartments impeccably.

MEETING PLACES: At home, restaurants, trendy places.

Alternativists

SIGNIFICANCE: Formed of subcultural groups in their later years, represent their constructive extremes, unstudied.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Activism, political, commitment in ecological, peace, or feminist movements, passivism, creativity, intellectualism.

APPEARANCE: Highly diverse.

MUSIC: Alternative, varied.

BEHAVIOR: Participation in radio programs, involvement in the theater, the film, or newspapers.

MEETING PLACES: Places associated with the arts, the Youth Culture Center, "101."

Heavy Metal Fans

SIGNIFICANCE: Heavy metal rock—a powerful form of rock based on repetition of standard guitar phrases.

WORLD OUTLOOK: A strange mix of hippy esthetics and the passion of the soccer fan (Hebidge).

APPEARANCE: Long hair parted in the middle, blue jeans and loose sweatshirts, impression of being a bit sloppy, hunched-over walk, appearance of being lost.

MUSIC: "Divlje Jagode" [Wild Strawberries], "Iron Maiden."

BEHAVIOR: Group life, at concerts they play an imaginary guitar, mild drug use.

MEETING PLACES: At one time the Student Center and Big Ben, today there are very few of them, and they have no permanent places.

Hackers

SIGNIFICANCE: Computer buffs, a product of the new information age and technological revolution in the world, heterogeneous, and amorphous.

WORLD OUTLOOK: Activism, creativity in the technical sciences, they devote their life to the search for truth and discovery of the new, they call for a strengthening of society's technological and material foundation, fanaticism and a blinding fascination with computers, creativity.

APPEARANCE: Diverse.

MUSIC: Not the reason that brings them together, so it is also diverse, since hackers may also belong to other groups.

BEHAVIOR: They spend a lot, they talk little, and when they decide to communicate the topic is mainly informatics, programs, computer languages.

MEETING PLACES: Computer centers and all the rest.

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